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I. NLRB JURISDICTION
A. Religious Schools: Catholic Bishop of Chicago
In 1970, the National Labor Relations Board [NLRB or Board] ended its
long-standing refusal to assert jurisdiction over non-profit educational institu-
tions. In Cornell University, the Board announced, "we shall no longer decline
to assert jurisdiction over such institutions as a class."' Despite this new as-
sertion of jurisdiction, the Board continued to decline jurisdiction over
church-operated schools.' The NLRB refused to assert jurisdiction over
organizations "primarily religious and noncommercial in character and pur-
pose, whose educational endeavors are limited essentially to furthering and
nurturing their religious beliefs." In 1975, however, the Board refined its
jurisdictional standard and embarked upon a policy of accepting jurisdiction
over church-operated schools which it characterized as merely "religiously as-
sociated," rather than as "completely religious." 4
 If instruction in the school
was not limited to religious subjects, but sought to provide a general educa-
tion, the NLRB would accept jurisdiction. 5
' Cornell University, 183 N.L.R.B. 329, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269 (1970). In that case
the Board made the following announcement: "We adhere to the view that the Board
has statutory jurisdiction over nonprofit educational institutions whose operations af-
fect commerce. But we shall no longer decline to assert jurisdiction over such institu-
tions as a class." Id. at 331, 74 L.R.R.M. 1269.
2
 See, e.g., Association of Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210
N.L.R.B. 1053, 1058, 86 L.R.R.M. 1249, 1250 (1974); Board of Jewish Educ., 210
N.L.R.B. 1037, 1037, 86 L.R.R.M. 1253, 1253 (1974).
" Board of Jewish Educ., 210 N.L.R.B. 1037, 1037, 86 L.R.R.M. at 1253 (a
nonprofit organization "operated for the sole purpose of furthering Jewish education
among the Jewish population in the Greater Washington area"); see also, Association of
Hebrew Teachers of Metropolitan Detroit, 210 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1056, 86 L.R.R.M.
1249, 1249 (a nonprofit organization operated for the sole purpose of providing "edu-
cational facilities for the study of the Hebrew language, a knowledge of the Jewish
religion, and an appreciation of Jewish culture").
Roman Catholic Archdioses of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 88 L.R.R.M.
1169 (1975), the Board, in ordering a representational election for the lay teachers in
five Catholic high schools, stated.
the Archdiocese also contends that the Board should not assert its juris-
diction because of its religious character. However, the Board's policy in
the past has been to decline jurisdiction over similar institutions only when
they arc completely religious, not just religiously associated, and the Archdiocese
concedes that instruction is not limited to religious subjects. That the Arch-
diocese seeks to provide an education based on Christian principles does
not lead 10 a contrary conclusion. Most religiously associated institutions
seek to operate in conformity with their religious tenets.
Id. at 250, 88 L.R.R.M. at 1171 (emphasis added). See also, Roman Catholic Archbishop
of the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218, 92 L.R.R.M. 1114, 1116
(1976).
5 See, e.g., Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 249,
88 L.R.R.M. 1169, 1170 (five Catholic high schools whose instruction was not limited
solely to religious education); and Roman Catholic Archbishop of the Archdiocese of
Los Angeles, 223 N.L.R.B. 1218, 1218, 92 L.R.R.M. 1114, 1116 (twenty-six Catholic
high schools which perform in part the secular function of educating children, and in
part concern themselves with religious instruction).
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The Board's "completely religious" /"religiously associated" dichotomy re-
mained unscathed until 1977. In that year, the District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania, in Caufield v. Hirsch," ruled that the NLRB's assertion
of jurisdiction over "religiously associated" schools violated the first amend-
ment 7
 principle of separation of church and state." The court noted that the
"secular characteristics of the schools are so intertwined with the schools' re-
ligious mission, that they blend imperceptibly one into the other."" The
Caufield court concluded that the Board's attempt to regulate those schools
with substantial secular activity' could interfere with the schools' exercise of
religious freedom guaranteed under the first amendment, and therefore was
invalid.'"
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court directly confronted this con-
flict presented by the NLRB policy and the district court's decision. In NLRB
v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago," a closely divided Court held that the National
Labor Relations Act 12 [NLRA or the Act] does not give the NLRB jurisdiction
over lay teachers in church-operated schools that teach both religious and
secular subjects." Significantly, the Supreme Court settled the potential con-
flict between the NLRB's jurisdiction and the first amendment by a narrow
interpretation of the NLRA provisions and, therefore, did not reach the
constitutional issues presented by the case.
The dispute in Catholic Bishop involved lay teachers at two groups of
Catholic high schools who petitioned the NLRB to hold representation elec-
tions at their places of employment." These religiously-sponsored high
schools sought to provide a traditional secular education, but oriented to the
tenets of the Roman Catholic faith; religious training at the schools was man-
datory.'" The schools challenged the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over
" No. 76-279, 95 L.R.R.M. 3164 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
7 The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in relevant
part: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or pro-
hibiting the free exercise thereof ....- U.S. Coss.r. amend. 1.
Id. at 3169-79.
1 ' Id. at 3176.
'" Id. at 3179. The court stated:
The entangling relationships which can arise under the NLRA appear in a
wide variety of wars. Because Cher may result in numerous conflicts and
confrontations between the NLRB and the church schools, they are, in my
mind, excessive and, therefore, not permissible within the meaning of the
first amendment.
Id.
" 440 U.S. 490 (1979).
12 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
1" 440 U.S. at 507.
14 Id. at 493.
15 One group of schools is operated by the Catholic Bishop of Chicago. Id. at
492. These schools have been termed "minor seminaries- because of their role in
educating high school students who may desire to become priests. Id. While at One
time these schools took only those students who had manifested a confirmed desire to
become priests, the school policy no longer requires such a definite inclination toward
priesthood. Id. Now the students need only to be recommended by a parish priest as
having a potential for priesthood. N. In addition to providing special religious instruc-
tion not offered in other Catholic secondary schools, the schools also offer essentially
the same college preparatory curriculum as public secondary schools. Id.
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their employment practices on both statutory and constitutional grounds."
The Board rejected these jurisdictional arguments, explaining that its policy
was to decline jurisdiction over church-operated schools "only when they are
completely religious, not just religiously associated."" Because neither group
of schools fell within the Board's "completely religious" category, the Board
ordered elections," in which the unions prevailed." When the schools re-
fused to recognize or to bargain with the unions, the schools were found
guilty by the Board of unfair labor practices."
The schools challenged the Board's orders in petitions to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.. 2 ' That. court concluded that, from the ini-
tial act of certifying a union as the bargaining agent for lay teachers, the
Board's actions impinged upon the freedom of church authorities to shape
and direct teaching in accord with the requirements of their religion." The
appeals court reasoned that if a church-run school is required by the first
amendment to finance its activities without government aid because of reli-
gious permeation of its curriculum, then that same school also should be free of
The other group of schools is operated by the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend.
Id. Unlike the schools operated by the Bishop of Chicago, the special recommendation
of a priest is not a prerequisite for admission. Id. at 492-93. Like the Bishop of
Chicago's schools, however, these schools seek to provide a traditional secular educa-
tion but oriented to the tenets of the Roman Catholic faith; religious training is also
mandatory. Id. at 493.
1" The schools challenged the NLRB's assertion of jurisdiction on two
grounds: (a) that they do not fall within the Board's discretionary jurisdictional
criteria; and (b) the religion clauses of the first amendment preclude the Board's juris-
dict ion. Id.
" Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. 359, 359, 90 L.R.R.M. 1225, 1225
(1975), citing Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore. 216 N.L.R.B. 249, 88
L.R.R.M. 1169 (1975). The decision concerning the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South
Bend, Inc., is not reported. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 493 n.6.
'" Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 220 N.L.R.B. at 360, 90 L.R.R.M. at 1226. The
decision concerning the Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., is not reported.
Catholic. Bishop, 440 U.S. at 493 n.0.
" Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 494.
2" Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 224 N.L.R.B. 1221, 1223, 92 L.R.R.M. 1553,
1553 (1976); Diocese of Fort Wayne-South Bend, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1226, 1229, 92
l„R.R.M. 1550, 1551 (1976).
Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 95 L.R.R.M, 3324 (7th
Cir. 1977).
" Id. at 1 1 1 8, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3329. The court of appeals explained:
At some point, factual inquiry by courts or agencies into such matters
[separating secular from religious training] would almost necessarily .
 raise
First Amendment problems. If history demonstrates, as it does, that
Roman Catholics founded an alternative school system for essentially re-
ligious reasons and continued to maintain them as an "integral part of the
religious mission of the Catholic Church," Lemon a. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
616 (1971), courts and agencies would be hard pressed to take official or
judicial notice that these purposes were undermined or eviscerated by the
determination to offer such secular subjects as mathematics, physics,
chemistry, and English literature.
Id. "The real difficulty is found in the chilling aspect that the requirement of bar-
gaining will impose on the exercise of the bishops' control of the religious mission of
the schools." Id, at 1124, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3334.
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the inhibiting impact of the restrictions of the NLRA. 2 " Both the free exer-
cise and the establishment clauses of the first amendment, the court con-
cluded, must foreclose the Board's jurisdiction over church-run schools."
Thus, the court of appeals denied enforcement. of the Board's orders. 25
The Supreme Court granted certiorari.'" The Chief justice, writing for
a closely-divided Court, affirmed the court of appeals' decision, but, on differ-
ent grounds." The analysis of the Court began with the proposition that an
Act of Congress ought not to be construed to violate the Constitution if any
other possible construction remains available." 28 Accordingly, the Court de-
termined that if it should find that. the Board's exercise of jurisdiction would
give rise to serious constitutional questions, there must he shown "the affirma-
tive intention of Congress clearly expressed" before a conclusion that the
NLRA grams such jurisdiction would be warranted. 2 "
In the next step of its analysis, the Court concluded that the Board's
exercise of jurisdiction over church-operated schools would, in fact, involve
serious first amendment questions." Looking to the Supreme Court decision
of Lemon v. Kurtzman,"I the Court noted that even in merely religiously as-
sociated schools "Heligious authority necessarily pervades the school sys-
tem."" 2 The Court also noted that, in this system teachers play a "key
role." ' ; Since teachers are central to the operation of the school system, the
Court concluded that the Board's assertion of jurisdiction on their behalf
would create an impermissible risk of excessive governmental entanglement in
2 " Id. at 1130, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3339. The court noted that "an evenhanded
approach to justice might seem to suggest that the Religion Clauses, serving as they do
as a buckler to stop financial aid to these schools should not now be any less effective
to ward off the inhibiting effect of governmental regulation here involved. - Id. at.
1131, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3340.
2-1 1,./.
35 Id. Circuit Judge Sprecher, writing a concurring opinion, added:
[Tihe National Labor Relations Board, in attempting to steer a course be-
tween the Scylla and Charybdis of the Establishment and Free Exercise
Clauses, has collided with one and fallen into the other. The Board's asser-
tion of jurisdiction will have the effect of inhibiting the practice of religion
by regulating it. yet by conceding that this will inexorably force it to "ac-
commodate" and prefer religious employers and conversely to discriminate
against secular employers in like situations, it will in the constitutional sense
"establish" the religions with which it deals.
2" NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 434 U.S. 1061 (1978).
27 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 507. The Chief justice was joined by Justices
Stewart, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens.
2"
 Id. at 500, citing Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804).
2" 440 U.S. at 501.
3" Id. at 501-04.
403 U.S. 602 (1971).
32
 Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501 (quoting Lemon, 403 U.S. at 617).
33 The Court pointed out: The key role played by teachers in such a school
system has been the predicate for our conclusions that governmental aid channeled
through leachers creates an impermissible risk of excessive governmental entangle-
ment in the affairs of church-operated schools." 440 U.S. at 501.
Id.
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the affairs of church-operated schools. t4 For example, any exercise by the
Board of its broad investigatory powers would allow that agency to focus
upon the internal and constitutionally protected affairs of the religious
employer." 5
 Further, because nearly everything that happens in a school af-
fects the teachers, the mandatory duty to bargain over "conditions of
employment" would represent an encroachment upon the former autono-
mous position of religious management."" The Court concluded, therefore,
that an exercise of jurisdiction would raise serious constitutional questions.
Because there exists a significant risk of constitutional infringement, the
Court, in the last phase of its analysis, turned to an examination of the NLRA
to determine whether it must be read to confer jurisdiction over church-run
Id. at 504.
"' The Court. explained:
The Board argues that it can avoid excessive entanglement since it will
resolve only factual issues such as whether an anti-union animus motivated
an employer's action. But at this stage of our consideration we are not
compelled to determine whether the entanglement is excessive as we would
were we considering the constitutional issue. Rather, we make a narrow
inquiry whether the exercise of the Board's jurisdiction presents a signifi-
cant risk that the First Amendment will be infringed.
Moreover, it is already clear that the Board's actions will go beyond
resolving factual issues. The Court. of Appeals' opinion refers to charges of
unfair labor practices filed against religous schools. 559 F.2d at 1125,
1126. The court observed that in those cases the schools had responded
that their challenged actions were mandated by their religious creeds. The
resolution of such charges by the Board, in many instances, will necessarily
involve inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by the clergy-
administrators and its relationship to the school's religious mission. It is not
only the conclusions that may be reached by the Board which may impinge
on rights guaranteed by the Religion Clauses, but the very process of in-
quiry leading to findings and conclusions.
Id. at 502 (footnote omitted).
"" The Court summarized the problems involved in the duty to bargain over
"conditions of employment" as follows:
The Board will be called upon to decide what are "terms and conditions of
employment" and therefore mandatory subjects of bargaining. See 29
§ 158(d). Although the Board has not interpreted that phrase as it
relates to educational institutions, similar state provisions provide insight.
into the effect of mandatory bargaining. The Oregon Court of Appeals
noted that "nearly everything that goes on in the schools affects teachers
and is therefore arguably a 'condition of employment.' Springfield Educa-
tion Asia v. Springfield School Dist, No. 19, 24 Ore. App. 751, 759, 547 P.2d
647, 650 (1976).
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court aptly summarized the effect of
mandatory bargaining when it observed that the "introduction of a concept
of mandatory collective bargaining, regardless of how narrowly the scope
of negotiation is defined, necessarily represents an encroachment upon the
former autonomous position of management." Pennsylvania Labor Relations
Board v, Stale College Area School Dist., 461 Pa. 494, 504. 337 A.2d 262, 267
(1975). Cf, Clark County School Dist. v. Local Government Employee-Management
Relations Board, 90 Nev. 442, 447, 530 P.2d 114, 117-18 0974). See M.
Lieberman & M. Moskow, COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TEACHERS
221-47 (1966). inevitably the Board's inquiry will implicate sensitive issues
that open the door to conflicts between clergy-administrators and the
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schools." Looking to the NLRA" and its legislative history, 3" the Court
found no "affirmative intention of Congress clearly expressed" to conclude
that the Act covers church-operated schools. Accordingly, the Court declined
to construe the Act in a manner that could in turn call upon the Court to
resolve difficult and sensitive questions arising out of the guarantees of the
first amendment religion clauses.'" Thus, the Court held that the NLRA
does not give the Board jurisdiction over lay teachers in church-run schools
that teach both religious and secular subjects.'"
A dissenting opinion was filed by Justice Brennan." The dissent began
by expressing concern that the Court's attempt to avoid unnecessary consti-
tutional decisions by requiring a "clear expression of affirmative intention of
Congress" allows the Court "virtually [to] remake congressional enact-
ments." 43
 While the dissenting justices agreed that statutes should he con-
strued to avoid unnecessary constitutional issues," these justices believed that
the correct canon for construing statutes wherein constitutional questions may
lurk is: "[w]hen the validity of an act of Congress is drawn in question, and
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle
that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly
possible by which the question may be avoided."''' Analyzing the case under
this standard of statutory construction, the dissent concluded that the inter-
pretation announced by the Court is not "fairly possible," since the Court's
construction is "plainly wrong in light of the Act's language, its legislative his-
tory, and this Court's precedents." 46
The dissenting opinion maintained that the instant situation was clearly
encompassed within the provisions of the NLRA. Section 2(2) of the NLRA,'"
Board, or conflicts with negotiators for unions.
Id. at 502-03.
37 Id. at 504-07.
"8 Id. at 504. Interestingly, the Court concluded that there is no clear expres-
sion of an affirmative intention to include church-run schools within the jurisdiction of
the Board, without ever quoting or citing to the relevant jurisdictional provisions of
the NLRA. Compare the analysis of the dissent: see text and notes at notes 47-49 infra.
"" For discussion of relevant legislative history, see 440 U.S. at 504-06.
4" Id. at 507.
4' Id .
42 Id. at 508. justice Brennan was joined by Justices White, Marshall and
Blackmun. Id.
l" justice Brennan explained:
The Court requires that there be a "clear expression of an affirmative in- .
tention of Congress - before it will bring within the coverage of a broadly
worded regulatory statute certain persons whose coverage might raise
constitutional questions. Ante, at 504. But those familiar with the legislative
process know that explicit expressions of congressional intent. in such
broadly inclusive statutes are not cminnonplace. Thus, by strictly or loosely
applying its requirement, the Court can virtually remake congressional
enactments.
Id. at 509.
" Id. at 508-09.
45 Id. at 510 (quoting Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749-50 (1961) (em-
phasis in original)).
4" 440 U.S. at 508, 511.
" 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976).
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the dissent noted, specifically limits the exceptions to the term "employer." 48
The dissenting justices noted that the NLRA, therefore, must cover all
employers except those falling within one of the eight express exceptions,
none of which excludes church-run schools. 45 The dissenting justices also
believed that the legislative history of the NLRA supports this clear import of
the board statutory definition of "employers." 8° The dissent also claimed
that the Court's interpretation is contrary to its own precedents. 51 Earlier
cases, the dissent pointed out, had consistently held that in passing the NLRA,
Congress intended to vest in the Board the fullest jurisdictional breadth
constitutionally permissible under the commerce clause. 52 Thus, as long as
an employer was within the reach of congressional power under the com-
merce clause, that employer would be covered by the NLRA regardless of the
nature of his activity."
Hence, the dissent would hold that the NLRA includes within its coverage
lay teachers employed by church-operated schools, and that the constitutional
questions presented under the first amendment should be reached. 54 The
dissenting justices, however, did not then address these constitutional issues.
The dissent failed to discuss these issues because the Court did not do so."
The implications of the Catholic Bishop decision with regard to NLRB
jurisdiction over lay teachers in church-operated schools are apparent. The
Court has settled the lower courts' uneasiness with the constitutional aspects
of the NLRB's "completely religious"/"religiously associated" test, by holding
that. the NLRA does not give the Board jurisdiction over lay teachers in
church-run schools that teach both religious and secular subjects. Beyond
church-operated schools, however, the ramifications of Catholic Bishop on the
NLRB's jurisdiction are not quite as clear. As was mentioned by the dissenting
justices, the Court has broken its own line of precedent which had construed
the NLRA as conferring jurisdiction over all employers (except those specifi-
cally excluded in the section 2(2) definition of "employer"), provided they are
within the reach of congressional power under the commerce clause." After
1 " 440 U.S. at 511. Section 2(2) provides that the term employer shall include:
any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
shall not include the United States or any wholly owned Government corpo-
ration, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision
thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from
time to time, or any labor organization (other than one acting as an
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of an officer or agent of such
labor organization.
29 U.S.C. § 152 (1976) (emphasis in dissenting opinion).
4" 440 U.S. ai. 511.
5" Id. at 511-16.
51 Id. at 516.
52 Id., citing NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Corp., 371 U.S. 224, 226 (1963); Guss
v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 3 (1956); Polish Alliance v. Labor Bd., 322 U.S. 643,
647-48 (1944); Labor Bd. v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).
440 U.S. at 516.
54 Id. at 517,
55 Id. at 518.
5" See text and notes at notes 51-53 supra. For discussion of section 2(2) of the
NLRA which defines employer see text and notes at notes 47-49 supra.
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Catholic Bishop, that an employer is within the reach of Congress under the
commerce clause does riot necessarily mean that he is within the jurisdiction
of the NLRA, at least where inclusion presents serious constitutional ques-
tions. This present policy is a far cry from the all-inclusive interpretation of
the NLRA suggested in earlier Supreme Court decisions.
The most significant aspect of Catholic Bishop, however, lies outside the
labor relations field. As was pointed out in Justice Brennan's dissent, the
Court has made a substantial change in the general principle of construing
statutes to avoid unnecessary constitutional decisions.''' The former standard
of such statutory construction, according to Justice Brennan, was that statutes
would be construed to avoid constitutional questions provided such a con-
struction is "fairly possible. - 58 The standard of construction used in the
majority opinion, however, states the statutes will be construed to avoid
constitutional issues, unless the court. can find the "affirmative intention of
Congress clearly expressed" prohibiting such a construction.'" The differ-
ences in these two standards of construction are more than semantic. As the
division of the Court in Catholic Bishop evidences, the majority's new standard
gives the courts much more freedom in construing statutes to avoid unneces-
sary constitutional decisions. The dissenting justices believe that the majority's
standard of statutory construction will allow courts "virtually [to] remake con-
gressional enactments.""" Whether the fears of the dissenters will be realized
remains to be seen.
B. Unemployment Benefits to Strikers:
New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor
The preemption doctrine, designed to give effect to the supremacy clause
of the Constitution,' provides that the Constitution, laws and treaties of the
United States shall take precedence over contrary or conflicting state legisla-
tion. As such, the doctrine directly reflects the intent of Congress. 2 If Con-
gress indicates in enacting a law that it sees no conflict between that law and
51 See text and notes at notes 43-45 supra.
58 See text. and note at note 45 supra.
See text and note at note 29 supra. The same test presumably would apply
to the intent of state legislatures where state statutes are involved.
"" See note at note 43 supra.
' The supremacy clause declares:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be hound thereby, any Thing in
the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
2 lit preemption cases, "Whe purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone. -
Retail Clerks Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn. 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963). Even where there
is no express preemption, any proper application of the doctrine must give effect to
the intent of Congress. Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497. 504 (1978).
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state legislation, or that it is willing to permit a possible conflict, it cannot be
said later that the "supremacy -
 of the federal law is threatened by the state
legislation. In the area of stale grants of unemployment. benefits to strikers,
however, Congress did not indicate a clear intent. that the National Labor
Relations Act " [NLRA or Ihe Act.] be exclusive.' Thus, this issue has been
surrounded with confusion and, in recent years, federal courts have split in
determining whether the NLRA implicitly preempts state statutes which pro-
vide unemployment compensation to sinking workers.'
During the Survey year, the Supreme Court confronted this issue in New
York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor" and concluded that
the states are free to grant unemployment benefits to strikers.' The Court
upheld the states' right to provide these benefits to strikers, despite the poten-
tial impact such state action may have on the balance of bargaining power
between unions and management. While the Supreme Court's resolution of
the conflict regarding state grants of unemployment. benefits to strikers is
clearly noteworthy, the impact of this case on other areas of conflict between
state statutes and the NLRA is limited due to the varied approaches taken by
the Justices in reaching their decision.
Prior to the New York Telephone decision federal courts had struggled to
determine, through two conflicting labor preemption approaches and scant
legislative history, the status of state statutes granting unemployment benefits
to strikers. The basic standard for determining whether state statutes are
preempted by the NLRA was established in San Diego Building Trades Council
v. Cannon." In Cannon, the Supreme Court determined that the states may
3
 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976).
For background on the issue of preemption of unemployment benefits or
welfare benefits to st•kers. see Note, Federal Preemption of Slate Welfare and Unemployment
Benefits for Strikers, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. Riv. 441 (1977). For background on labor
preemption doctrine in general, see Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 H,\Rv.
REV. 1337 (1972).
5
 The holdings in the district courts were far from unanimous. State laws in
Hawaii and New York which allowed payment of benefits to strikers under certain
circumstances were found preempted. See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept.
of Labor, 434 F. Supp. 810, 824, 95 L.R.R.M. 2487, 2497 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Hawaiian
Telephone Co. v. State of Hawaii Dept. of Labor and Indus. Relations, 405 F. Supp.
275, 290, 90 L.R.R.M. 2854, 2865 (D. Hawaii 1976). The state law in Rhode Island,
which also alltiived payment of unemployment compensation to strikers under certain
circumstances, was not found preempted. See Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 344 F. Stipp.
749, 754, 80 L.R.R.N.I. 3167, 3170 (D.R.1. 1972).
The opinions in the appellate courts on this question also were divided. The Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit vacated the trial court's denial of a preliminary in-
junction and reversed and remanded with instructions concerning the challenge to
Rhode Island Unemployment Compensation law. Grinnell v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449,
461, 82 l.„R.R.M. 2986, 2996 (1973). The Second Circuit also reversed the district
court and found the New York Unemployment Compensation Law not preempted.
New York Tel. Co. v. New York Dept. of Labor, 566 F.2d 388, 395-96, 96 L.R.R.M.
2921, 2926-27 (2d Cir. 1977).
440 U.S. 519 (1979).
Ld. at 545-46.
8 359 U.S. 236 (1959). For a discussion of Garmon, see Cox, Labor Law Preemp-
tion Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1337, 1348-51 (1972).
96	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:85
not regulate conduct which arguably is protected or prohibited by the
NLRA." Since the NLRA does not protect or prohibit the payment of un-
employment. benefits to strikers, state statutes do not appear to be preempted.
The Court in Gannon also established an exception to its basic approach to-
ward NLRA preemption. "Where the regulated conduct. touched interests so
deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility" the Court would not infer
that Congress had deprived the states of the power to act "in the absence of
compelling congressional direction." " Because the payment of unemploy-
ment benefits may "touch interests deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibil-
ity" and because there is an "absence of compelling congressional direction,"
the states may be free to act. Unions and states argued that under Gannon.
preemption and the deeply rooted in local feeling exception, the states
were free to grant unemployment benefits to strikers. This exception, how-
ever, has been narrowly construed to apply only to cases in which a state
sought. to protect its citizens from violence," libel," and intentional infliction
of mental distress." Employers, therefore, argued that the deeply rooted in
local feeling exception did not sanction state grants of unemployment benefits
to strikers.
A second approach to NLRA preemption of state laws was developed by
the Court in Local 20, Teamsters Union v. Morton 14 and Lodge 76, Ina Ass'n of
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.'
These cases surpassed the Garman approach, by finding that some conduct,
which was neither arguably protected nor prohibited by the NLRA, neverthe-
• 359 U.S. at 244-45.
" id. at 244.
" Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131, 139 (1957).
I1 1.11111 v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114. 383 U.S. 53, 62 (1966).
" Farmer v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 304-05 (1977).
'4 377 U.S. 252 (1964). In Morton, the Court considered Ohio's attempt to
award compensatory damages to an employer for a union's attempt «) induce custom-
ers and suppliers to cease dealing with their employer during a strike. Id. at 253-55.
The Union conceded that its activity, which was neither protected by § 7 nor prohib-
ited by § 8 of the NLRA, fell outside of the NLRB's jurisdiction. Id. at 258. The
Court. however, held the state's award of damages preempted by the NLRA. Id. at.
259-60. The Court reasoned that such state interference would frustrate a congres-
sional determination to leave this weapon of self-help available to striking employees
and thereby would upset the balance of power between labor and management ex-
pressed in the NLRA.
1 ' 427 U.S. 132 (1976). In Machinists, the Court reconsidered a Wisconsin
Employment Relations Board holding that a union's concerted refusal to work over-
time during negotiations was an unfair labor practice according to state law. Id. at 135.
The Court held the state regulation was preempted by the NLRA, despite the union's
conduct being neither protected by § 7 nor prohibited by § 8 of' the NLRA, and there-
fore outside the jurisdiction of the NLRB. Id. at 135, 150-51. The Court rested this
decision upon a finding that a basic purpose of federal lab(ur law is to strike a balance
of power between labor and management (id. at 146) through a combination of "pro-
tection, prohibition, and laissez-faire in respect to union organization, collective
bargaining, and labor disputes. - Id. at 140 n.4. Therefore, even though Congress had
not explicitly regulated such conduct, the state was "denying one party to an economic
contest a weapon that Congress meant him to have available." Id. at 150. For further
discussion of the Morton and Machinists branch of labor law preemption, see Note, Labor
Law—Preemption, 18 B.C. L. REV. 494 (1977).
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less was not subject to state regulation. The Court in Morton and Machinists
determined that Congress intended some conduct to be free from all gov-
ernmental regulation—both federal and state. In both Morton and Machinists
the Court noted that, "[i]n selecting which forms of economic pressure should
be prohibited .. . , Congress fin the Labor Act] struck the 'balance ... be-
tween the uncontrolled power of management and labor to further their re-
spective interests.' " 16
 In other words, Congress in the NLRA protected some
conduct, prohibited some conduct, and intentionally left some conduct free of
regulation. Under Morton and Machinists the NLRA preempts state regulation
in the areas which Congress intended to be free from regulation; in these
areas, states may not upset the established balance." While Morton seemed to
require a case-by-case analysis in which evidence that Congress actually has
focused on a particular activity is needed, Machinists expanded this analysis
into a per se rule that Congress will be presumed to have intended all
economic self-help activities which it chose nor to prohibit to be free of regu-
lation by the states.' 8
 Under the Morton and Machinists preemption approach,
state provision of unemployment benefits to strikers would be prohibited since
the availability or expectation of benefits alters the economic balance of the
employer and union.' 9
In addition to an analysis of the two approaches to labor preemption, the
issue of federal preemption of state grants of unemployment benefits to strik-
ers involves an analysis of the congressional purpose underlying the Social
Security Act. State unemployment compensation statutes are a part of a joint
federal-state program under Title IX of the Social Security Act. 20 Accord-
ingly, congressional intent on the preemption issue may be gleaned from that
Act.. 2 ' Unfortunately the legislative history of both the Social Security Act
and the NLRA are largely silent on the issue of unemployment benefits to
strikers.
'" Machinists, 427 U.S. at 146 (quoting Morton. 377 U.S. at 258-59).
' 7
 427 U.S. at 150.
18 See Note, Federal Preemption of Stale Welfare and Unemplorment Benefits for
Strikers, 12 HAM'. C.R.-C.L. L. RE. v. 441, 447 (1977).
19 See New York Tel. Co. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 434 F. Supp. 810,
813-14, 95 L.R.R.M. 2487, 2489 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); and Hawaiian Tel. Co. v. State of
Hawaii Dept. of Labor and Indus. Relations, 405 F. Supp. 275, 282. 90 L.R.R.M. 2854,
2859 (D. Hawaii 1976).
20
 49 Slat. 639, as amended and recodifiecl as the Federal Unemployment Tax
Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 501 et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1976).
In broad outline, the federal scheme imposes a tax on employers which the States may
mitigate, as all have done, by establishing their own unemployment programs. 26
U.S.C. § 3301 (1976). State programs qualified by the Secretary of Labor are then
eligible for federal funds. 42 U.S.C. §§ 501-503 (1976).
It is noteworthy that the NLRA and the Social Security Act were considered
in Congress simultaneously, and were enacted into law in the summer of 1935 within
five weeks of one another. As justice Stevens recognized in New York Telephone Co.,
"[o]ur decision is ultimately governed by our understanding of the intent of the Con-
gress that enacted the National Labor Relations Act on July 5, 1935, and the Social
Security Act on August 14 of the same year. -
 440 U.S. at 527.
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The Supreme Court in Ohio Bureau of Employment Set -vices v. Hodoty, 22
however, analyzed the legislative history of the Social Security Act and deter-
mined that an Ohio statute, which disqualified workers for benefits if their
unemployment was "due to a labor dispute other than a lockout," was not
preempted by the Social Security Act. 24 Significantly, the Court recognized
that in Title IX of that Act, Congress intended the states to have "broad free-
dom to set up the type of unemployment compensation they wish." The
Court further noted that when Congress wished to impose a condition upon
state unemployment statutes, it did so in explicit terms.'" Accordingly, the
Hodory Court concluded that the absence of congressional legislation on the
subject of labor dispute disqualifications in the Social Security Act created an
inference that Congress did not intend to restrict the state's freedom to legis-
late in this area." Therefore, after Hodoty, states and labor could argue that
the states are free to determine for themselves whether to grant. unemploy-
ment benefits to strikers, because Congress did not expressly forbid them to
do so in the Social Security Act.
The Supreme Court attempted to settle this confusion concerning
preemption of state unemployment laws in New York Telephone." The dispute
in New York Telephone involved an employer's challenge to New York's un-
employment insurance law on the grounds that it was preempted by the
NLRA. 29 Under section 590(7) of the unemployment insurance law, the
payment of benefits to workers normally is authorized after approximately
one week of unemployment, 30 but if a claimant's loss of employment was
caused by "a strike, lockout or other industrial controversy in the establish-
ment. in which he was employed," section 592(1) will suspend the payment of
benefits fOr an additional seven-week period.'" The maximum weekly ben-
efit, payable to art employee whose base salary is at least $149 per week, is
$75." 2 These benefits are financed primarily through employer contri-
22 431 U.S. 471 (1977). See also Bane/ton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416 (1977);
Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
" 431 U.S. at 473 (citing OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4141.29(1))(1)(a) (1973)). It
was immaterial that the unemployed worker may not have been involved in that labor
dispute. In Hodoyy the plaintiff-appellee, an employee of United States Steel Corp.
(USS) at a plant in Ohio, was furloughed when the plant shut down because of a
reduction in fuel supply, resulting from a nationwide strike of workers at USS's coal
mines. 431 U.S. at 473. The gravamen of the employee's complaint was that because
he was not involved in the labor dispute by the mine workers against his employer, he
had been involuntarily unemployed, and, therefore, the State could not. under the
Social Security Act deny bins benefits. Id. at 475.
24 Id. at 488-89. The Court in Hodory expressly declined to consider the
preemptive effect of the National Labor Relations Act on the state unemployment
benefits statute at issue. Id. at 475 n.3.
25 Id. at 483 (citation omitted).
21'
	 at 488.
27 Id. at 488-89.
28
 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
2"
 Id. at 522.
"" Id. at 523, citing N.Y. LABOR LAW § 590(7) (McKinney Supp. 1978).
3 ' 440 U.S. at 523 (citing N.Y. LAB. LAW § 592(1) (McKinney Supp. 1978)).
32 440 U.S. at 523. In New York 38,000 members of the Communications
Workers of America, AFL-CIO (CAVA) remained out on strike against Bell Telephone
November 19791	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 99
butions, based on the benefits paid in past years to former employees."' Thus,
the challenged provisions of the New York statute had a "two-fold impact." on
the bargaining process: not only did these provisions cushion the economic
hardship of the workers while out on a lengthy strike, but they also made the
strike more expensive for the employer. 34
Justice Stevens, in a plurality opinion for the Court, 35 acknowledged the
district court's finding that the payment. of benefits was a "substantial factor"
in the employee's decision to strike and to remain on strike,"" and held that
the New York law had altered the economic balance between labor and man-
agetnent. 37
 Despite these concessions, however, Justice Stevens found the
analysis developed in Machinists and Morton 3H inapplicable in evaluating the
New York statute." The Court's opinion was founded upon the novel belief
that since the state statute did not purport to regulate private conduct. in
labor-management relations directly, but, rather, was a "law of general
applicability," the Morton-Machinists analysis was not controlling.'" Justice Ste-
vens found the New York unemployment compensation statute to be a "law of
general applicability" on the ground that the general purport. of the program,
unlike the state's activity in Morton and Machinists, was not. to regulate the
bargaining relationship between labor and management but instead to provide
an efficient means of insuring employment security in the state..' While this
atone was not sufficient reason to exempt the statute from preemption, Justice
Stevens believed that the Supreme Court's cases "have consistently recognized
Company affiliates for seven months. Id. at 522. After the eight-week waiting period,
many striking employees began to collect unemployment conpensation. During the en-
suing five months inure than $49 million in benefits were paid to about 33,000 striking
employees at an average rate of somewhat less than $75 per week. Id. at 523.
" Id. at 523-24.
34 Id. at 555-56 (Powell, J., dissenting).
33 Id. at 522. justice Stevens was joined by Justices White and Rehnquist.
" Id. at 526, The Court quoted from the district court's opinion:
Notwithstanding the State's adamant position to the contrary, I regard
it as a fundamental truism that the availability 10, or expectation or receipt
of a substantial weekly tax-free payment of money by, a striker is a sub-
stantial factor affecting his willingness to go on strike or, once on strike, to
remain on strike, in the pursuit. of desired goals. This being a truism, one
therefore would expect. to find confirmation of it everywhere. One does.
Id. at 526 n.5 (citing 434 F. Supp. 810, 813-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)). Also, the strike com-
menced on a nationwide scale when contract negotiations between Communications
Workers of America, AFL-CIO and Bell Telephone Company affiliates had reached
an impasse. 440 U.S. at 522. While the strike for most workers lasted only one week,
in New York, the state which perhaps had gone the furthest in giving unemployment
compensation to strikers (for comparison of state unemployment insurance programs,
see Note, Federal Preemption of State Welfare and Unemployment Benefits for Strikers, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.I... L. REV. 441, 456-58 (1977)), the workers remained out on strike for
seven months. 440 U.S. at 522.
n Id. at 546.
38
 For discussion of preemption analysis used in the Morton and Machinists
cases, see text at notes 14 - 19 supra.
39
 440 U.S. at 533.
1° Id.'
,11
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that a congressional intent to deprive the States of their power to enforce
such general laws is more difficult to infer than an intent to pre-empt laws
directed specifically at concerted activity. " 42
Justice Stevens also pointed out that the New York unemployment insur-
ance program was designed specifically to comply with Title IX of the Social
Security Act of 1935, and thus congressional intent on the preemption issue
might also be found by considering that Act.. 43
 The Court then noted the
rationale in Hodory, 44
 that in enacting the Social Security Act Congress was
sensitive to the need to allow the states leeway in fashioning their unemploy-
ment programs. The Court determined that it was appropriate to treat the
New York statute with the deference accorded general state laws which pro-
tect state interests "deeply rooted in local feeling." 45
 Accordingly, the Court
accepted the standard that " in the absence of compelling congressional direc-
tion, we could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power' "
to establish unemployment compensation programs like that of New York. 46
Applying this standard, Justice Stevens found no evidence that Congress,
which had enacted both the NLRA and the Social Security Act in 1935, in-
tended to deny the states power to act in this area. 47 In fact, he believed that
the silence of Congress in 1935 actually supports the contrary inference that
Congress intended to allow the states to make the policy determination
whether to act for themselves." Central to the Court's analysis was the hold-
ing in Hodury that Congress in the Social Security Act intended the several
states to have broad freedom in setting up the types of unemployment com-
pensation they wished." The Court also mentioned the legislative history of
both Acts which showed that Congress had been aware of the problem, but
had not given any specific indication of an intent in either the NLRA or the
Social Security Act to preempt. subsequent state action." The Court con-
cluded, therefore, that a state's power to fashion its own policy concerning the
payment of unemployment compensation should not be denied on the basis
of speculation about the unexpressed intent of Congress."
42 Id. (citing Fanner v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 302 (1977); Sears,
Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
194-95 (1978): and Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. REV. 1337, 1356-
57 (1972)).
' 3
 440 U.S. at 527. See also text and notes at note 21 supra.
44 FOE discussion of Radon case. see text and notes at notes 22-27 supra.
45
 440 U.S. at 539-40. For discussion of the "local feeling .' exception to labor
preemption doctrine, see text and notes at times 8-13 supra.
4" 440 U.S. at 540 (quoting San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gannon,
359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)).
47
 440 U.S. at 540,
4" Id. For a discussion of the relevant legislative histories of the NLRA and
Title IN of the Social Security Act, as considered by Justice Stevens' opinion for the
Court, justice Blackmun's concurrence, and Justice Brennan's concurrence. see New
York Telephone Co., 440 U.S. at 540-45.
4" Id. at. 542. See also text. and notes at notes 22-27 supra.
5" Id. at 544. See note 48 supra.
51 Id. al 545-46.
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Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Marshall, concurred in the judgment,
of the Court. 52 He began by agreeing that, according to the legislative his-
tories of the NLRA and the Social Security Act, Congress, by its silence, had
made a decision to permit the states to pay unemployment benefits to strik-
ers. 5" Justice Blackmun pointed out, however, that the requirement created
by the Court. that the petitioner demonstrate "compelling congressional direc-
tion" to establish preemption of a state law of general applicability was not
consistent with the principles laid down in Machinists." In Justice Blackmun's
opinion the crucial inquiry was not whether the state's purpose was to confer
a benefit on a class of citizens, 55 but whether the exercise of state authority
"frustrates the effective implementation of the [National Labor Relations]
Act's processes." 5 " Justice Blackmun did not find the state grant of un-
employment benefits to strikers to frustrate the NLRA's processes because of
his earlier conclusion that the legislative histories suggest that Congress, by its
silence, had intended to tolerate such state action." Thus, he concurred with
the result." Finally, although admitting the "deeply rooted in local feeling"
exception 5y may in some instances require "compelling congressional direc-
tion" to infer preemption, Justice Blackmun noted that this exception has not
extended beyond "a limited number of state interests that are at the core Of
the States' duties and traditional concerns."""
Concurring separately in the result, Justice Brennanf't agreed with Justice
Blackmun's conclusion that the legislative histories of the NLRA and the So-
cial Security Act provided Sufficient evidence of congressional intent to toter-
52
 Id. at 547.
5''
	 See note 48 supra.
54 Id. at 547-48. Justice Blackmun explained:
This requirement that petitioners must_ demonstrate "compelling con-
gressional direction" in order to establish pre-emption is not, I believe,
consistent with the pre-emption principles laid down in Machinists .... I
believe, however, that Machinists indicates that the States are not free, en-
tirely and always, directly to enhance the self-help capability of one of the
parties to such a dispute so as to result in a significant shift in the balance
of bargaining power struck by Congress. Where the exercise of state au-
thority to curtail, prohibit, or enhance self-help " 'would frustrate effective
implementation of the Act's processes: (citation omitted) I believe
Machinists compels the conclusion that Congress intended to pre-empt such
state activity, unless there is evidence of congressional intent to tolerate it.
Id. at 548-49. This distinction, as justice Blackmun notes, is not merely semantic: fOr
while Justice Stevens would place assumed priority on the state side in New York Tele-
phone Co.. Justice Blackmun would place it on the federal side. Id. at 549.
" Id. at 550. In other words, whether the state statute is a "law of general
applicability." See text at notes 40-42 supra.
5" 440 U.S. at 550.
." Id. at 549-50.
58 Id. at 551.
For discussion of the "local feeling- exception to labor preemption doctrine.
see text and notes at notes 8-13 supra.
"" 440 U.S. 550-51 (citing Youngdahl v. Rainktir, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957)
(violence); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (libel); Farmer
v. Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977) (intentional infliction of mental distress)).
" 1
 440 U.S. at 546.
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ate state grants of unemployment benefits to strikers." 2 justice Brennan did
not join in the Court's opinion, however, on the grounds that the New York
statute may not. be a "law of general applicability,' and that although the
law may fall within the "deeply rooted in local feeling" exception to preemp-
tion," there is no need in this case For such a distinction."'"
In dissent., Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice
Stewart,"" claimed that the Court's decision substantially altered the balance
between labor and management prescribed by the NLRA." 7 As such, the dis-
sent believed that the Court had rewritten the principles of preemption es-
poused in Morton and Machinists." Justice Powell's analysis began with the
assertion that nothing in the NLRA or its legislative history specifically indi-
cated that the Congress intended to tolerate unemployment benefits for strik-
ers." He then noted that the unemployment. compensation statute of New
York was not, as the Court opinion claimed,'" a "law of general applicabil-
ity. , '" Regardless, Powell agreed with the view expressed in Justice
Blackmun's concurring opinion 72 that the crucial inquiry should be whether
the application of state law "would frustrate the effective implementation of
the NLRA's process," 7 " and further noted that the narrow scope of the
"deeply rooted in local feeling" exception" would not encompass the chal-
lenged provisions of the New York law." The dissent, therefore, concluded
"2 Id. at. 546-47. See note 48 supra.
" Although Brennan agrees with Stevens' opinion fur the Court that a dif-
ferent level of scrutiny may, according to past cases, be required when dealing with
statutes that regulate private conduct in labor relationships rather than confer public
benefits, for the same reasons as stated in justice Powell's dissent (see note 71 infra),
Justice Brennan was not sure that the New York unemployment compensation statute
was a law of general applicability. 440 U.S. at 546 (in the asterisk footnote).
"'' 440 U.S. at 546-47 (in the asterisk footnote). For discussion of the "local
feeling" exception to labor pre-emption doctrine, see text and notes at notes 8-13
supra.
" 5 "[T]he legislative histories of the NLRA and the Social Security Act re-
viewed in my Brother Stevens's opinion provide sufficient evidence of congressional
intent to decide this case." 440 U.S. at 547. See also note 48 supra.
"" 440 U.S. at. 551.
Gi
"" Id. at 556. But see note 48 supra.
?" See text. at notes 40-42 supra.
'' 440 U.S. at 557. Justice Powell noted:
Those provisions are "of general applicability" only if that term
means—contrary to what the plurality itself says—generally applicable
only to labor-management relations. It would be difficult to think of a law
more specifically focused on labor-management relations than one that.
compels an employer to finance a strike against itself.
Id. (footnote omitted).
72 See text at note 56 supra.
73 440 U.S. at 558.
14 For discussion of the "local feeling" exception to labor preemption doctrine,
see text and notes at notes 8-13 supra.
75
 440 U.S. at 560. Justice Powell stated: "The provisions of the New York law
at issue here have nothing in common with the stale laws protecting against personal
torts or violence to property that have defined the 'local feeling and responsibility'
exception to pre-emption. - Id.
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that the principles of Morton and Machinists 7" apply, and that a finding of
preemption is required, unless in some other law Congress has modified the pol-
icy of the NLRA." Looking to the Social Security Act and to its legislative his-
tory,'' the dissent could find no specific indications that Congress intended the
stales to have authority to upset the NLRA's collective-bargaining processes.':'
In the dissenters' opinion, therefre, preemption was appropriate."
Because the Court's decision against preemption by the NLRA was, for a
majority of the justices, based on the determination that. Congress had, in the
Social Security Act, given great leeway to the states in fashioning t.heir un-
employment laws, it is unlikely that New York Telephone effects any major
changes in labor law preemption outside the area of unemployment. compen-
sation. According to a majority of the justices," Morton-Machinists principles
still apply to state laws of general applicability. While Justice Stevens" at-
tempted to imply a state's rights presumption against preemption where the
state law in question is one of general applicability, most of the justices would
not concur in finding such a presumption. Further, a majority" would leave
the 'deeply rooted in local feeling'' exception exactly where it was—applicable
only to state laws protecting against personal torts or violence to property.
Beyond the area of unemployment compensation, therefore, little is changed
in the labor preemption doctrine by the decision in New York Telephone.
In the area of state benefits to unemployed strikers, however, the Court.
has attempted to settle the confusion experienced by the lower courts. As was
pointed out by Justice Powell in his dissent," six of the justices hold that New
York may require employers to pay unemployment compensation to strikers,
after an eight-week waiting period, amounting to some 50% of the workers'
average wage. Because the New York statute has the strongest impact upon
the balance of bargaining power between labor and management of all state
unemployment compensation statutes," it would appear likely that the other
states' compensation statutes are not preempted by the NLRA. The question
''' For discussion of the preemption analysis used in the Morton and Machinists
cases, see text at notes 14-19 supra.
77 440 U.S. at 560.
78 justice Powell's dissent reviews the legislative histories of the Social Security
Act. See 440 U.S. at 560-67. But see note 48 supra.
79 440 U.S. at 566.
"" Id. at 567.
" justices Blackmun and Marshall, see text and notes at notes 52-56 supra,
Justice Powell in dissent, joined by the Chiellustice and Justice Stewart, see text and
notes at notes 66-73 supra.
" Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court, joined by justices White and Rehn-
quist, see text and notes at notes 40-42 supra. justice Brennan agrees that in preemp-
tion cases there should be a lesser level of scrutiny for laws of general applicability, but
does not find the New York unemployment compensation statute to he such a law. 440
U.S. at 546 (in the asterisk footnote).
83 Justices Blackmun and Marshall, see text and notes at notes 59-60 supra.
justice Powell's dissent, joined by the Chief' Justice and Justice Stewart, see text and
notes at notes 74-75 supra.
84 440 U.S. at 565.
XS
 For comparison of state unemloyment insurance programs, see Note, Federal
Preemption of State Welfare and Unemployment Benefits for Strikers, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 441, 456-58 (1977).
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remains, however, whether the state would be free to interfere further in
labor relations than as presently provided under the New York statute."
II. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. Elections
1. Union Solicitation: Beth Israel Hospital
Section 7 ' of the NLRA z explicitly provides employees with the right to
self-organization. The Supreme Court consistently has interpreted section 7 to
protect the right of employees to communicate with one another on the job
site regarding union organization." The NLRB (Board) developed a rule
which struck a balance between the employees' right to organizational ac-
tivities at the workplace and the employers' private property rights and right
to maintain discipline in their businesses. 4 Under the Board's rule, employer
and employee interests are balanced by presuming the validity of employer
restrictions on employee solicitation and distribution during working time and
in working areas, yet presuming invalid restrictions on employee solicitation
and distribution during non-working time and in non-working areas. 5
8 6
 For example, the states could interfere further in labor relations than the
New York statute by increasing unemployment compensation 10 100% of the worker's
average wage and eliminating the additional waiting period imposed where the un-
employment is caused by labor dispute.
' 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) states in pertinent part:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1976).
a See, e.g., Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 491 (1978); Central
Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 542-43 (1972). The Court in Central Hardware
noted that:
[Section 7] organization rights arc not viable in a vacuum; their effective-
ness depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the
advantages and disadvantages of organization from others. Early in the his-
tory of the administration of the Act the Board recognized the importance
of freedom of communication to the free exercise of organization rights.
407 U.S. at 543. (citations omitted), quoted in, Beth Israel, 437 U.S. at 491-92 11.9.
4
 The Court in Republic Aviation Co. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797-98 (1945)
set out the Board's task:
[The Board must adjust] the undisputed right of self-organization assured
to employees under the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of
employers to maintain discipline in their establishments. I.ike so many
others, these rights arc not unlimited in the sense that they can be exer-
cised without regard 10 any duty which the existence of rights in others
may place on employer or employee.
Id. at 797-98.
5
 The Board developed the presumption approach in Peyton Packing, 49
N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44, 12 L.R.R.M. 183, 183 (1943), enforced, 142 F.2d 1009, 1010, 14
L.R.R.M. 792, 794 (5th Cir. 1944).
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In 1974 the NLRA was amended," extending its coverage to non-profit
health care institutions. In the Survey year the Supreme Court in Beth Israel v.
NLRB ,' considered the issue whether employees in health care institutions
would be covered by the solicitation and distribution rules developed by the
Board for the industrial sector. In Beth Israel, the Court upheld a qualified
extension of the industrial solicitation and distribution rules to health care
institutions!'
The solicitation and distribution rules applicable to the industrial sector
were established in Republic Aviation Co. v. NLRB." The Supreme Court in
Republic Aviation approved the Board's adoption of a presumption approach,"
to determine whet-her employee solicitation and distribution in the workplace
was protected by section 7 of the NLRA. Under this approach the Court
noted, employer rules prohibiting union solicitation during working hours are
"presumed to be valid in the absence of evidence that it was adopted for a
d seri m in a tory p u rpose. " 11 During non-working time, even though. an
employee is on company property, a rule prohibiting union solicitation "must
be presumed to be an unreasonable impediment to self-organization and
therefore discriminatory in the absence of evidence that special circumstances
make the rule necessary in order 10 maintain production or discipline.
Employee distribution of organizational material is treated similarly to solicita-
tion. Company rules prohibiting distribution or organizational material in
The 1974 Health Care Amendments, Pub. L. No. 93-360, 88 Stat. 395
(1974) altered the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Section 2(2) was amended by
deleting the provision that an employer shall not include "any corporation or associa-
tion operating a hospital, if no part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual ..." from the definition of an employer. Id. Section
2(14) was added to define a Health Care Institution. Id. Section 8(d) was amended by
altering the notice requirement for the termination of a contract with a health care
institution. 88 Stat. at 396. Section 8(g) was added to prohibit a strike or concerted
refusal to work without proper notice. 88 Stat. 396. Section 19 was added allowing
employees, who refused to pay dues for religious reasons, to pay an equivalent sum to
a nonreligious charity. 88 Stat. 397. And Section 213 was added authorizing the direc-
tor of the Federal Mediation Conciliation Service to appoint a Board of Inquiry to
investigate a labor dispute in a health care institution. 88 Stat. at 396-97. For a general
discussion of these amendments, see Feheley. Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act; Health Care Institutions, 36 Onto ST. L.J. 235, 238-40 (1975); Vernon, Labor Rela-
tions in the Health Care Field Under the 1974 Amendments to the National Labor Relations
Act: An Overview and Analysis, 70 Nw. U.L. REV. 202 (1975); Comment, National Labor
Relations Act—History and Interpretation of the Health Care Amendments, 60 MARQUETTE L.
REv. 921 (1977).
7
 437 U.S. 483 (1978). justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court in
which Justices Stewart, White, Marshall, and Stevens joined. Justices Blackmun and
Powell filed separate opinions concurring in the judgment, in which the Chief Justice
and Justice Rehnquist joined. Id. at 508, 509.
8 Id. at 507.
" 324 U.S. 793, 803-04 & n.10 (1945).
I" See note 6, supra.
" 324 U.S. at 803 n.10 (quoting Peyton Packing, 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843-44, 12
L,R.R.M. 183, 183 (1943).
1 2 Id. at 804 n.10.
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working areas are presumed valid, while restrictions of distribution in non-
working areas are presumed to be discriminatory."
The Republic Aviation approach for determining the validity of restrictions
on employee solicitation and distribution, has been applied consistently by the
Board to disputes arising in the industrial sector. The Board has, however,
created exceptions for retail establishments and public restaurants, holding
that solicitation and distribution may be prohibited at all times from areas
where customers have access." The presence of customers heightened the
employer's interest. in restricting employee solicitation and distribution.'"
In 1974 the scope of the NLRA was expanded to include health care
institutions.' Subsequent to the 1974 Health Care Amendments, the Board
in St. John's Hospital & School of Nursing Inc.," considered the issue of restric-
tions on employee solicitation and distribution in all health care insti-
tutions." The result. of St. John's was a qualified extension of the Republic
Aviation prestunption approach, to health care institutions. Hospitals were
permitted to impose stricter restrictions on employee solicitation and dis-
tribution, than would be permitted under the Republic Aviation approach."
The Board determined that Hospitals could prohibit solicitation by employees
"on non-working time in strictly patient care areas, .. 
.2" After St. Johns the
Board's position on solicitation and distribution in hospitals was contained in
four rules: (1) A no solicitation rule covering working time would be valid no
matter what the area; (2) A no solicitation rule covering non-work time would
not be valid except with respect to actual patient care areas; (3) A no distribu-
tion rule covering working time would he valid no matter what the area; (4) A
no distribution rule covering non-working time would be valid if it covered a
13 See Beth Israel, 437 U.S. at 493 n.10.
14 See id., al 493 & n.11. Strict application of Republic Aviation would allow
employees to solicit and distribute material in customer areas on non-working time.
15
 Employees in retail establishments and restaurants may solicit in non-
customer areas.
1" See note 7, supra. Prior to 1974, the Republic Aviation approach was applied
to proprietary hospitals, but no clear rule emerged from the Board's decisions. In
Summit Nursing and Convalescent Home, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 769, 80 L.R.R.N1. 1069, 1070
(1972), enforcement denied, 427 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1973) the Board found a rule pro-
hibiting solicitation or distribution "at any time in the patient or public area within the
home or in the nurses' stations.• invalid. In Guvan Valley Hospital, Inc., 198 N. L. R. B.
107, I 1 1, 81 L.R.R.M. 1023, 1025 (1973) the Board upheld a no solicitation rule which
provided: "There is to be a soliciting in working areas during working hours at this
hospital." Finally in Bellaire General Hospital, 203 N.L.R.B. 1105, 1108, 83 L.R.R.M.
1291, 1293 (1973) the Board found invalid a rule prohibiting solicitation and distribu-
tion "by employees while off duly or during working hours.
-
 See Beth Israel, 437 U.S.
at 494.
17
 222 N.L.R.B. 1150, 91 1...R.R.M. 1333 (1976), enforcement denied, 557 F.2d
1368, 1379, 95 L.R.R.M. 3058. 3066 (10th Cir. 1977).
Id.
1"
 Id., 91 L.R.R.M. at 1334.
20 Id. Strictly, patient care areas include patients' rooms, operating rooms, and
places where patients receive treatment, such as x-ray and therapy areas.
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work area or patient care area but would not be valid if it covered a non-
working area. 2 '
On appeal the Tenth Circuit in St. John's Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc.
v. NIRB, 22 denied enforcement of the Board's qualified extension of the Re-
public Aviation presumption to health care institutions. 22 Despite the denial of
enforcement in the Tenth Circuit, the Board continued to apply its qualified
Republic Aviation approach to solicitation and distribution issues in Health
Care institutions. Thus, in Beth Israel, the Board applied the rules developed
in Republic Aviation and St. John's determining that employee solicitation and
distribution of organizational material in a hospital cafeteria frequented by
employees, patients, and the public was protected activity under section 7 of
the Act." The First Circuit slightly modified and enforced the Board's Or-
der.'-' The Supreme Court affirmed the decision, upholding the Board's
qualified extension of the Republic Aviation presumption approach to deter-
mine the validity of restrictions on employee solicitation and distribution in
health care institutions.'" Applying the Board's rules the Court held that
Beth Israel had not rebutted the presumption of illegality of its restriction.'
Beth Israel is a significant development in labor law as the presumption of
illegality of hospital restrictions on employee solicitation and distribution up-
held by the Court provides a strong guarantee of employee rights. Con-
sequently, employee activity in situations where the circumstances are less
compelling than Beth Israel, will be protected under the presumption ap-
proach."''
The facts in Beth Israel are uncomplicated. Beth Israel is a large nation-
ally recognized hospital located in Boston, which has approximately 2200 reg-
ular employees. 25 In July of 1974, the Hospital promulgated a rule pro-
hibiting solicitation and distribution of literature in any area to which patients
21 See 	  WALTER, THE COURSE or CHARTED AND UNCHARTED WATERS IN
LABOR RELATIONS LAW PROBLEMS IN HOSPITALS AND THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
64-65 (1977).
22 557 F.2d 1368, 95 L.R.R.M. 3058 (1977).
23 Id. at 1379, 95 LIZ.R.M. at 3066. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit would permit hospitals to prohibit employee solicitation and distribution in patient
access areas, such as halls. stairways, elevators and waiting rooms as well as cafeterias
and gift shops. Id. at 1375, 95 L.R.R.M. at 3061.
24 223 N.1...R.B. 1193, 1196-99, 92 1..R.R.M. 1078, 1079.
24 554 F.2d 477, 482-83, 95 L.R.R.N.I. 2230, 2234-35 (1977).
2" 437 U.S. 483, 488, 495, 507 (1978).
27 Id. at 507. Under the Court's analysis a hospital may rebut the presumption
of illegality by showing that the restrictions on employee solicitation and distribution
are necessary to avoid disruption of health care operations. or disturbance of patients.
Id.
" The concurring opinions of justice Blackmun (joined by the Chief justice
and justice Rehnquist), id. at 508, and justice Powell (joined by the Chief Justice and
Justice Rehnquist), id. at 509, would have supported the holding of Beth Israel on a
finding that the restrictions on solicitation and distribution violated section 8(a)(1)
based on substantial evidence contained in the record as a whole, rather than adopting
the stronger presumption approach of Republic Aviation. Id. at 508, 510.
3" Id. at 489.
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or visitors had access. 3" Because of this rule employees were allowed to solicit
other employees and to distribute literature in only six separate locker rooms
containing 613 lockers."' The locker rooms are restricted on the basis of sex,
and generally are not. used by the Hospital to communicate messages to the
employees."' The cafeteria, on the other hand, is the common gathering
area for the employees on non-working time. 3 " The cafeteria also has vend-
ing machines where employees purchase snacks while on coffee breaks. The
Hospital allowed the cafeteria to be used for non-union solicitation and dis-
tribution purposes. 34 Additionally, the Hospital maintains in the cafeteria an
official bulletin board for communicating messages to the employees, and an
unofficial bulletin hoard for use by the employees."'
"" Id. at 486-87. In July of 1974 the hospital promulgated the following rule
on solicitation and distribution:
Hospital employees who want to solicit other employees for the Union
or other i causes may do so when they are not on their own working times,
but only in two well-defined locations of the Hospital:
I) Employee-only areas—employee locker rooms and certain adjacent
rest rooms; and
2) Cafeteria and coffee shop.
In the locker areas literature may be offered. In the cafeteria and col-
fee shop, conversations may take place on a one-to-one basis but there is to
he no setting up of special tables, public distribution of literature nor any
form of coercion. Elsewhere within the Hospital, including patient-care and
other work areas, the lobbies, corridors, elevators, libraries, meeting rooms,
etc., there is to be no solicitation nor distribution of literature. Soliciting of
patients and visitors is expressly prohibited at. all times and places.
Beth Israel, 223 N.L.R.B. at 1195, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1078. After the complaint in Beth
Israel was filed, the hospital, on March 5, 1973 changed the solicitation rule. The re-
vised rule provided:
There is to he no soliciting of the general public (patients, visitors) on
Hospital properly. Soliciting and the distribution of literature to BI
employees may be done by other Bi employees, when neither individual is
on his or her working time, in employee-only areas—employee locker
rooms and certain adjacent rest rooms. Elsewhere within the Hospital, in-
cluding patient-care and all other work areas, and areas open to the public
such as the lobbies, cafeteria and cciffeeshop, corridors, elevators, gift shop,
etc., there is to he no solicitation nor distribution of literature.
Solicitation or distribution of literature on Hospital property by non-
employees is expressly prohibited at all limes.
Consistent with our long-standing practices, the annual appeal cam-
paigns of the United Fund and of the Combined Jewish Philanthropies for
voluntary charitable gifts will continue to be carried out by the Hospital.
1(1.
31 437 U.S. at 489.
Id. at 489-90,
"" Id. at 490.
" Id. The United Way, United Fund, Jewish Philanthropies Organizational
Drive, The Israel Emergency Fund, and the Credit Union were allowed to solicit and
distribute literature in the Cafeteria. Id.
"" Id.
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The dispute in Beth Israel arose when the union 36 filed a section 8(a)(1)" 7
and 8(a)(3)" charge with the Board."" The union contested both the prom-
ulgation of the restriction on solicitation and distribution, and the Hospital's
disciplining an employee for violating the restriction on solicitation and dis-
tribution. 4 " The Board affirmed the findings of the Administrative Law
Judge that the Hospital had violated sections 8(a)(1) and (a)(3). 4 ' The Board
ordered the Hospital to cease and desist from interfering with "concerted
union activities," and to "rescind its written rule prohibiting distribution of
union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffee shop." 42 On
appeal the First Circuit Court of Appeals modified and enforced the Board's
order. 43 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the First Circuit. 44
In reaching its decision, the Beth Israel Court considered four arguments
presented by the Hospital as to why restrictions on employee solicitation and
distribution should he allowed in health care institutions. 45
 The Hospital had
contended first, that the Board's decision to allow solicitation conflicts with
congressional policy expressed in adopting the 1974 Health Care Amend-
men ts. 46 Second, the Hospital argued that limited judicial review of NLRB
decisions is not applicable in this case since the Board has no expertise in
3" The Massachusetts Hospital Workers Union, Local 88{) Service Employees
International Union AFL-CIO. Id. at 487 n.3.
37 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
39 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3) (1976).
"9 437 U.S. at 487.
" Id. at 491. Ann Schuniur was disciplined for distributing a union newsletter
in the hospital cafeteria.
" 437 U.S. at 487. The Board issued a complaint. on the § 8(a)(1) & (3)
charges. An Administrative Law Judge found a § 8(a)(1) violation in the adoption of
the no solicitation rule and a § 8(a)(3) violation in the disciplining of an employee for
violating the rule. Id.
4" Id. at 487-88. See also Beth Israel, 223 N.L.R.B. 1193, 1199, 92 L.R.R.M.
1078, 1078-79.
" 554 F.2d 477, 482-83, 95 L.R.R.M. 2230, 2234-35 (1977). The two portions
of the Board order modified by the First Circuit are:
(1) Cease and desist from disciplining employees or otherwise discriminat-
ing against them with regard to their tenure of employment or any other
term or condition of employment for engaging in concerted union ac-
tivities for their mutual aid or protection, or in any like or related manner,
interfering with, restraining, or coercing employees in the exercise of their
rights guaranteed in Section 7 of the Act.
(2)(6) Rescind its written rule prohibiting distribution of union literature
and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffeeshop.
223 N.L.R.B. at 1199, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1078-79. The First Circuit declined to enforce
part one since the record did not show "that the Hospital has a proclivity knowingly to
violate the Act, thus justifying a. broad order." 554 F.2d at 477, 483, 95 L.R.R.M. at
2234. The First Circuit also modified part 2(h) of the order inserting the words that
part of, so the order read: "Rescind that part of its written rule prohibiting distribution
of union literature and union solicitation in its cafeteria and coffeeshop."Id. at 482, 95
L.R.R.M. at 2234. The First Circuit left open the possibility that other parts of the
restrictions on solicitation and distribution might be valid. Id.
as 437 U.S. at 489.
45 Id. at 495-507.
4(:
	 at 496.
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medical care. 47 Third, the Hospital urged that. the Board's decision was irra-
tional and was not supported by the evidence.'" Finally, the Hospital con-
tended that it was irrational to distinguish a dispute involving a hospital
cafeteria from cases involving public restaurants and retail stores.'" The
Court rejected all four of the Hospital's arguments.
In rejecting the contention that the Board's solicitation rule conflicted
with the policies underlying the 1974 Health Care Amendments, the Court.
relied on an interpretation of the legislative history of the amendments which
revealed no evidence of congressional intent to treat. employees of health care
facilities differently front industrial employees in terms of section 7 solicitation
and distribution rights.'" Turning to the Hospital's second argument, that
the principle of limited judicial review of Board decisions 51 was inapplicable
to this case, the Court acknowledged that the Board was not an expert in
medical decisions.'"- The Court., however, deferred to the Board's expertise
in labor-management relations under federal labor law, and not to the
Board's expertise in specific occupations. The Hospital's concern that the
Board was not medically expert was irrelevant to the deference granted to
the Board's expertise in national labor relations policy.
The Court reviewed the records of the case and rejected the Hospital's
third argument. that the Board decision was irrational.''" The Court noted
that the Hospital was unable to introduce any evidence to show that solicita-
tion or distribution was or would be harmful.' The Court concluded that.
47 Id. at 500.
18 Id. at 501,
M. at 505.
5 " Ir I. at 496. '['he Court rejected the Hospital's interpretation of the legislative
history,
We can only infer therefore. that Congress was satisfied to rely on the
Board to continue to exercise the responsibility to strike the appropriate
balance between the interests of hospital employees, patients and
employers.
Second, nothing in the legislative history supports petitioners argu-
ment that the particular approach to enforcement of § 7 rights in the Hos-
pital context adopted by the Board is inconsistant with congressional policy.
Id. at 497.
'' Id. at 500. The Court generally defers to the Board's decision recognizing
that the Board has developed a special expertise in labor-management disputes. Board
rules are judicially reviewable for consistency wit.h the act, and for rationality, but sub-
ject to that limited review the Board's application of its rules will be enforced if it is
supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. See NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 235-36 (1963).
52 The Hospital presented a three-step argument to demonstrate that the
Court should not apply limited judicial review to the Board's decision: (1) restrictions
on solicitation and distribution in areas where patients have access is a medical deci-
sion; (2) the Board has no expertise in medical decisions; (3) therefore the Court
should not defer to the Board's expertise by limiting review of the Board's decision to
whether it was supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 437 U.S. at
500-01.
53 Id. at 501.
54 Id. at 502. The Administrative Law Judge stated, "I am not persuaded that
the (Hospital] has offered any convincing evidence to demonstrate that the rule is
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the inference drawn by the Board, from the evidence, regarding the likeli-
hood of disruption of patient care was rational. 55
 The Court finally found
only superficial appeal in the Hospital's fourth argument that the hospital
cafeteria could not rationally be distinguished from a public restaurant. or re-
tail market." The Court noted that retail markets and restaurants have
non-public areas where employees gather, and where employee organizational
activity must be allowed." In public restaurants and retail markets,
employees may be prohibited from organizational activity where the primary
purpose of the business is being performed. In hospitals, the primary func-
tion of medical care is performed in the operating rooms, patients' rooms and
patients' lounges—not in the cafeteria.'
In summary, the Court rejected the Hospital's argument that, with the
1974 Health Care Amendments to the NI.,RA, Congress intended the Board
to develop different. rules for employee solicitation and distribution in hospi-
tals." The Court affirmed the Board's use of the presumption of illegality
for restrictions on solicitation and distribution on non-working time in non-
working areas.' ° ° Nevertheless, the Court concluded on a cautionary note
remarking that the Board's decisions on employee solicitation in hospitals
were in flux, and that the Board always could modify its construction of the
Act. in light of' further experience."'
Both justices Blackmun " 2
 and Powell' ' ' wrote concurring opinions in
which they emphasized the cautionary note of the majority opinion. The con-
curring opinions supported the conclusion that Beth Israel violated section
8(a)(I) and (3) by implementing and enforcing the restrictions on employee
solicitation and distribution. In his opinion, however, Justice Blackmun urged
the Board to accept the suggestion of the Court by modifying the rules for
organizational activity in hospitals to give greater weight to the hospital's in-
terest. in maintaining a "restful, uncluttered, relaxing, and helpful atmos-
needed, either by reason of actual or suspected interference with patients, visitors, or
non -employees. -
 223 N.L.R.B. at 1198, 92 L.R.R.M. at 1078.
" 437 U.S. at 504. The Court left open the possibility that the Hospital might
be able to justify a less restrictive rule for regulating solicitation and distribution. Id. at
503. The Court also indicated that in future cases the Board might develop a "more
finely calibrated scale'' to balance the Hospital's interest in protecting patients from
disturbance and the employees' organizational rights. Id. at 505.
'' Id. at 505-06. The Board has held that a rule prohibiting solicitation and
distribution in areas of public restaurants and retail markets which are open to the
public does not violate §.8(a)(I) since solicitation tends to upset patrons. See, e.g., Mar-
riott Corp. (Children's Inn), 223 N.L.R.B. 978, 978, 92 L.R.R.M. 1028, 1028 (1976);
Bankers Club, Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 22, 27, 89 L.R.R.M. 1812 (1975); McDonalck Corp.
205 N.L.R.B. 404, 407-08, 84 L.R.R.M. 1316 (1973); Marshal Field & Co. 98 N.L.R.B.
88, 90, 29 L.R.R.M. 1305, 1306 (1952), enforced, 200 F.2d 375, 382-83, 31 L.R.R.M.
2073, 2079 (7th 01-.1953).
57
 437 U.S. at 506.
58 Id.
Id. at 507.
60 Id.
"' Id. at 508.
" Id. Justice Blackmun was joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Rehnquist.
"" Id. at 509. Justice Powell was joined by the Chief justice and Justice Rehn-
quist.
1 12	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 I Vol. 21:85
phere. - " 4 Justice Powell in his concurring opinion agreed with the conclu-
sion of the majority that Beth Israel had violated section 8(a)(•l) and (3), but
rejected the majority's rationale for reaching that conclusion."' Justice Powell
would not transfer the Republic Aviation presumption of the illegality of re-
strictions on employee solicitation during working time and in non-working
areas to hospital situations. Rather, he would base the Court's decision on a
finding that the evidence on the record demonstrated section - 8(a)(I) and (3)
violations."
For . Justice Powell, the Hospital's fourth argument—that the Hospital
cafeteria cannot rationally be distinguished from a public restaurant—was
most persuasive.'' The presence of patients and visitors, Justice Powell main-
tained, removes the hospital cafeteria from the industrial and manufacturing
model, so that the Republic Aviation presumption is inapplicable,''" Rejecting
the presumption approach, Justice Powell would require the Board to show by
substantial evidence, on the record as a whole, that the employer has violated
sections 8(a)(1) and (3).""
The significance of Beth Israel is reflected in the disagreement. between
the majority opinion and Justice Powell's concurrence. The Republic Aviation
presumption approach adopted by the Court.—a presumption that. restrictions
on employee solicitation and distribution on non-working time and in non-
working areas violates section 8(a)(1)—is broader than the standard advocated
by justice Powell. Under the Court's presumption approach, employee or-
ganizational activity will be allowed in situations where the union might not be
able to meet Justice Powell's substantial evidence standard; unions will win
more cases under the presumption approach.
The broad impact of the Beth Israel Court's presumption approach is illus-
trated by another Survey year decision, NLRB v. National Jewish Hospital. 7" Na-
tional Jewish Hospital involved a hospital rule restricting employee solicitation
and distribution which was similar to the rule found to be a section 8(a)(I)
violation in Beth Israel." The Board found a section 8(a)(I) violation and
ordered the National Jewish Hospital to rescind its restrictions on solicitation
and distribution. 72
 The Tenth Circuit accepted the presumption approach
"I Id. at. 509. Justice Blackmun agreed with Justice Powell that the Republic
Aviation presumption approach was unnecessary, and (.1 questionable validity when
applied to hospitals. Justice Blackmun was concerned that the situation at Beth Israel,
which he considered to be unusual, would set a rule for all subsequent hospital solicita-
tion cases where the patient interest might be stronger. Id.
"5 Id. at 509-10.
" 1 ' Id. at 510. Beth Israel's restrictions on employee activity were, for Justice
Powell, a clear violation of § 7. The presumption approach was a stronger rule than
necessary with which to decide the case.
17 Id. at 513.
fitl
"9 Id. at 515.
'" 593 F.2c1 911, 99 l..R.R.M. 3141 (1978), enforcing, 226 N.L.R.B. 1241, 94
1...R.R.M. l 10 (1976).
7 ' 593 F.2d at 912, 99 L.R.R.M. at 3142. The rule stated: "Solicitation, collec-
tions and petitions for outside agencies are permitted only on approval of the adminis-
trator." Id.
72
 226 N.L.R.B. at 1241, 94 L.R.R.M. at 1111.
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and enforced the Board's order noting that Beth Israel was "not only applica-
ble but controlling; that it comes to grips with our problem and resolves it." 7"
The facts in National Jewish Hospital were not., however, exactly similar to
those in Beth Israel." Ninety to ninety-five percent of the patients at the
National Jewish Hospital were ambulatory and ate their meals in the
cafeteria." The patients were mostly asthmatic and were highly affected by
emotional stress.'" The employees at the National Jewish Hospital had
access to four lounges and two locker rooms where solicitation was permitted."
Under the standard advocated by Justice Powell in his concurring opin-
ion, the Board might not be able to show by substantial evidence that the
National Jewish Hospital violated section 8(a)(1). The Board would be re-
quired to prove that the Hospital interfered with, restrained, or coerced
employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights. The effect of Beth Israel,
however, is to shift the burden to the Hospital; the Hospital must produce
evidence showing that the employees' organizational efforts had a disruptive
effect on health care operations. 78 Neither Beth Israel nor the National
Jewish Hospital were able to meet this burden. It is probable that many other
hospitals also will be unable to show that restrictions on employee
organizational activity are necessary to avoid a disruption of health care oper-
ations.
The narrow holding of Beth Israel is to allow employee solicitation and
distribution in a hospital cafeteria where only 1.5% of the patrons are pa-
tients. The broader impact of Beth Israel will be to protect. nearly all employee
solicitation and distribution in non-patient care areas.
2. Extrinsic Evidence in Certification Proceedings: Bell & Howell
In 1977, the NLRB (Board) reversed its long-standing policy' and decided
that it would no longer consider extrinsic evidence of a union's discriminatory
practices in determining whether to certify a fairly elected bargaining re-
presentative.' During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the District.
7j 593 F.2d at 916, 99 L.R.R.M. at 3145.
74 judge Stanley, dissenting in National Jewish Hospital, distinguished the cases
on their facts. Id. at 916-17, 99 L.R.R.M. at 3145-46.
75 Id. at 917, 99 L.R.R.M. at 3145-46. •
7" Id. 99 L.R.R.M. at 3146,
" Id.
" Id. at 915, 99 L.R.R.M. at 3144. The Tenth Circuit in National Jewish Hospi-
tal based its shifting of the burden of proof to the Hospital on Beth Israel:
"[Me must be mindful that the Supreme Court in Beth Israel made it plain that
the burden was on the employer to bring forward positive evidence showing that solici-
tation activities had a disrupting effect upon patient's health." Id. See Beth Israel, 437
U.S. at 507.
' Compare Bell & Howell Co., 213 N.L.R.B. 407, 87 L.R.R.M. 1172 (1974) with
Bell & Howell Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 420, 95 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1977), eq'd sub nom. Bell &
Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136, 100 L.R.R.M. 2192 (D.C. Cir. 1979). See also
Handy Andy, Inc., 228 N.L.R.B. 447, 94 L.R.R.M. 1554 (1977) (refusing to consider
extrinsic evidence of union's discriminatory practices in deciding whether to certify the
union as a bargaining representative).
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of Columbia enforced the Board's order in Bell & Howell v. NLRB,' upholding
the Board's new policy. The decision of the District of Columbia Circuit is in
conflict with the position of the Eighth Circuit." The conflict between the
circuits may necessitate eventual resolution by the Surpeme Court unless the
persuasive reasoning of the District of Columbia Circuit gains broad accep-
tance.'
The Bell & Howell dispute arose when Local 399 of the International
Union of Operating Engineers, AFL-CIO (union) petitioned the NLRB for a
representation election. After some procedural wrangling,' the election was
held and the union prevailed. Bell & Howell (company) then moved to dis-
qualify the union because of alleged union discrimination against women."
While Bell & Howell's motion was pending, a plurality of the Board in
Bekins Moving & Storage Co.,' decided that. the Constitution prohibited the cer-
tification of a union engaged in invidious racial discrimination. Member Ken-
nedy provided the deciding vote by concurring in the result, 8 but declared
that his holding was limited to cases involving suspect classifications." When
the Board considered the sex discrimination issue in Bell & Howell" it held
that section 9(c)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act" mandated certifi-
cation of a union that was victorious in a fair election. The Board further
held that. constitutional due process concerns ''  remained dormant unless the
2
 598 F.2d 136, 100 L.R.R.M. 2192 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
" See NLRB v. Mansion House Center Management Corp. 473 F.2d 471, 82
L.R.R.M. 2608 (8th Cir
. 1973). where a contrary result was achieved on substantially
similar facts. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in deciding Bell &
Howell, acknowledged the conflict, but stated that it was "compelled to disagree with
that conclusion. - 598 F.2d at 139 n.1, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2193-94 n.l.
4 Of course, not every conflict between the circuits requires the Supreme
Court's intervention. The Bell LI. ' Howell opinion is well-reasoned and may become an
important beacon for future decisions in this area.
This wrangling involved Bell & Howell's claim that Local 399 was an inap-
propriate bargaining unit wider the standards enunciated in Mallinckrodt Chemical
forks. 162 N.L.R.B. 387, 397, 64 L.R.R.M. 1011. 1016 (1966). However, the Bell &
Howell court stated that those factors are more relevant to "carve out" elections where
a union seeks to sever itself from a larger bargaining representative's membership. 598
F.2d at 141 n.3. 150. 100 L.R.K.M. at 2194 n.3, 2201-02. This part of the case pre-
sented no difficulty for the court and, since it is not part of the major holding of the
case. it will nut he considered in the Survey.
" 598 F.2d at 141, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2195. The basis for these allegations is
discussed in the text at note 33 infra.
7 211 N.L.R.B. 138, 86 L.R.R.M. 1323 (1974).
Chairman Miller and Member Jenkins formed the plurality in deciding that
the Board could not constititionaily certify a union engaged in invidious dis-
crimination. 211 N.L.R.B. at 139, 86 L.R.R.M. at. 1325. Members Fanning and Pencil()
took the opposite view and dissented. Member Kennedy, concurring in the result, cast
the deciding vote.
" Specifically. Member Kennedy mentioned membership policies based on
race, alienage or national origin. See Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 211 N.L.R.B. at
145.
1 " 213 N.L.R.B. 407, 87 L.K.R.M. 1172 (1974).
" 29 U.S.C.	 159(c)(1) (1976),
12 The due process clause of the fifth amendment prohibits invidious dis-
crimination by the Federal government„S'ee, e.g., Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
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alleged discrimination precipitated a representation hearing.'" Member Ken-
nedy, again concurring, reconciled his position in Bell & Howell with that in
Bekins by noting that this Bekins principle did not apply to cases involving the
non-suspect classification of sex discrimination."
Bell & Howell refused to bargain with Local 399 in order to gain access
to judicial review." The NLRB found that. Bell & Howell had violated sec-
tions 8(a)(1) and 5(a) of the Act." The Board then granted a rehearing, sua
sponte, to review its finding against Bell & Howe11.' 7 Before the rehearing
was convened, however, the Board decided a third case, Handy Andy, Inc." In
Handy Andy, the NLRB held that the Constitution did not require considera-
tion of racial discrimination before union certification, and that section 9 of
the Act precluded denials of certification on that basis. The Board thus ex-
pressly overruled its Bekins decision,'' and, when Bell & Howell was reheard,
found that Handy Andy controlled and affirmed its finding that Bell & Howell
had committed unfair labor practices. 2 "
I n affirming the NLRB's decision, the court of appeals confronted three
major issues: (1) whether Bell & Howell, as an employer, had standing to
challenge the union certification by allegations of discriminatory union prac-
tices; (2) whether the NLRA bars precertification consideration of the union's
record of alleged discrimination; and (3) whether the NLRB violated the due
process clause of the fifth amendment of the Constitution by certifying a
union without inquiry into alleged discrimination.
In considering the first issue, the court had little trouble finding that the
employer had third-party standing. 2 t The court found that freedom from
bargaining with a discriminatory union is a legitimate interest which the
employer is in the best position to protect. A contrary finding, the court
noted, might shield the Board's certification from judicial review since no
other party at this early stage, including employees, has the adversarial in-
terest necessary to insure standing. 22
 An aggrieved employee has an interest
& Howell Co.. 230 N.L.R.B. at 423, 95 L.R.R.M. 1336 (1974),
14 Id.
15
 598 F.2d alt 142. 100 L.R.R.M. at 2195 (1979).
t" Id. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1). (a)(5) (1976).
'' 239 N.L.R.B. 420, 95 L.R.R.M. 1333 (1977).
" 228 N.I...R.B. 447, 94 L.R.R.1.1. 1554 (1977).
'" 230 N.L.R.B. at 920, 95 L.R.R.N.I. at 1334 (1977).
2" Id.
21
 598 F.2(1 at 142-44, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2195-97. For a further discussion of
third-party standing, see Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.190, 192-97 (1 976).
22 The Bell & Howell court stated:
Whether in this case the interest would otherwise go unprotected depends
on precisely how the "interest- at stake is defined.... lf, on the other
hand, the interest is in preventing certification of a discriminatory union,
there may he no adequate alternative to allowing the employer to raise the
issue. The right of a dissenting unit member, or an individual outside the
unit, to intervene in a representation proceeding in order to raise the dis-
crimination issue is questionable.
598 F.2d at 144, 100 1...R.R.M. at 2197.
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in fair representation but not necessarily in certification. 2
 ' The court, there-
fore, avoided the undesirable loss of judicial review of the certification process
and recognized employer standing.
The court then turned its attention to the second issue, the relationship
of section 9(0(1) of the NLRA to the dispute. Section 9(c)( I) provides that: "If
the Board finds a question of certification exists, it shall direct an election by
secret ballot and shall certify the results thereof." 24
 In spite of the mandatory
language of this section, it is well settled that the Board may withhold certi-
fication to protect the policies of the NLRA from serious erosion. 2 N For in-
stance, the Board may deny certification where the election process itself is
tainted, 2 " or where the union's interests baldly conflict. with those of the
employees it wishes to represent. 27 The Bell & Howell court, therefore, had
to choose between labor-related interests—such as the sanctity and efficiency
of elections to expedite collective bargaining—and the policy interest of not
certifying a union engaged in invidious discrimination,
The court determined that the extent of the NLRB's role in carrying out
the national policy against invidious discrimination ought to be determined in
light of the purpose underlying the agency's creation. 2 " The court noted that.
the NLRB was a remedial agency 2"
 concerned primarily with labor/
management relations so as to prevent. economic disruption. The Act there-
fore, compels agency action where a union practices discrimination and is un-
able to represent its employees fairly. Unfair representation threatens critical
NLRA concerns because the Act's basic premise is that economic warfare can
be minimized by faithful representation and negotiation with management. In
this case, an argument. that the union had misrepresented its employees would
be totally speculative since representation does not begin until after certifica-
tion. Thus, the court agreed with the Board's decision to reserve con-
sideration of discrimination charges until after a fair representation hearing
when actual labor interests are implicated.
Significantly, the court declined to favor protection from speculative dis-
criminatory practices over the obvious potential for disturbing the orderly
certification process set forth in section 9 of' the Act." The court perceived
that complicating the certification process would not necessarily deter dis-
crimination effectively. In favoring labor interests, the court took comfort in
the existence of the EEOC which has the tools, expertise, and duty to in-
vestigate and correct subtle forms of discrimination. The NLRB, on the other
23 The
 B ell & Howell court noted that the Board has procedures for allowing
an employee to bring an unfair representation charge against his union after certifica-
tion. 598 F.2c1 at 144 tt.18, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2197 n.18.
24 29	 § 159(c)(1) (1976) (emphasis added).
25 Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d at 140, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2198.
26 Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 101 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1120, 31 L.R.R.M.
1189, 1191 (1952).
R & M Kaufman v. NLRB, 47i F.2d 301, 81 L.R.R.M. 2309 (7th Cir. 1972).
ss 598 F.2(1 at 147. 100 L.R.R.M. at 2198.
29 hi. at 147 n.36, 100 L.R.R.M. al 2199 n.36.
29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1) (1976).
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hand, was not designed to prevent. discrimination and could only employ the
draconian remedy of withholding certification. Furthermore, duplication of
the EEOC's efforts would serve no useful purpose."'
On the other hand, the court suggested that more blatant discrimination
might require an immediate response from the Board, even before certifica-
tion."' This caveat was raised by the third issue the court addressed: the due
process clause of' the fifth amendment might be violated by a government
agency granting its imprimatur of approval to a blatantly discriminatory un-
ion. In the instant. case, however. Bell & Howell's allegations of discrimination
bordered on the frivolous." Specifically, Bell & Howell complained that sec-
tions of Local 399's governing instruments called for benefits to "dependent
wives" but riot to "female employees," and for death benefits to "widows" but
not to "widowers."' The court decided that such allegations, even if true,
were too insignificant and speculative to constitute state action and to impli-
cate the clue process clause. The court reasoned that mere certification does
not "significantly involve" 35
 the government in discriminatory practice. In-
stead, certification marks the beginning of the union's obligation to refrain
from future discriminatory practices." The Constitution, therefore, did not
require the court to modify its interpretation of section 9(c)(1) of the Act." 7
The court's decision thus begins to demarcate the jurisdictional territory
between the NLRB and the EEOC. Subtle forms of discrimination, like those
alleged in the instant case, are better left to the EEOC. 38
 Where the dis-
crimination is so blatant" that certification "substantially involves" the state in
its perpetuation, however, it may be possible to compel the NLRB's immediate
action. 4" For instance, the court suggests that if' the union's by-laws exclude
women or provide evidence that discrimination is one of the union's purposes,
a different result might be reached. 4 ' The court does not state whether con-
sideration of the discrimination aL that point would be mandated by the fifth
amendment or whether it would be a matter open to the Board's discretion.
Theoretically, it would seem that the Board should have more discretion to
avoid the consideration provided it was deciding which forms of dis-
crimination were so threatening to the NLRA that they required pre-
certification action, and which forms were so subtle that the EEOC would be
the more appropriate agency to take action. 42
 Where the Board runs into
31
 598 F.2d at 147-48, 100 1.„K.R.M. at 2199-200.
"2 598 F.2e1 at 150 & n.46, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2201 & n.46.
"" See id.
34 Id.
"5 Id. at 149, 150, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2200.
" 7 Id. at 150, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2201.
"" Id. at 147-48, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2199-200.
3" By "blatant" it is meant that the discrimination is so obvious or purposeful
that the Board could be said to be "authorizing" or "encouraging" the discrimination
by certifying the union. See id. at 149, 100 L. R.R.M. at 2200.
"" Id.
41 Id. at 150 n.46, 100 L.R.R.M. at 2201 n.46.
2 See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(A) (1976). The A.P.A.
provides that an agency's interpretation of law within its aegis should not be upset
unless "arbitrary or capricious" or "not in accordance with law." Id.
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constitutional concerns, however, discretion may be more limited and the
Board may be required to deal with it.
Although the court did not establish guidelines it would seem that under-
standing which allegations of discrimination the Board may be complelled to
consider can be clarified by considering the purpose of section 9 of the NLRA
in light of the due process clause. Where the NLRB recognized unions that.
are "discriminatory on their face,"'" such as a union pledged to exclude women,
not only is there state action but no labor purposes are forwarded by the
union certification. In fact, by certifying a blatantly discriminatory union, the
Board probably would be exacerbating labor/management relations by giving
a blatant discriminator official status. In such cases, therefore, the Board may
have no choice but to hear the allegations since a prima facie due process viola-
tion requires immediate consideration and section 9 concerns do not justify
postponing a hearing of these charges. Employing this approach, the NLRB
can focus on the labor-related effects of a given certification and be fairly
certain that its labor perspective will correlate with its constitutional obli-
gations.
In practical terms, the court's decision will deter employers from attempt-
ing to forestall a union's certification by alleging that the union practices
discrimination. In some cases, this deterrence may allow discriminatory unions
to avoid detection until they arc already established as bargaining representa-
tives. While it may be true that a discriminatory union, once certified, is more
difficult to reform than if it never were recognized, aggrieved employees are
in a better position to enlist the NLRB's aid than are employers who may be
interested primarily in impeding unionization. Bell & Howell, therefore, is in
accord with the realities of labor/management relations. Furthermore, the de-
cision tends to harmonize section 9 with the due process clause in accom-
modating labor-related interests with the national policy against dis-
crimination.
In summary, the Court. of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Bell & Howell v. NLRB upheld the Board's certification of a collective bargain-
ing agent which was allegedly discriminating against women. The appeals
court enforced the Board's finding that the company violated sections 8(a)(3)
and (a)(5) by refusing to bargain with the certified representative. The deci-
sion largely takes the Board out of the business of policing potential bar-
gaining representatives for discriminatory practices; that function is properly
reserved for the EEOC. However, where the discriminatory policies of the
bargaining representative are so blatantly invidious as to interfere with the
union's ability to fairly represent the employees, the Board will conduct a
hearing and conceivably deny certification. The immediate impact of Bell &
Howell will he to prevent employers from alleging discriminatory practices by
the newly elected bargaining representative as a tactic for stalling negotiations.
Hopefully, the well-reasoned opinion of the District of Columbia Circuit will
be followed by the other circuits.
4 " By "discriminatory on its face- reference is made to "blatant" discrimination.
See note 39 supra.
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B. Bargaining Units
1. Withdrawal of Multi-Employer Units Upon Impasse: Independent Ass'n of Steel
Fabricators
The use of multi-employer bargaining units has long been considered a
desirable means of promoting effective collective bargaining, and therefore a
valuable means of preserving industrial peace) Because of this recognition
that the multi-employer bargaining unit is an important component of na-
tional labor policy, the National Labor Relations Board (Board) has acted
carefully in setting guidelines pertaining to either union or employer with-
drawal from such bargaining arrangements.' Essentially, the Board has held
that prioroo opening negotiations, the union or an employer may withdraw
unilaterally from group bargaining for any reason, without consent from the
other party(ies), provided that adequate and unequivocal notice is given. 3
After negotiations have begun, however, withdrawal is permitted only upon
either the mutual consent of the union and employer, or unilaterally in the
event of "unusual circumstances."' Since these guidelines are designed to
promote certainty in the scope of' collective bargaining units and to foster and
maintain stability in bargaining relationships, the Board has restricted the
scope of the "unusual circumstances" justification for withdrawal. Generally
speaking, the Board will allow withdrawal only where "the very existence of
[the withdrawing employer] as a viable business entity has ceased or is about
to cease," r' or where the bargaining unit has been fragmented or dissipated to
the point that it no longer is viable.''
During this Survey year, the Second Circuit, in NLRB v. Independent Associ-
ation of Steel Fabricators, Inc. 7 expanded the scope of the "unusual cir-
cumstances" rule to include a genuine impasse in contract negotiations. The
court determined that an employer may withdraw from contract negotiations
upon genuine impasse, provided that unequivocal notice of withdrawal is
given to the union." The court also held that an employer has a duty to
bargain individually with the union following withdrawal if the union ex-
presses its willingness to bargain."
The Steel Fabricators case involved a multi-employer bargaining group (the
Association) that had been formed in 1975 by a group of employers who
' NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 95 (1957) (Buf-
falo Linen Supply Co.).
2 Retail Associates, Inc., 120 N.L.R.B. 388, 393-95. 41 L.R.R.M. 1502, 1502
(1958).
3 Id.
4 Id .
Hi-Way Billboards, 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23, 84 L.R.R.M. 1161, 1162 (1973). See
also Spun -ice Corporation, 171 N.L.R.B. 557, 558, 68 L.R.R.M. 1121, 1123 (1968).
+' Typographic Service Co., 238 N.L.R.B. No. 211, 99 L.R.R.M. 1649, 1650
(1978); Connell Typesetting Co., 212 N.L.R.B. 918, 921, 87 L.R.R.M. 1001, 1004
(1974).
7 582 F.2d 135, 98 L.R.R.M. 3150 (2d Cir. 1978).
8 Id. at 146, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3157.
Id. at 150-51, 98 L.R.R.N1. at 3160-61.
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previously had bargained individually with Local 455." By combining their
bargaining efforts, the group hoped to eliminate some of the fifty-six differ-
ences that existed between their expiring individual contracts and the contract
received by a different multi-employer group of competitors (Allied).'' How-
ever, bargaining progress was slow. Throughout negotiations, the union per-
sisted in refusing to budge on- the Association's attempts to reach parity with
the Allied agreement. After six months of bargaining, four members of the
twenty-eight member employer unit had withdrawn with union consent."
Six others had withdrawn silently and had signed contracts with a different
union, Local 810." Finally, nineteen members of the employer group, in-
cluding the six who already had signed with Local 810, sent written notice of
withdrawal to the union.' 4
 The union promptly replied that it did not con-
sent to the withdrawals, and, within a week thereafter, the union reached a
settlement with the five remaining employers." All but two of the nineteen
employers who had withdrawn without union consent refused to join in this
agreement; six of these nonsignatories eventually signed contracts with Local
810.'" pi
•'Local 455 fled" various unfair labor practice charges with the Board."
Concerning the charges related to withdrawals from the multi-employer bar-
gaining group, the Board held that all withdrawals made without union con-
sent were invalid.'" All withdrawing employers were charged by the Board
with violations of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations
Act. They were ordered to dissolve whatever relationships had been reached
with Local 810 and to execute the agreement reached with the five non-
withdrawing employers."
On appeal, the Second Circuit denied enforcement of part of the Board's
order." Most importantly, the court found that an impasse in the negotia-
tions had been reached by the time the nineteen members of the employer
'" Id. at 140, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3152. Local 455 represented, among others,
employees in the steel Fabrication and construction industry.
" Id.
' 2 Id. at 141, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3153.
'' Id.
' 4 Id. at 141, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3154.
13 Id. at 142, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3154.
it; hi,
17
 Certain employers were charged with violations of sections 8(a)(1), (2), and
(5) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (2), (5) (1976), for
soliciting their employees to abandon Local 455 and join Local 810. Some were also
charged with violations of section 8(a)(1) for threatening plant shutdowns or employee
discharge unless workers agreed to join Local 810. Finally, sonic employers were
charged with violatons of sections 8(01) and (3) for failure to reinstate discharge
employees upon their unconditional offer to return to work. 231 N.L.R.B. 264, 265,
97 L.R.R.M. 1391, 1392 (1977). Discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this
Survey chapter.
" 231 N.L.R.B. at 290, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1392.
Ili Id .
" See NLRB v. Independent Ass . n of Steel Fabricators, Inc., 582 F.2d 135,
153, 98 L.R.R.M. 3150, 3162-63,
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unit notified the union of their withdrawal. 21 Reasoning that "the objectives
of collective bargaining would be ill-served by compelling employers to remain
in the bargaining unit once it becomes clear that no progress is being made
within that framework," 22
 the court found that such an impasse was the sort
of unusual circumstance which would justify unilateral withdrawal, provided
notice was given to the union. 23
 Based on this finding, the court held that
the withdrawal from multi-employer bargaining was effective as to thirteen of
the nineteen withdrawing employers. 24
 The six employers who hid signed
contracts with Local 810 prior to their notice of withdrawal, however, were
found to have committed a section 8(a)(5) violation. 25 Since these employers
had precluded themselves from bargaining with Local 455 before the Union
had been given notice of withdrawal, the court determined that joining in a
subsequent notice to the union could not protect them from liability for the
earlier inability to bargain. 2 "
The court then considered two remaining issues. First, the court denied
enforcement to that part of the Board's order which determined that the
withdrawn employers were bound by the terms of the agreement reached by
the union with the five non-withdrawing members of the Association. 27
 Those
21 Id. at 146, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3157. Although the factors which can lead to a
court's finding of impasse are too varied too allow a listing of specific criteria, the
Second Circuit. cited American Federation of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d
622, 628, 67 L.R.R.M. 3032, 3035-36 (D.C. Cir. 1968), and NLRB v. Hi-Way Billboards,
473 F.2d 649, 655, 82 L.R.R.M. 2527, 2532 (5th Cir. 1973), for the proposition that a
genuine impasse exists when "there [is] no realistic prospect (sic) that continuation of
discussion ... would have been fruitful." 582 F.2d at 147, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3158. Using
this definition, the Steel Fabricators court found that an impasse had been reached. The
court stated that: "[wihen the union refused to budge on any of the fifty-odd differ-
ences between the independent contracts and the Allied contract, it was akin to affir-
mation that the Association was useless as a bargaining device." Id., 98 L.R.R.M. at
3157. The court rejected the union's contention that it had broken any impasses by
continually circulating new and revised proposals. Id., 98 L.R.R.M. at 3157. The court
rejected the union's contention that it had broken any impasses by continually circulat-
ing new and revised proposals. Id., 98 L.R.R.M. at 3158. The court noted that "not
every shift in position signifies progress, especially if it is unresponsive to the principal
issue in contention." Id. Since the elimination of disparities between the individual
contracts and the Allied agreement was the "single most important issue in dispute,"
the union's lack of flexibility in that area resulted in a genuine impasse. Id.
" Id. at 146, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3157.
2" Id. at 149, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3159.
24 id. at 148-49, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3159.
25 Id. at 149, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3159.
2 " The court's requirement of notice of withdrawal is consistent with the posi-
tion taken by the Board. See, e.g., Goodsell & Vocke, Inc., 223 N.L.R.B. 60, 66, 92
L.R.R.M, 1187, 1187 (1976), enforced, 559 F.2d 1141, 96 L.R.R.M, 2370 (9th Cir.
1977). The Steel Fabricators court spoke of the dangers of withdrawal without notifica-
tion: Ishich tacit withdrawal not only withholds knowledge from the union about the
composition of the bargaining unit, .hut also deprives it of the opportunity either to
initiate independent negotiations with the withdrawing party or to file a complaint
promptly with the Board. To abrogate the notice requirement when one party leaves
multi-employer bargaining in the face of an impasse would interject a further element
of uncertainty into a negotiating context already destabilized by withdrawal." 582 F.2d
at 149, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3159.
27 Id.
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employers who signed the agreement had made it clear that. they were not
authorized to sign on behalf of anyone but themselves. The court felt that
enforcement of the Board order would be tantamount to allowing the Board
"to dictate substantive contractual terms to which neither an employer nor its
agent had acceded," 28
 a power which is clearly beyond the scope of Board
authority. 2 " Thus, the court held that the withdrawn employers, including
the six who had withdrawn without notice, were not bound by the terms of
the agreement.
The court then considered whether there was a duty for the employers to
bargain individually with Local 455 after withdrawal." To evaluate this issue,
the court divided the members of the Association into three groups: (I) those
employers who signed with Local 810 before giving notice of withdrawal; (2)
those employers who signed with Local 810 after giving notice of withdrawal;
and (3) those employers who gave notice of withdrawal, but did not sign an
agreement with any union."' As to the first group, the court held that be-
cause they signed with Local 810 before giving any notice to Local 455, they
clearly had violated section 8(a)(5). 32 The court found that such "tacit with-
drawal" must be considered ineffective in order to perserve "stability of labor
relations."' 13
 The subsequent signing of agreements with Local 810, which
precluded any future bargaining with Local 455, therefore resulted in an un-
excused violation of section 8(a)(5). As to the second and third groups, the
court found that the duty to bargain individually with Local 455 depended on
twc.) factors.
First, the duty to bargain exists only if the Union enjoys a majority status
among employees."' Since Local 455 had not been certified by the Board
within the year prior to withdrawal, the union was not entitled to a conclusive
presumption of majority status. 35
 However, since Local 455 had been the
recognized bargaining agent of the employees "for many years," and was the
"incumbent union," the court held that it was entitled to a rebuttable pre-
sumption of a majority status." The court. then stated that, "[Omployers
charged with a refusal to bargain could rebut the presumption by introducing
evidence that the union did not in fact have majority support when their
refusal occurred or that their refusal was founded on a good faith doubt of
the union's majority status." 37
28 Id., 98 L.R.R.N.I. at 3160.
29
 See, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970); NLRB v. In-
surance Agents' International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 486 (1960).
3"
 582 F.2d at 149, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3159.
" Id. at 149-50, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3160.
32 Id. at 150, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3160.
33
 Id. at. 148-49, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3159.
31
 NLRB v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 277
(1972).
582 F.2d al 150, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3160 (citing Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96,
104 (1954)).
3fi
37 Id.
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Before reaching the question of the union's majority status, however, the
court. felt. that a second factor must be considered in assessing the duty to
bargain individually after withdrawal. Even though an employer may concede
that the union has majority status, there may be no duty to bargain unless the
union requests individual negotiations. 3 " In the instant. case, the union never
requested individual meetings, but "chose, instead, to stand upon its position
that the withdrawing employers were bound by the stipulation signed by the
minority.""" Thus, for the third class of employers who withdrew and signed
with no union, there was no proof of violation of a duty to bargain." The
court reasoned that because of the union's steadfast position regarding the
binding effect of the agreement. ultimately reached, it was impossible to place
blame on the employer for any failure to negotiate individual contracts. As to
the second group of employers, however, who withdrew and then signed with
Local 810, the court found that "since they intended to sign with some union,
we believe that. they were under a duty to seek bargaining with Local 455 on
an individual basis before negotiating with Local 810." 41 This duty to seek
bargaining exists even in the face of the union's claim that the employer was
already bound by the minority agreement.
The court thus distinguished employers in group two from group three
employers by placing the burden on the union to show willingness to bargain
individually, unless an employer is about to engage in negotiations with
another union. In the latter case the burden to show a willingness to pursue
individual negotiations shifts to the employer. Since the employers in group
two had not sought individual bargaining with Local 455 before negotiating
with Local 810, the court affirmed the Board's finding of an 8(a)(5) viola-
tion. 42 The court did, of course, leave room for an employer defense, noting
that the negotiations with other unions, without an attempt to reach agree-
ment with Local 455, could be excused if the employer could show that the
union had in fact lost its majority status or that there was a rational basis for
doubting its majority. 4 "
The Steel Fabricators decision is significant for two reasons. First, the Sec-
ond Circuit now has joined four other circuits in holding that an impasse in
negotiations is sufficiently "unusual circumstance" to justify withdrawal from
multi-employer bargaining. 44 This developing trend in the courts is a clear
departure from the Board's policy, which consistently has refused to expand
the coverage of the 'unusual circumstance" rule to an impasse in bargain-
Id. at 150-51, 98 L.R.R.M, at 3160-61.
' 3 " Id. at 150, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3160.
4" Id. at 151, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3161.
11 Id. (emphasis added).
42 Id. at 152, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3161.
43 Id. at 151, 98 L.R.R.N11. at 3161 .
44 NLRB v. Beck Engraving Co., 522 F.2d 475, 483, 90 L.R.R.M. 2089, 2094
(3d Cir. 1975); NLRB v. Associated Shower Door Co., 512 F.2d 230, 232, 88 L.R.R.M.
3024, 3025-26 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 893 (1975); NLRB v. Hi-Way
Billboards, Inc., 500 F.2d 181, 183-84, 87 L.R.R.M. 2203, 2205-06 (5th Cir. 1974);
Fairmont Foods Co. v. NLRB, 471 F.2d 1170, 1172-73, 82 L.R.R.M. 2017, 2019 (8th
Cir. 1972).
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ing. 45
 The second important aspect of the Steel Fabricators case is its holding
regarding the employer's duty to bargain with the union fi.)1lowing withdrawal
from the multi-employer group. The Steel Fabricators decision represents the
first thorough discussion of the issue in a circuit court.
To evaluate the soundness of the court's decision one must consider the
two reasons typically advanced to justify unilateral withdrawal upon impasse.
The four circuits which upheld the impasse justification for withdrawal prior
to Steel Fabricators seemed most concerned with the promotion of even-handed
fairness in the union/employer relationship." The courts all noted that the
Board has committed itself to the proposition that its rules for withdrawal
from multi-employer negotiations should apply equally to unions and
employers. 47
 Since the Board has held that a union which has commenced
collective bargaining with a multi-employer group may withdraw from the
group bargaining with respect to one or more employers, while continuing to
hold negotiations with the other members as a unit," it would he unfair to
'deny employers the right to withdraw upon impasse. If, upon impasse, a
union is allowed to enter into individual negotiations and reach individual
agreements with selected members of the employer unit who then would re-
sume operations, the bargaining strength of the remaining members would he
weakened considerably. Through the subsequent use of selected strikes, the
union would he able to whipsaw the remaining members of the significantly
fragmented and weakened multi-employer unit. into signing a collective bar-
gaining agreement that would reflect the union's strengthened bargaining
position. This imbalance resulting from the Board's present position is re-
moved by allowing employers, as well as unions, to withdraw from multi-
employer bargaining upon impasse.
Although the court in Steel Fabricators recognized the importance of'
balancing union/employer negotiating weapons, and protecting the group
members from being whipsawed by selected individualized agreements," the
court seemed most concerned with a second reason for permitting with-
drawal: the futility of continued group negotiations in the face of a genuine
impasse. 5 " Since the rules against untimely withdrawal arc designed to pre-
serve the stability of multi-employer bargaining, once a genuine impasse is
reached there is no utility in narrowly applying these rules to preserve a bar-
gaining situation that obviously has failed. Rather than keep employers locked
" Florida Fire Sprinklers, Inc., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 155, 99 1...R.R.M. 1078, 1078
(1978); Bill Cook Buick, Inc., 224 N.L.R.B. 1094, 1096, 92 L.R.R.M. 1582, 1582
(1976); Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23-24, 84 L.R.R.M. 1161, 1163
(1973).
4 " See note 44, supra.
47
 The Evening News Ass'n, 154 N.L.R.B. 1494, 1495-97, 60 L.R.R.M. 1149,
1150-52 (1965), enforced sub nom. Detroit. Newspaper Publishers Ass'n v. NLRB, 372
E.2d 569, 572, 64 1...R.R.M. 2403, 2406 (6th Cir. 1967).
48
 Pacific Coast Ass'n of Pulp & Paper Nlanufacturers, 163 N.L.R.B. 892, 895,
64 L.R.R.M. 1420,.1423 (1967).
4" 582 F.2(1 at 147 n.21, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3158 11.21
5" See text and notes at notes 21 and 22, s nprw.
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into a group position, the court felt that it would better serve the interests of
labor policy to allow withdrawal and a fresh start on an individualized basis.
The disagreement between the circuits and the Board over use of the
impasse doctrine appears to rest mainly on differences in viewpoint regarding
the impact of an impasse on the bargaining situation. The Board has stated
that:
[A] genuine impasse is akin to a hiatus in negotiations. In the over-
all ongoing process of collective bargaining, it is merely a point at
which the parties cease to negotiate and often resort to forms of
economic persuasion to establish the primacy of their negotiating
position. Moreover, the occurrence of a genuine impasse cannot be
said to be an unexpected, unforeseen, or unusual event in the pro-
cess of negotiations since no experienced negotiator arrives at the
bargaining table with absolute confidence that all of his proposals
will be readily and completely accepted. Therefore, it is clear that an
impasse is but one thread in the complex tapestry of collective bar-
gaining, rather than a bolt of a different hue. In short, a genuine
impasse is not the end of collective bargaining."
In denying withdrawal rights upon impasse, the Board plainly is concerned
with disruption of the normal processes of bargaining. No doubt, the Board is
justified in denying withdrawal where hard bargaining or economic strikes
lead to gaps in the negotiating process, but where continued bargaining is
reasonably certain to occur. In situations like Steel Fabricators, however, where
group bargaining has been an obvious failure, or where there is no realistic
possibility that continuation of discussion would prove to be fruitful, the deci-
sion of the circuits appears to be justified. Whether used to provide equiva-
lence in union/employer bargaining weapons, or to prevent employers from
being locked into a useless negotiating situation, the impasse doctrine should
be accepted by the Board. The concerns of both the Board and the courts can
be met by distinguishing between a halt in bargaining progress that reflects
difficulties of sufficient magnitude to justify withdrawal, and a situation where
the prospects for future progress appear reasonable.
The Second Circuit has demonstrated this sort of responsible application
of the impasse doctrine by denying withdrawal in a decision announced the
same day as Steel Fabricators. In NLRB v. Acme Iron Works, Inc.," an employer
(Acme) had attempted unilateral withdrawal from negotiations, and had
claimed that a bargaining impasse justified the attempted withdrawal." Al-
though negotiations had come to a halt, the court noted that "[t]he suspension
of negotiations does not of itself indicate that further discussion would have
been fruitless."" The court then referred to the industry practice, whereby
Acme's bargaining group (the Association) would use the agreement reached
5 ' Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206 N.L.R.B. 22, 23, 84 L.R.R.M. 1161, 1162-63
(1974).
'" 582 F.2d 153, 98 L.R.R.M. 3163 (2d Cir. 1978).
" U. at 155-56, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3164-65.
5a Id. at 157, 98 L.R.R.M. at 3165-66.
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between the union and another multi-employer group (Allied) as a bench-
mark.'" The court felt that negotiations between the union and the Associa-
tion were simply at a lull while the parties awaited a settlement between the
union and Allied. Thus, the court stated that even though bargaining was
stopped, "the prospects for a settlement were excellent."'" Furthermore, the
court noted that Juinlike Independent Association of Steel Fabricators, where both
parties displayed intransigence on a critical issue, ... there is nothing in the
record here to suggest that the Union would decline to give [Association]
employers the benefit of the Allied agreement, and nothing to indicate that.
they had reason to hope for something better."" The distinction drawn by
the Second Circuit between impasse situations where further negotiations
would be fruitless (Steel Fabricators), and those that arise in the normal course
of the bargaining process (Acme Iron Works), should be adopted by the Board
in analyzing future withdrawal cases.
The second part of the Steel Fabricators decision, in which the court dis-
cussed the individual bargaining duties of withdrawing employers, also is con-
sistent with national labor policy. The use of collecive bargaining as a means
of preserving industrial peace is the crux of that policy." The fact that a
voluntarily created multi-employer group has been a failure should not excuse
any party from their section 8 duties to bargain in good faith. Furthermore, it
appears proper to require the union to show willingness to bargain individu-
ally before holding an employer liable for refusal to bargain, unless the
employer is considering negotiations with an ()inside union. In a situation like
Steel Fabricators, where the union refuses to consent to employer withdrawals
and adheres to a position that all employers are hound by any subsequent
agreement, it would be futile to place an affirmative duty on employers to
press for individualized bargaining.
In sum, both the Board and the courts agree that the use of multi-
employee bargaining units is an effective means of promoting collective bar-
gaining. In the interest of preserving stability in the bargaining process, it is
essential that rules be fashioned to govern the withdrawal rights of individual
employers within the group. In cases where the group bargaining process
breaks down, the Second Circuit, in NLRB v. Independent Ass'n of Steel Fab-
ricators, has now joined four other circuits in holding that a "genuine impasse"
in negotiations is an appropriate event for employer withdrawal from the
bargaining group. Employers who withdraw are thereafter required to seek
individual negotiations with the union, unless the union refuses to accept the
validity of a withdrawal and persists in negotiating solely with the remaining
group members. The Second Circuit's decision appears to be a reasonable
accommodation of all parties' interests, and should serve to promote labor
relations stability in situations where group bargaining has failed.
55 Id. at 158, 98 1.„R.R.M. at 3166.
5" Id. at 157, 98 1..R.R.M. at 3165.
57 Id. at 158, 98 L. R.R.M. at 3166.
'" See, e.g., United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co.,
363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
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111. UNFAIR LABOR PRAcricEs
A. Employer Unfair Labor Practices
1. Duty to Release Information
a. Detroit Edison—The employer's duty to bargain collectively, established
in section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA ' includes the duty to provide relevant infor-
mation to the employees' collective barganing agent. 2
 During the Survey year
in Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB," the Supreme Court considered the issue of
whether an employer is required to provide psychological aptitude tests, and
test. scores of named employees, which were used as criteria fOr promotion, to
the employee's bargaining agent in preparation for arbitration.' The Court
held that the Board had exceeded its remedial discretion in ordering the
employer to release the tests directly to the union 5
 and that the employer had
not committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to release the scores of
individual employees until the union procured the employee's consent.' The
decision has the immediate impact of protecting the utilization of standard-
ized aptitude tests in employment situations, and also has a broader impact
through its limitation of" the employer's duty to provide the union with rele-
vant information and its complication of the arbitration process.
Detroit Edison (Company) is a public utility engaged in the generation
and distribution of electric power in ,Michigan
. '
 The Utility Workers Union
of America Local 223, AFL-CIO (Union) represents a unit of operating and
maintenance employees at the Company's plant in Monroe, Michigan." One
of the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement specified that promo-
tions within the unit were to be based on seniority "whenever the reasonable
qualifications and abilities of the employees are not significantly different.""
In 1971 the Company invited bids from unit employees to fill six Instrument
Man B openings at the Monroe plant.'" The Company administered stan-
dardized aptitude tests as a means of predicting job performance on the In-
strument Man B positions, and all employees who hid for the positions were
required to take the aptitude tests." On the basis of the aptitude tests the
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) provides in pertinent pari — :
lilt shall be an unfair labor practive for an employer—to refuse to bargain collectively
with the representatives of his employees. -
NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 436 (1967); NLRB v. Truitt
Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 153-54 (1956).
" 440 U.S. 301 (1979). justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which the Chief justice and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. justice
Stevens concurred in part and dissented in part. justice White filed a dissenting opin-
ion, in which Justices Brennan and Marshall joined.
-1 Id. at 303.
' Id. at 317.
" Id. at 320.
7 Id. at 304.
8 Id.
' 1 Id. at 304-05.
'" Id. at 307. An "Instrument Man B" is responsible for installing, calibrating,
testing and adjusting power plant instrumentation. The position is the lowest starting
grade under the contract. Id. at 305.
" Id. at 306.
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employees were graded either as "not recommended" or as "acceptable".' 2
Ten unit employees bid for the Instrument. Man B positions. None of the
employees received an "acceptable" score on the aptitude tests; they all were
rejected on that basis.' 3 The Company eventually filled the jobs with
employees from outside the bargaining unit." The Union subsequently filed
a grievance concerning the company's refusal to hire any of the ten unit
employees, contending that the testing procedure was unfair, and that the
Company's bypassing the senior unit employees violated the collective bargain-
ing agreement. The grievance was taken to arbitration.'"
In preparation for the arbitration, the Union requested that the Com-
pany turn over materials relating to the standardized psychological aptitude
tests administered for the Instrument Man B position. The Union requested
three types of information: the actual tests (the test battery), the applicant's
test papers, and the applicants test scores, identified by name.'" The Com-
pany refused to release the materials, claiming that complete confidentiality of
the materials was required to protect. the future use of the tests and the pri-
vacy of the applicants."
The Union filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board.'" The
Administrative Law Judge agreed with the Union and determined that the
Company's failure to turn over the materials was a section 8(a)(5) violation.
He ordered that the tests and answer sheets he delivered to "a qualified psy-
chologist selected by the Union to act in its behalf in this matter." '" The
Board affirmed the finding of the violation, but modified the remedial order
to require the Company to give the materials directly to the Union.'" The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit enforced the Board's order; 2 ' the Su-
preme Court reversed. 22
 The Court held, first, that the Board abused its dis-
12 Id. The tests were revised in the late 1960's. Originally the company graded
employees as "not recommended, acceptable or recommended." Id. Under the revised
testing system only two grades were possible "not recommended" or "acceptable." The
gross test score for the new "acceptable" grade was higher than the old "acceptable"
grade but lower than the old "recommended .' grade. Id.
13 Id. at 307. The employees were graded on a point system. A total score of
less than 10.3 indicated that the employee was not recommended, a score above 10.3
was acceptable.
14 Id. at 307.
15 Id.
'" Id. at 307-08.
' 7 Id. at 308.
' 8 Id. The parties proceeded with the arbitration with the reservation that the
union could reopen the hearing should it prevail on its unfair labor practice charge.
The arbitrator found that the Company was within its contractual rights in administer-
ing the tests, but that the cutoff point of 10.3 was arbitrary. The arbitrator ordered
the Company to reevaluate the three employees who scored between 9.3 and 10.3.
One of these employees was eventually hired. See Detroit Edison Co., 218 N.L.R.B.
1024, 1029-31, 89 L.R.R.M. 1515 (1975).
1 " 218 N.L.R.B. 1024, 1036, 89 1...R.R.M. 1515, 1519.
20 Id. at 1024, 89 L.R.R.M. at 1519.
21
 NLRB v. Detroit. Edison Co., 560 F.2(1 722, 727, 95 L.R.R.M. 3341, 3344
(6th Cir. 1977).
22 440 U.S. 301, 320 (1979).
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cretion in ordering the Company to turn over the test battery and answer
sheets directly to the Union. 23
 Second, the Court held that the Board's order
requiring the Company to release the employee's scores was erroneous, that
the Company's refusal to release the scores was not a section 8(a)(5)
 viola-
LtOn. 24
The Court accepted the Board's finding that the Company had violated
section 8(a)(5) by refusing to release the test battery and answers. 25
 While
affirming the Board's finding of a statutory violation, however, the Court
questioned the Board's remedial order, which required the Company to re-
lease the test battery and answers directly to the Union, rather than to a qual-
ified psychologist, as the Adminstrative Law Judge had ordered. The Court
found that the Company had an "undisputed and important" 26 interest in
keeping the test questions and answers secret, and that the Board's remedial
order unnecessarily disserved the "legitimate and substantial" interest of the
Company in secrecy. 27
 The Court also found that the restrictions contained
in the Board's order—that the Union use the tests to the extent necessary to
process and arbitrate the grievances, but not to copy or disclose the tests—
probably were unenforceable." Due to these considerations the Court con-
cluded that the Board's remedial order exceeded its discretion; 29 the Com-
pany should not be required to release the test battery and answers directly to
the union. 3 "
The Court next analyzed the issue of whether the Company had commit-
ted a section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice by refusing to release the scores of
the applicants who took the test and to identify these scores by the employees'
" Id. at 317.
24
 Id. at 320.
25 Id. at 312. The Company presented the following arguments: (I) disclosure
of the test materials to the union includes a substantial risk of disclosure to potential
job applicants: (2) the company went to great expense to prepare and validate the
tests; (3) the effectiveness of the tests depends on their secrecy; (4) public policy favors
validated perlO•mance aptitude tests; (5) material harm will result if the company is
required to release the tests directly to the Union. Id. at 313.
The Board countered with the following arguments: (1) the Union's institutional
function of presenting grievances at arbitration requires the information; (2) the
Union will not distribute the information, and will respect the Board's order. Id. at
314.
2" Id. at 316.
Id. at 315.
" Id. The Court implied that the Union would violate inevitably these restric-
tions. Further, the Court noted that contempt proceedings would not be available
against the Union since the Union was not a party to the appeals court enforcement
proceeding. The Court dismissed as inadequate the possibility of unfair labor practice
proceedings to enforce the Board's restrictions. Id. at 315-16. The dissent rejected this
analysis. Id. at 322-24.
2''
	 at 316-17.
3" Id. This reversal of the Board's remedial order, while affirming the Board's
finding of an 8(a)(5) violation, implicitly re-establishes the remedial order of the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge which required the Company to release the test battery and
answers to a qualified, Union selected psychologist. See 218 N.l..R.B. at 1036. 89
L, R. R. M . at 151.
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name."' The Court determined that the Company had a well founded in-
terest in preserving employee confidence in the testing program"? and that •
the Company's promise of confidentiality was not designed to frustrate union
attempts to process grievances." The Court then took judicial notice of the
fact that people are sensitive to the disclosure of information concerning their
basic competency."' The Court, with these factors in mind, concluded that
the Company's offer to release the examinees' scores only upon consent. of the
individual examinees satisfied the Company's obligations under section 8(a)(5)
to bargain in good faith." 5 The Court, therefore, held that the Board's order
requiring the Company to release unconditionally the employees' scores to the
Union was erroneous.'
In summary, the Court retained the Board's finding that the Company
committed a section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice by refusing to release the
tests and answer sheets. The Court, however, rejected the Board's remedial
order for that violation, determining that the Board exceeded its discretion in
ordering the Company to release the tests and the answers directly to the
Union."' The Court completely rejected the Board's finding that the Com-
pany committed a section 8(a)(5) unfair labor practice by unconditionally re-
fusing to release the examinees' test scores. The Company's offer to release the
scores, upon consent of the individual examinees, the Court found, satisfied
the Company's duty to bargain in good faith." 8
Both aspect of the Court's opinion present significant developments in
labor law. Generally, once the Board has determined that a party has commit-
ted an unfair labor practice, the Board is accorded "broad discretionary"
power to remedy the unfair labor practice "subject to limited judicial re-
view.""" The Court had previously held that the remedial order of the Board
"will not be disturbed 'unless it can be shown that the order is a patent at-
tempt to achieve ends other than those which can fairly be said to effectuate
the policies of the Act.' " 4" In Detroit Edison, however, the Court was willing
" 1 440 U.S. at 312, 317-20. The Company presented several arguments on this
issue: (1) the information is not relevant for the Union's purposes; (2) the Union's
need for the individual test scores is outweighed by, (a) the Company's promise of'
confidentiality; (b) the psychologists code of ethics; (c) the potential embarrassment
and harrassment of the examinees. Id. at 317.
The Board presented the following arguments: (1) The information is relevant;
and (2) The Union's need outweighs the Company's asserted justification for non-
release. Id.
"2 Id. at 315.
:u Id. at. 319.
" 4 Id. at 318. The dissenters disagreed with this point, finding that the poten-
tial embarrassment of employees in this situation was speculative and not a subject for
judicial notice. Id. at 328.
3" Id. at 317.
" Id. at 320.
17
 Id. at 316-17.
Id. at 318.
" 5 Fibreboard v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964). The Detroit Edison dissent
emphasized the remedial discretion normally accorded to the Board. 440 U.S. at 321.
4" Fibreboard v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 216 (1964) (quoting Virginia Electric &
Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943)).
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to substitute its own accomodation of the conflicting interests in place of the
Board's determination.
As the dissent noted, the Court's rejection of the Board's remedial order,
is an implicit acceptance of the original order of the Adminst•ative Law judge
which required the Company to release the test battery and answers to a
psychologist selected by the Union.'" By tacitly adopting this remedial or-
der, the Court is introducing a third party, or at least an uninvited partner
for the union, into the arbitration process. This requirement. of employing an
expert psychologist, as a prerequisite to obtaining the relevant information
from the company, complicates a proceeding which is ideally a model of effi-
ciency, economy and justice:12 By striking the Board's remedial order, there-
fore, the Court has both limited the remedial discretion of the Board, and
complicated some arbitration proceedings by requiring the involvement of
third party experts.
The second part of the Court's holding—that the company's refusal to
provide the test. scores unless the union procures the employees' consent is
not a section 8(a)(5) violation—is the more significant aspect of the opinion.
Decisions in the line of NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co. 43 and NLRB v. Acme Industrial
Co. :44 have followed the analysis that once the union shows that the sought
after information is relevant, the company is required to release the informa-
tion." In Detroit Edison, the Court rejected that analysis. Although the Court
accepted the relevance of the sought after information," the Court rejected
the relevancy standard for the release of information. Instead, the Court
adopted a standard which balanced the interest of the Company, the
employees and the Union in considering the release of the information.'
This balancing approach is likely to limit the information which employers are
required to provide to unions.
The introduction of the employees' interest in confidentiality into the ar-
bitration process is a noteworthy development. Arbitration is a contractual
enforcement mechanism, in which the employer and the collective bargaining
agent, the parties to the contract, are parties; the individual employee griev-
ant is not a party to the arbitration. The union has a duty to represent fairly
all the employees in the bargaining unit," not simply those employees who
4i 440 U.S at 324-25. See Detroit Edison Co., 218 N.L.R.B. at 1036, 89
L.R.R.M. at 1519.
42 "Efficiency, Economy and Justice" is the motto of the American Arbitration
Association.
' 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
44 385 U.S. 432 (1967). In Acme the Court found that an employer had a duty
to release information when the union demonstrated "a probability that the desired
information was relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in carrying out its
statutory duties and responsibilities." Id. at 437.
as Id. at 436.
46 440 U.S. at 311.
42 Id. at 319.
" Steele v. Louisiana & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 199-200 (1944); Wal-
lace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). A union violating its duty of fair_rep-
resentation is liable in federal court for damages or equitable relief. See Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 196 (1967).
132	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:85
consent to have the employer release their scores. The Court's weighing of
the employer's, employees' and union's interest in the release of the informa-
tion creates the possibility of a divergence of interest between the union and
some of the employees, a conflict with which the arbitration process was not
designed to deal.
In conclusion, the narrow holding of Detroit Edison is that the Board ex-
ceeded its discretion in ordering the Company to release the test battery and
answers directly to the Union, and that the Company did not violate section
8(a)(5) by refusing to turn over the employees' scores until the Union pro-
cured the indvidual employees' consent. The broader impact of the case,
however, will be to restrict union access to admittedly relevant information
and to create in an arbitration proceeding a potential conflict of interest be-
tween the collective bargaining agent and the employees it represents.
h. Westinghouse Electric; East Dayton Tool & Die Co.—The National Labor Re-
lations Act ' (the Act) imposes an obligation to "bargain collectively" upon
both employers and labor organizations subject to its terms. 2
 To fulfill this
statutory mandate, and to assure that the bargaining which takes place is' in-
formed bargaining, a duty is imposed upon employers to furnish, at the
union's request, such information and data as may he needed by the labor or-
ganization to negotiate and administer a collective bargaining agreement. 3
The union's right of access to, and the employer's corresponding obligation to
disclose, the requested information depends upon the "relevancy" of the in-
formation sought to the rights and duties of the labor organization. 4 An
employer who fails to produce relevant information or data properly sought
by the union commits an unfair labor practice in violation of section 8(a)(5) of
the Act. 5
 The labor union is also subject to certain obligations under the Act.
Among these is the duty of fair representation: an obligation to represent
fairly and without discrimination all unit employees with respect to terms and
conditions of employment." In two National Labor Relations Board decisions
' 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (1976).
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5), (b)(3), and (d) (1976).
3
 NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967); NLRB v. Whitin
Machine Works, 217 F.2d 593, 594, 35 L.R.R.M, 2215, 2216 (4th Cir. 1954), cert. de-
nied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955); Vcrjtrol Division, Boeing Company, 182 N.L.R.B. 421, 421,
74 L.R.R.M. 1165, 1167 (1970).
4
 A broad, discovery-type standard is used in determining the relevance of
the information sought by the union. The union roust show simply "a probability that
the desired inkrination was relevant, and that it would be of use to the union in
carrying out its statutory duties and responsibilities." NLRB v. Acme Industrial Co.,
385 U.S. 432, 437 (1967).
5
 29 U.S.C. § 58(0(5) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) states that "Mt shall he an un-
fair labor practice for an employer—... to refuse to bargain collectively with the rep-
resentatives of his employees ...." Id.
Steele v. Louisiana & Nashville R. Co., 323 U.S. 192. 199-200 (1944); Wal-
lace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255 (1944). A union is obligated to represent
employees without regard to race, sex, union status or other invidious grounds. A
union violating its duty of fair representation may be subject to a federal court suit for
damages or equitable relief, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 196 (1967), or to decertifica-
tion or unfair labor practice proceedings before the National Labor Relations Board.
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rendered during the Survey year, the Board expanded the scope of informa-
tion possessed by the employer which is available to the union for collective
bargaining and contract administration purposes. In Westinghouse Electric
Corp.' the Board held that labor unions were entitled to statistical data—
broken down by race, sex and Spanish surname—concerning the composition
of the bargaining unit. 8 The Board also held that an employer must provide
the union with a compilation of complaints and charges filed against the
employer under various federal and state fair employment practices laws,"
and dismissed as inapplicable statutes guaranteeing the confidentiality of such
charges)" In a companion case decided the same day, East Dayton Tool and
Die Co.," the Board further broadened the Westinghouse decision by holding
that the union was entitled to information relating to the race and sex of job
applicants where that information is relevant to the monitoring of a collective
bargaining agreement) 2
Together, Westinghouse and East Dayton raise the possibility that the
union's duty of fair representation has been broadened to a considerable extent.
The increased availability of information relating to the racial, sexual and
Spanish surname composition of the bargaining unit may impose upon the
union a corresponding obligation to seek out, analyze and act upon such in-
formation actively in fulfilling its duty to monitor employer compliance with
contractual and statutory antidiscrimination provisions. Further, Westinghouse
and East Dayton may have pierced the shield of confidentiality accorded
charges and complaints filed against employers pursuant to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act'" and other federal and state fair employment practices sta-
tutes.
A. Westinghouse Electric
In Westinghouse, the Electrical Workers International Union (IUE), repre-
senting certain Westinghouse bargaining units, requested from Westinghouse
three categories of information. First, the IUE sought a statitical
breakdown—by race, sex and Spanish surname—of Westinghouse's work-
force with respect to labor grade, job classification, wage rate, method of
payment (daywork or incentive pay basis), seniority, hiring, and promo-
tions: 4
 Second, the union requested a compilation of all complaints and
charges filed against Westinghouse that alleged violations of federal and state
fair employment practices laws."' Finally, the union sought copies of West-
inghouse's "affirmative action plan" and accompanying "work force
Independent Metal Workers Union, Local No. 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.L.R.B.
1573, 1576, 56 L.R.R.M. 1289. 1294 (1964); Galveston Maritime Ass'n., Inc., 148
N.L.R.B. 897, 899, 57 L.R.R.M. 1083, 1085 (1964).
239 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 99 L.R.R.M. 1482 (1978).
8 Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1487-88.
" Id., 99 L.R.R.M, at 1491.
'" Id.
" 239 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 99 L.R.R.M. 1499.
12 Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1501.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1976).
14 239 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 99 L.R.R.3 .1. at 1485.
m.
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analysis."'" When Westinghouse refused to comply with this request, the
IUE filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Board alleging that the
employer's failure to provide the requested information violated sections
8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the Act.' 7
The matter was heard first before an Administrative Law Judge (AI.J),
who found that Westinghouse had violated the Act by its refusal to comply
with certain of the requests for information." The AU j ordered Westing-
house to produce the statistical information and the information regarding
charges and complaints as requested by the union, but only insofar as that
information related to employees within the IUE bargaining units.'" No dis-
closure was ordered of information relating to non-unit employees. The ALJ
also ordered Westinghouse to produce copies of its affirmative action plan
and work force analysis.
The Board affirmed the decision and order of the Administrative Law
Judge in most respects." The Board addressed, first, the union's request for
statistical employment. data broken down by race, sex and Spanish surname.
Although recognizing that the issue was not seriously contested by Westing-
house,21
 the threshold concern for the Board was whether this statistical in-
formation was relevant to the collective bargaining process." The Board
concluded that, for a number of reasons, this information did meet the rele-
vancy test. The Board first noted the general non-discrimination policies of
the National Labor Relations Act and the appropriateness of non-
discrimination as a subject of collective bargaining. 2 ' Further, the Board
noted that the collective bargaining agreement in effect between Westing-
house and the IUE contained an antidiscrimination clause, which could be
t" Id. Westinghouse, as a United States government contractor, is required by
Executive Order No. 11296 to develop and maintain an "affirmative action plan" con-
taining company projections, goals and timetables to achieve equal employment oppor-
tunities. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10-2.13 (1978). Included in this plan is a "work force
analysis," which is a listing by job title, pay and other categories of all employees of the
company, broken down by race and sex. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11(a) (1978).
" 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) and (a)(5) (1976).
'" 239 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1485.
'" Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1493.
Id. The Board's disagreement with the Al,j concerned the Ails order that
Westinghouse provide the union with its affirmative action plan. See text and notes at
notes 33-36 infra.
21
 239 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1487. The Board noted that counsel
for Westinghouse objected only to making the compilation of the data, and not to the
legal obligation to supply the data. Id.
22 Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1485-87.
" Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1486. The Supreme Court has stated that "national labor
policy embodies the principles of nondiscrimination as a matter of highest priority."
Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50,
66 (1975). Toward this end, it has been held that failure to bargain in good faith
concerning discriminatory practices is a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the Act. Farmer's
Cooperative Compress, 169 N.L.R.B. 290, 290, 67 L.R.R.M. 1266, 1267 (1968), en-
forced sub nom United Packing Houses, Food and Allied Works Int. v. NLRB, 416 F.2d
1126 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 903 (1969).
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monitored through the use of such data.' Finally, the Board interpreted the
union's duty to its members—its duty of fair representation—as requiring
that the union seek and acquire such information or risk being held in breach
of its duty through "passive ignorance" of the employer's discriminatory prac-
tices." Based on these factors and concerns, the Board held that the re-
quested statistical data, as it concerned employees in the bargaining unit, was
presumptively relevant to the bargaining process. 2 i' The union, therefore,
was not required to make an initial showing of relevance before it became
entitled to the information." After finding presumptive relevance, the
Board rejected the employer's defenses for its failure to provide the statistical
data sought," and affirmed the ALJ's order that Westinghouse produce the
data for the union."
Having concluded that the statistical data was relevant to the bargaining
process and thus was available to the IUE, the Board next considered the
24 239 N.I.R.B. No. 19, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1486.
25 Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1486-87.
2" Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1487.
27 Id.
28 Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1488-91. Westinghouse raised five "affirmative" defenses
to providing the union with the requested data, regardless of its relevance. First, West-
inghouse contended that the local union, and not the International IUE, was the
proper party to request such information. The Board, pointing out that the antidis-
crimination clause between the parties was contained in the national contract, quickly
rejected this defense. Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1488.
Second, Westinghouse argued that the IUE "waived- its right of access to the
requested statistical data. The Board concluded that the record did not show evidence
of such a waiver. Id.
As a third defense, Westinghouse claimed that the JUE was seeking the requested
information nut for the purposes of collective bargaining, but for the purpose of pros-
ecuting a Title VII suit against the company, and that therefore, Westinghouse
should not have to provide the union with the data. The Board disagreed. Informa-
tion relevant to the collective bargaining process, stated the Board, does not lose that
relevance simply because it is susceptible to use by the union in another forum. Id., 99
L.R.R.M. at 1489. In any event, the Board noted further that, Title VII and NLRA
forums overlap and the use of any of these forums by a labor union is neither inconsi-
sent nor impermissible as related to the bargaining obligations of the union. Id.
Westinghouse further stated, as a fourth defense, that the IUE, in seeking the
statistical data, was attempting to circumvent discovery processes under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. Rejecting this contention, the Board noted that such data
might, in any event, be subject to production under the Federal Rules. The Board
found no evidence that the union was either acting in bad faith or attempting to abuse
the Board's processes in requesting the information. Id.
As a fifth, and final defense, Westinghouse claimed that compiling and providing
the union with the requested information would place an undue burden upon the
company. The Board rejected this defense as well, declaring that Westinghouse had
not made a valid attempt to substantiate this claim and that, regardless, Westinghouse
was required, as a government contactor, to keep much of the information sought by
the union. See note 15 supra. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1489-90.
2" Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1490. The Board also affirmed the ALJ's holding that
the requested statistical data was not presumptively relevant as to non-unit employees,
and that the union had not shown the particular relevance required. Therefore, in-
formation regarding non-unit employees was not ordered produced. Id., 99 L.R.R.M.
at 1487,
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union's request for the list of complaints and charges filed against Westing-
house alleging violations of Title VII and of other fair employment practices
laws. 3° Unlike the statistical data previously discussed, the Board did not find
"plainly obvious" the relevance of these charges and complaints, and therefore
invoked no presumption of relevance concerning them. 3 ' Rather, the Board
required the union to specify the relationship between the information sought
and the union's bargaining duties. 32 To fulfill this requirement, the IUE of-
fered two justifications for seeking the charges and complaints: first, it con-
tended that the information was necessary so that it could accurately measure
employee discontent concerning any alleged discriminatory practices on the
part of Westinghouse; and second, the IUE claimed that the information
would serve to determine whether charges of discrimination against Westing-
house had been resolved in a manner inconsistent with the collective bargain-
ing agreement." The Board, concluding that these concerns of the union
were sufficient to make such information relevant to the union's bargaining
duties, affirmed the order of the ALJ requiring Westinghouse to provide the
union the information regarding charges and complaints."
In finding the union entitled to these charges and complaints, the Board
expressly rejected Westinghouse's contention that the confidentiality provi-
sions of Title VII bar making this information available to the union." The
Board reasoned that the applicable section of Title VII,"' binds only the gov-
ernmental agency involved, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commis-
sion, and does not. govern the relationships between private parties." Further,
the Board concluded that these confidentiality provisions were designed to
prevent making available unproven charges to the general public, and thus
were not meant to prohibit making such information available to a labor or-
ganization which, because of its relationship to employees and employer, is
"far more concerned" with the issues involved than is the general public."'
The employer's affirmative action plans and accompanying work force
analysis were the final items requested by the union and considered by the
Board. The union, justifying its request for this information, contended that
the affirmative action plans were relevant because an inspection of them
might reveal that Westinghouse had undertaken committments inconsistent
" Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1491.
° Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id.
3"
 The applicable statute, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976), reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to
make public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the
Commission pursuant to its authority under this section prior to the institu-
tion of any proceeding under this title.
17 239 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 99 L.R.R.11.1. at 1491.
3" Id. The Board did, however, take cognizance of one of the purposes of the
confidentiality requirement: to protect the identity of the complaining party. Thus the
Board ordered Westinghouse to delete from the complaints and charges turned over
to the union the names of the charging parties. Id.
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with its collective bargaining agreement with the IUE. 39 The Board dis-
agreed, holding that the affirmative action plan was not "reasonably necessary"
to enable the union to administer the contract, and thus was not presump-
tively relevant to the bargaining process," The Board further suggested that
even if the union's speculation that Westinghouse had undertaken obligations
inconsistent with the collective bargaining agreement were true, the IUE
would have remedies available to deal with it. 4 ' Consequently, the Board
reversed this portion of the ALys decision and determined that the union was
not entitled to access to Westinghouse's affirmative action plan." A contrary
result, however, was reached with respect to the work force analysis. The
Board, noting that at least some of the information contained in the work
force analysis was similar to the statistical data previously ordered to be pro-
duced, 4" held that the union was entitled to copies of the analysis. Westing-
house was, however, entitled to delete any information "unrelated" to the
statistical data.'
B. East Dayton Tool & Die Co.
In the companion case to Westinghouse, East Dayton Tool & Die Co.," the
union, against the IUE, requested from the employer, East Dayton, data con-
cerning the total number of males, females, whites, blacks and other
minorities who sought employment, and the total number in each group who
actually were hired by East Dayton in 1973 and 1974. 46 When the employer
refused to honor this request, the IUE filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the NLRB. The Administrative Law Judge, finding that the union was
entitled to this information, ordered East Dayton to comply with the union
request."
The Board affirmed the order of the ALJ, concluding that the union had
successfully shown the relevance of information concerning job applicants to
the collective bargaining process." The Board noted that the parties them-
Id„ 99 I...R.R.M. at 1192.
4 " Id.
4 I Id. The Board also rejected the union's contention that federal regulations,
in particular 41 C.E.R..§ 60-2.21(a)(6), required union involvement in employer affirm-
ative action plans. The Board concluded that although this regulation did suggest
and encourage such participation, it did not mandate union involvement. Id.
42 Id., 99 I...R.R.M. at 1492.
4:1
	 See text and notes at notes 18-26 supra.
41 Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1492.
45 239 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 99 L.R.R.M. 1501.
4" Id., 99 LR.R.M. at 1501. The union also requested that the employer state
the reason or reasons why so few females and blacks were employed by East Dayton,
and sought copies of East Dayton's master health insurance agreements. The Board,
reversing the Alj, refused to order the employer to respond to the "subjective" ques-
tion regarding the reasons for the alleged small numbers of female and black
employees. Id„ 99 L.R.R.N.1. at 1502. The Board, also overruling the ALI held that the
insurance agreements should be produced since they concerned unit employees. Id.
47 Id., 99 1..R.R.M. at 1501.
Id. Since the Board concluded that the union had demonstrated the rele-
vance of the requested information concerning job applicants, it did not reach the
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selves had negotiated a contract which contained an express prohibition of
discrimination in hiring. Further, the Board emphasized the union's expressed
concern that the requested information /night_ be needed to defend the
union against potential charges of discrimination based upon alleged acquies-
cence in East Dayton's discriminatory hiring practices. 4 " Such a motivation,
stated the Board is "not. inconsistent" with the union's representative func-
tion." Therefore, the Board affirmed the All's order that East Dayton pro-
vide the union with the requested information.''
C. Union Access to Information After
Westinghouse and East. Dayton
The holdings of and modes of analysis in Westinghouse and East Dayton
present a number of significant developments; most important among these is
the possibility that Westinghouse may be viewed as broadening drastically the
scope of union liability for breach of its duty of fair representation. The West-
inghouse Board, noting the relevance to the labor union of information relat-
question of whether such data is "presumptively - relevant. Id., 99 L.R,R.M. at 1501
n.6.
4" Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1501.
50 id.
s ' Id. In vigorous dissents, Board member Murphy sharply disagreed with her
colleagues in both Westinghouse and East Dayton and objected to making the informa-
tion available to the unions. Westinghouse, 239 N.L.R.B, No. 19, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1493-
99; East Dayton, 239 N,L.R.B. No. 20, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1502-05. Member Murphy's
major concern was that by making information relating to race, sex and Spanish sur-
name available to the union, and by implying that unions would be liable for "passive
ignorance" of employers' discriminatory practices, the Board was, in effect, placing an
obligation upon unions to seek out and act upon such information. In the Westinghouse
context, this obligation relates to the union's duty of fair representation. Westinghouse,
239 N.L.R.B. No. 19. 99 L.R.R.M. at 1495. While no such duty can arise in East Day-
ton, where only job applicants arc involved, Member Murphy contended that the Title
• VII liability of unions may be broadened by the majority's decision. Now, claimed
Member Murphy, labor unions may find themselves being held jointly liable for the
employer's unilateral discriminatory hiring. East Dayton, 239 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 99
L.R.R.M. at 1503.
Member Murphy also disagreed with the Westinghouse Board's requirement that
the employer make available to the union charges and complaints of fair employment
practices law violations. Westinghouse, 239 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 99 L.R.R.M. at. 1497-98.
She argued that the confidentiality requirements of Title VII forbid making such in-
formation available to anyone outside of the government. Westinghouse, 239 N.L.R.B.
No, 19, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1498. The Board, Member Murphy contended, has no power
to make section 8(a)(5) of the Labor Act supercede confidentiality statutes.
Member Murphy also raised several technical objections to the unions' requests. In
Westinghouse, she maintained that section 8(a)(5) does not require an employer to sup-
ply information to a union where the union—like the IUE in Westinghouse—sought.
the information for purposes other than collective bargaining, i.e. for purposes of pros-
ecuting a Title VII suit against the employer. Westinghouse, 239 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 99
L.R.R.M. at 1496-97. In East Dayton, Member Murphy contended that the Interna-
tional Union was not the proper party to request the information. East Dayton, 239
N.L.R.B. No. 20, 99 L.R,R.M. at 1503 n.16. She also maintained that, as in Westing-
house, the union intended to use the information for purposes not. relating to collective
bargaining; to defend against charges that the union acquiesced in the employer's dis-
criminatory hiring practices. East Dayton, 239 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1504.
November 19791
	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 139
ing to the racial, ethnic and sexual composition of the bargaining unit, stated
that such information might be needed by the union to fulfill its duty of fair
representation, and to avoid liability for "passive ignorance" of the employer's
discriminatory practices."' When viewed from this perspective, the Board's
opening employers' race/sex/Spanish surname data to the union may imply a
corresponding obligation to seek out and act upon such information by the
labor organization. It is suggested, however, that the Board's ruling need not
be read so broadly.
Although it is not to he doubted that the duty of fair representation can
be breached by union inaction as well as by union action,'" it is not at all clear
that, in all circumstances, the union is obligated to take some action to avoid
being held vicariously liable for its "passive ignorance" of the discriminatory
practices of the employer. As traditionally construed by the courts, the duty of
fair representation does not impose such liability upon labor organizations.
The Supreme Court has stated that the union's duty to its members is
breached only if the union's conduct is "arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad
faith." 54
 While there may be instances where a labor organization's failure to
act would violate this standard, other situations may be envisioned where such
a failure to act does not rise to the level of arbitrary, discriminatory or bad
faith conduct. Thus, to read Westinghouse to stand for the proposition that a
union's failure to act concerning an employer's discriminatory practices ren-
ders the union, in almost all circumstances, vicariously liable under its duty
of fair representation, simply is not in accord with established judicial in-
terpretations of the union's duty to its members.
This reading of Westinghouse, standing for a requirement that a union
actively seek out evidence of the discriminatory practices of the employer, also
does not necessarily follow from prior Board law. The Westinghouse Board, in
discussing the parameters of the union's duty of fair representation, cited the
Board's 1964 Business League of Gadsden '' decision as holding that a union is
required to act affirmatively to oppose the employer's discriminatory
employment practices by proposing specific contractual provisions to that end.
Gadsden certainly did order such action on the part of the union; ' '' yet, the
Gadsden Board did not, require that all labor organizations bargain actively to
eradicate discrimination under all circumstances. Rather, the Gadsden order
was a specific remedial order aimed at remedying both employer and union
discrimination." Thus, the Westinghouse Board was not merely restating exist-
ing Board law in intimating that the union had a general requirement to seek
out and respond to employer discrimination. It is unclear whether the West-
inghouse majority simply was overstating prior Board law concerning the
52 Westinghouse, 239 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1486.
" Local Union No. 12 (Business League of Gadsden), 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 315,
57 L.R.R.M. 1535, 1536 (1964), enf'd. 368 E.2d 12, 63 L.R.R.N.I. 2365 (5th Cir. 1966).
" Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
•5 150 N.L.R.B. 312, 57 L.R.R.M. 1535 (1964), enf'd. 368 F.2d 12, 63 L.R.R.M.
2365 (5th Cir. 1966).
'" Id. at 322, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1540.
57 Member Murphy makes this point in her dissenting opinion in Westinghouse
Electric. 239 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1495 n. 65.
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union's duty of fair representation as a means of establishing the relevance of
data relating to the racial, sexual or ethnic makeup of unit employees, or
whether Westinghouse itself was greatly expanding Board law regarding the
duty of fair representation. 58
A further problem raised by Westinghouse and East Dayton was the Board's
conclusion that the confidentiality provisions of Title VII were not applicable.
The Board justified this conclusion on two grounds: first, the Board
contended that the statute's guarantee of confidentiality barred only the gov-
ernment agency, the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, from re-
leasing the information, and did not concern the relations between private
parties, such as unions and employers; second, the Board suggested that labor
unions were not members of the "general public" to whom disclosure is pro-
hibited by the statute." Thus the Board concluded that since there was to be
no disclosure by the agency restricted by the confidentiality provisions, and
since there was no disclosure to the general public, it could safely order the
employer to make available to the union copies of the requested charges and
complaints without running afoul of the purposes of the confidentiality stat-
utes. It is submitted that although the second justification does not appear to
be in accord with existing judicial interpretations of Title VII, the first. justifi-
cation is supported by the current state of the law. Accordingly, the Board
was correct in disregarding the confidentiality provisions of Title VII.
The weakest basis upon which the confidentiality provisions of Title VII
can be dismissed in the Westinghouse context is the Board's second argument:
that disclosure to a labor union, because of the union's special obligations and
relationships to employment practices, is not disclosure to the general public
and thereby not prohibited under section 709 of the Civil Rights Act.""
Neither the federal courts nor the Equal Employment. Opportunities Commis-
sion have reached this issue. Several federal courts have considered, however,
a somewhat analogous issue: whether private Title VII plaintiffs are members
of the public to whom the EEOC may not disclose confidential informa-
tion."' On that issue, the circuits are split. While the Fifth Circuit has held
that private Title VII plaintiffs are not members of the public, and thus that.
" A related problem to the duty of fair representation, and one focused upon
by Nlember Murphy, see note 40 supra, is all arguable increase in Title VII liability by
allowing the unions access to information concerning employers' hiring practices. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976) makes it unlawful for a labor organization to discriminate
itself or to cause an employer to discriminate. The Equal Employment Opportunities
Commission has held unions liable under Title VII for employer discrimination that
the union is aware of or should be aware of. 2 E.E.O.C. Dec. 77-10 F,topt.. PRAC. GuiDE
(CCH) 6565. As Member Murphy points out, the EEOC has not. yet held labor
unions liable under Title VII for an employer's unilateral hiring decisions. East Dayton,
239 N.L.R.B. No. 20, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1503. The question remaining is. since the East
Dayton Board entitled the labor organization to information concerning job applicants,
does this increased access impose upon the union increased Title VII liability?
" Westinghouse Electric, 239 N.L.R.B. No. 19, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1491.
"" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e) (1976), set out in full at note 30 supra.
"' Burlington Northern, lEic. v. EEOC, 582 F.2d 1097, 17 F.E.P. Cases 1358
(7th Cir. 1978): Scars, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC. 581 F.2d 941, 17 F.E.P. Cases 897
(D.C. Cir. 1978): H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147, 5 F.E.P. Cases 405 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
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the EEOC may provide them with otherwise confidential information," the
Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits have arrived at an opposite conclu-
sion and have halted EEOC attempts to provide plaintiffs with the protected
materials.""
The Fifth Circuit reasoning, that certain classes of individuals may be in
such a relationship that they should not he considered members of the gen-
eral public and denied access to "confidential" information," provides at least
some measure of support for the Board's conclusion that disclosure to a labor
union is not forbidden under Title VII. Yet the contrary view, expressed by
the Seventh and District of Columbia Circuits, that "Title VII was never
meant to permit dissemination of EEOC investigative data to anyone not
within the government" seriously undermines the Board's decision in this
regard. The National Labor Relations Board, unlike the federal courts or the
EEOC, is not given principal authority for interpretation of Title VII, and
perhaps overstepped its proper bounds in seeking to justify its conclusion on
the basis of Title VII law, law that is currently in much dispute.
Despite the arguable impropriety of the Board's second reason for its
conclusion, the Board's decision can ultimately be justified. The Board's first
justification-that the confidentiality provisions of the statute involved forbid
only disclosure by the EEOC, and not disclosure by other bodies-is well in
line with prevailing federal law. Without exception, every federal court which
has considered the question has held that section 709 of Title VII forbids
disclosure only by the EEOC.'" Disclosure by private parties, and disclosure
by other agencies of the federal government are beyond the statute's prohibi-
tion."' Upon this basis, an NLRB order that the employer provide the labor
organization with the information would not be limited by the provsions of
the confidentiality statute. The Board's decision on this matter was, therefore,
correct.
Westinghouse and East Dayton undoubtedly leave many questions un-
answered. On the practical level, entire new categories of information con-
cerning the racial, sexual and ethnic makeup of the unit workforce and
12 H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F.2d 1147, 1152, 5 F.E.P. Cases 405, 408
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
" 3 Burlington Northern, Inc. v. EEOC. 582 F.2d 1097, 1100, 17 F.E.P. Cases
1358, 1360 (7th Cir. 1978); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941, 947, 17
F.E.P. Cases 897, 902-03 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
" 4 H. Kessler & Co. v. EEOC, 472 F,2d 1147, 1152, 5 F.E.P. Cases 405, 408
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973).
"5 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. EEOC, 581 F.2d 941, 946, 17 F.E.P. Cases 897, 901
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
"" See Chrysler Corp. v. Schlesinger, 565 F.2d 1172, 1188, 15 F.E.P. Cases
1217, 1230 (3rd Cir. 1977); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administration,
509 F.2d 527, 529, 8 F.E.P. Cases 1296, 1297-98 (D.C. Cir. 1974); National Resources
Defense Council v. SEC, 432 F. Stipp. 1190, 1210 n. 84, 14 F.E.P. Cases 1544, 1557 n.
84 (D.D.C. 1977); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Stipp. 150, 157, 14
F.E.P. Cases 83, 89 (D.D.C. 1976).
" 7 See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Services Administation, 509 F.2d 527,
529, 8 F.E.P. Cases 1296, 1298 (D.C. Cir. 1974); National Resources Defense Council
v. SEC, 432 F. Supp. 1190, 1210 n. 84, 14 F.E.P. Cases 1544, 1557 n. 84 (D.D.C.
1977).
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applicant pool now are available to labor organizations. The extent to which
unions will seek this information, and the purposes for which they will use the
information that they do obtain, can only be speculative. Also left open is the
question of union liability for discriminatory employment practices carried on
by the employer. Does Westinghouse actually reach as far as its language
suggests in imposing an obligation on the union to seek out information relat-
ing to the employer's hiring and employment, practices? If so, the increased
union "right." of access may seem it hollow victory indeed.
Westinghouse and East Dayton stand as perhaps pivotal cases in the area of
law where labor relations and equal employment. opportunity intersect. At a
minimum, by making information relating to the racial, sexual and ethnic
makeup of the employer's workforce and applicant pool available to the
union, these cases provide the opportunity for a stronger role by the union in
monitoring the employer's practices and enforcing antidiscrimination statutes.
The extent to which labor organizations will avail themselves of this opportun-
ity remains to be seen. It seems clear, however, that if the Westinghouse Board
can he taken at. its word in asserting that labor unions will he held liable for
"passive ignorance" of the employer's discriminatory practices, aggressive
union action should be expected to increase.
2. Duty to Bargain
a. Partial Closings: Brockway Motor Trucks—Among the responsibilities
which the National Labor Relations Act' (Act) places upon employers and
labor unions subject_ to its terms is the duty to "bargain collectively." As de-
fined by section 8(d) 2
 of the Act, this duty places a mutual obligation upon
the employer and labor organization to "meet_ and confer in good faith with
respect. to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." Fail-
ure to heed this statutory command subjects the employer or labor union to
unfair labor practice charges under sections 8(a)(5) 3
 or 8(b)(3) 4 of the Act. As
a corollary to the employer's duty in this regard, it is well settled that an
employer may not unilaterally institute a change in a madatory subject of
bargaining—a subject falling within the scope of the phrase "wages, hours
and terms and conditions of employment." An employer who does alter any
mandatory subject of bargaining concerning his employees without prior
notification and discusion of such an alteration with the employee's represen-
tatives therefore commits a violation of section 8(a)(5).
Despite these established principles, there are uncertainties regarding the
employer's duty to bargain. Often, the question is whether a particular subject
falls within the scope of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment,"
since it is only subjects within the purview of this phrase that trigger the bar-
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seg., (1976).
29 § 158(d) (1976).
29 § 158(a)(5) (1976).
4
 29 U.S.C. § 158(6)(3) (1976).
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gaining obligation. Because the Act does not define or otherwise give content
to this phrase, it has been left to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
and the Federal courts to establish its reach. Certain subjects, such as vaca-
tions'' and pensions," have long been established and accepted as within the
scope of "terms and conditions of employment" and as being, therefore,
mandatory subjects of bargaining. As to other subjects, however, the applica-
bility of the statutory obligation to bargain is less well-settled.
One area in which the bargaining obligation is in question is that of par-
tial closings: Must an employer, who operates two or more facilities and who
chooses to close one facility, bargain with the union representing the
employees at the closing plant regarding the decision? 7 There has been a
good deal of tension between the NLRB and the federal courts of appeal
concerning the answer to this question. While the Board generally has taken
the position that a partial closing decision is a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing,' several courts of appeal have held that such a decision is solely within
the prerogative of management and, therefore, not subject to the bargaining
requirement." During the Survey year, a court of appeals again was faced
with the issue of an employer's obligation to bargain concerning a partial dos-
Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 101 N.L.R.B. 360, 369, 31 1...R.R.M.
1072, 1075 (1952).
" Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247, 255, 22 L.R.R.M. 2507, 2514 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949).
' It is well settled, however, that an employer is required to bargain over the
effects on employees of . a partial closing decision at the affected plant. NLRB v.
Thompson Transport Co., 406 F.2d 698, 703, 70 L.R.R.M. 2418, 2421 (10th Cir.
1969); NLRB v. Transmarine Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 940, 65 L.R.R.M. 2861,
2866 (9th Cir. 1967). A partial closing 6w reasons of anti-union animus may be a
violation of section 8(a)(3) of the Act. Textile Worker's Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,
380 U.S. 263, 274-75 (1965).
8
 Royal Typewriter Co., 209 N.L.R.B. 1006, 1012-13, 85 L.R.R.M. 1501, 1509-10
(1974); Ozark Trailers, Inc., 161 N.L.R.B. 561, 564-70, 63 L.R.R.M. 1264, 1266-69
(1966). (f. Schnell Tool & Die Corp., 162 N.L.R.B. 1313, 1316-17, 64 L.R.R.M. 1184,
1185 (1967) (employer's failure to bargain concerning decision to lease plant out a
violation of § 8(a)(5)). The Board has recognized an exception to this bargaining rule,
An employer whose partial closing takes him out of a particular business is not re-
quired to bargain concerning the decision. The employer retains the right to go out of
business. Kingwood Mining Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 844, 845, 86 L.R.R.N4, 1203, 1204
(1974); Summit Tooling Co., 195 N.L.R.B. 479, 480, 79 L.R.R.M. 1396, 1400 (1972).
See also Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269-74 (1965)
(employer who goes completely out of business, even if for anti-union reasons, does
not violate section 8(a)(3)).
The Board has experienced sonic difficulty in distinguishing between a partial
closing and an employer's "sale" of part of an enterprise, and has held that the latter
does not require bargaining. General Motors Corp., 191 N.L.R.B. 951, 951-52. 77
L.R.R.M. 1537, 1539 (1971), enf'd, 470 F.2d 422. 81 L.R.R.M. 2439 (D.C. Cir•. 1972).
" NLRB v. Thompson Transport Co., 406 F.2d 698, 702-03, 70 L.R.R.M. 2418,
2421 (10th Cir. 1969); NLRB v. Transmarinc Navigation Corp., 380 F.2d 933, 939, 65
L.R.R.M. 2861, 2866 (9th Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co., 350 F.2d
191, 196, 60 L.R.R.M. 2033, 2035-36 (3rd Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Adams Dairy, Inc., 350
F.2d 108, 113, 60 L.R.R.M. 2084, 2088 (8th Cir. 1965). But see NLRB Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc., 361 F2d 512, 516-17, 62 L.R.R.M. 2218 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S.
935 (1966) (employer must bargain over decision to discontinue its cheese cutting and
packaging operations).
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ing decision. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Brockway Motor
Trucks v. NLRB," rejected the per se approaches taken in prior Board and
court decisions and held that whether an employer had an obligation to bar-
gain with the union concerning a partial closing decision depends upon a
consideration of the facts and circumstances of each particular case."
Brockway Motor Trucks (Brockway), a division of Mack Trucks, Inc., op-
rated a number of facilities involved in the manufacture, sale and servicing of
trucks." One of these facilities was located in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania,
where Brockway's employees were represented by Local 724, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO (union). On July
19, 1976 Brockway, without prior notification to or consultation with the un-
ion, shut down the Philadelphia facility.'" In response to this action, the
union filed an unfair labor charge against Brockway with the NLRB. The
charge alleged that Brockway's failure to bargain with the union prior to clos-
ing the Philadelphia facility was a violation of sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of
the Act.''
The Board issued a complaint and a notice of hearing on the union's
charge against Brockway. Waiving a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge, the union and Brockway then submitted the case directly to the full
Board.on a record consisting only of the pleadings and a stipulation that. the
Philadelphia plant closing was based on "economic considerations."' The
Board, following its settled precedents in partial closing cases," found Brock-
way's failure to bargain to constitute an unfair labor practice. The Board is-
sued an order requiring, inter alia, that Brockway bargain with the union con-
cerning the closing, and a possible reopening, of the Philadelphia plant."
Brockway then petitioned the Court. of Appeals for the Third Circuit. for re-
view of the Board's decision,'" and the Board filed a cross-application for
enforcement of its order.
582 F.2d 720, 99 L.R.R.M. 2013 (3d Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 731, 99 L.R.R.N1. at 2021.
12 Id. at 723, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2015.
13 Id. At the time the plant was shut clown, employees of the plant were engaged in
a strike over the inability to reach agreement on a new collective bargaining agree-
ment. Neither the Board nor the court attached any importance to this fact in consid-
ering the issue at hand.
14 Id. No issue was raised regarding bargaining over the effects of the closing on
Brockway's employees. See note 7 supra.
'' 582 F.2d at 723, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2015.
' 1' See cases cited at note 8 supra.
" The Board's Decision and Order are reported at 230 N.L.R.B. 1002, 95
L.R.R.M. 1462 (1977). The Board also ordered Brockway to make the employees
whole by paying the employees backpay from the date of the employees' termination
to the date of commencement of bargaining. Further, the Board ordered reinstate-
ment of all former Brockway employees at the Philadelphia facility if operations were
to be resumed at that plant. Id. at 1004-05, 95 L.R.R.M. at 1463-64.
I" Section 10(f) of the Act, 29	 § 160(f) (1976), provides for judicial review
of final orders of the Board. Appeal can be made either to the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals or to the court of appeals for the circuit where the alleged unfair
labor practice was committed. In the present case, the alleged unfair labor practice
occurred in Philadelphia, in the Third Circuit.
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The court, denied enforcement. of the Board's order,'" and, in doing so,
registered its disapproval of the Board's contention that partial closing deci-
sions are always mandatory subjects of bargaining. Yet, the court also stopped
far short of embracing Brockway's assertion that such a decision, if based
upon "economic considerations" of any degree or magnitude, is always beyond
the scope of mandatory bargaining. The Brockway court, by adopting this ap-
proach, was consciously seeking 10 remain faithful to its perceived duty to
accommodate the two conflicting policies and philosophies implicated by the
partial closing issue. On the one hand there are the concerns which the NLRB
seeks to protect: namely, the protection of the jobs of employees and the
strengthening of the collective bargaining process. On the other hand are the
policies advanced by Brockway: the business interests and economic freedom
of the employer, which also deserve protection. The court. argued that the per
se approaches of both the Board and Brockway failed to take into considera-
tion the countervailing interests represented by the opposite view. An
adequate weighing of all of the concerns involved. stated the court, requires
the rejection of any rigid per se rule and the substitution of a more flexible
approach that takes into consideration the parties' concerns as they relate to
and are involved in each particular case.'
In establishing the framework for applying this balancing approach in the
partial closing context, the Brockway court first considered the policies of the
NLRA and the Act's committment to the efficacy of collective bargaining as a
means of bringing about the peaceful resolution of labor disputes. 2 ' The
court stated that these basic policies would be furthered by requiring bargain-
ing with regard to partial closing decisions."- 2
 Further, the court noted that
the act of closing a facility comes within the literal language of "terms and
conditions of employment." In this regard, the court cited the Supreme Court's
decision in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB. 2 ' The Fibreboard Court,
in holding that an employer's decision to subcontract work previously per-
formed by union members was a mandatory subject of bargaining," asserted
that the termination of employment resulting from such subcontracting
clearly was within the definition of "terms and conditions of employment... 25
The Brockway court, noting that the partial closing of a business leads to the
termination of employees' jobs no less than does subcontracting out work pre-
viously' performed by employees, adopted this reasoning of the Fibreboard
Court and placed partial closings within the statutory requirement of bargain-
ing. 2 " Based upon these factors of statutory policy and language, the court
concluded that an initial presumption was justified that a partial closing deci-
sion is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 27
" 582 F.2d at 740-41, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2027-28.
20 Id. at 731, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2021.
21 Id. at 734, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2023.
22 Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 2023-24,
2"
 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
24 Id. at 209.
25 Id, at 210.
2i
 582 F.2d at 735, 99 I..R.R.M. at 2024.
27 Id.
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Working from this initial presumption, the Brockway court then moved to
the next step of its analysis. To determine whether the duty to bargain re-
garding a particular partial closing arises, stated the court, it is necessary to
engage in an equitable balancing of the relative interests of the employees and
the employer in the circumstances of the particular case. On the employees'
side of the balance, the prospect of job loss will be the chief concern.'"
Beyond this, however, an additional factor which may tilt. the balance toward
a requirement of bargaining is the possible efficacy of union efforts to pre-
vent the closing, either through concessions designed to reduce the employer's
costs or by providing useful information or technical assistance to the
employer. 29 On the other side of the balance are factors which would make
it difficult to insist upon bargaining in a specific situation. Giving due regard
to the employer's freedom to conduct his business and to determine the ulti-
mate economic direction of the company, the Brockway court suggested several
circumstances which might weigh the balance against requiring bargaining in
a particular case. These circumstances include situations where bargaining
would be either fruitless or unfair to the employer: such as when action by a
third party necessitates closing the plant, where the business is under severe
financial pressure, or where there is a desire by the employer to restructure
the business itself. 30 It is these types of situations, the court suggested, that
will rebut the presumption of mandatory bargaining over the decision to close
part of the business.
In evaluating the economic and other factors which might rebut the pre-
sumption of mandatory bargaining, however, the Brockway court made clear
that the mere recitation, as in the Brockway case itself, that a closing was based
on "economic considerations" would not excuse the employer from his obliga-
tion to bargain. The precise nature of the economic considerations involved
must be shown in each particular case.' Not all partial closing decisions
based on economic or financial factors are beyond the range of the bargaining
requirement. Only where the economic or financial factors are of such a na-
ture or degree that bargainng would be "unacceptable and unfair" can the
employer escape the duty to bargain. 32 Having established the framework
for determining whether bargaining is required in partial closing situations,
the court refused to enforce the Board's order. The sparse record in the case
at bar, claimed the court, was inadequate to allow any meaningful utilization
of the balancing approach.'° The balancing test simply could not be applied
on the facts before the Court. Therefore, enforcement of the Board's order
29 Id.
29 Id. at 736, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2024-25. The court also suggested that bargaining
prior to the time of' the closing would be a more useful and effective way for the
union to bargain over the rifecis of the closing on employees, even if the closing itself
could not be averted. Id.. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2025.
3(' Id. at 738, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2026.
31 Id. at 739, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2026-27.
32 Id. at 739-40, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2026-27.
33 Id., 99 L.R.R.N.I. at 2027.
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was denied, without prejudice to the Board to commence additional proceed-
ings in the case. 34
The majority opinion in Brockway was challenged by a dissent from Judge
Rosenn.35
 Judge Rosenn objected strenuously to the balancing approach ad-
vanced by the majority. In his view, the prior Third Circuit decision in NLRB
v. Royal Plating & Polishing Co.," in which the court denied enforcement of a
Board order which required an employer to bargain concerning a partial clos-
ing decision, controlled the case at bar. As read by Judge Rosenn, Royal Plat-
ing stood for the proposition that a partial closing, when based upon any
economic reason, may be made by an employer without producing any obliga-
tion to bargain with the union. Thus, the stipulation in Brockway that the dos-
ing was due to "economic reasons" would place the case, for Judge Rosenn,
within the "four corners" of Royal Plating, and would not require bargain-
ing."' Judge Rosenn also objected to the majority's attempt to distinguish be-
tween various degrees of economic impact." Whether a partial closing was
made for economic "considerations" or upon economic "necessity" would, in
Rosenn's view he irrelevant, since the employer should have the right to shut
down a facility for any economic or business reason without. consultation with
the union.'" Judge Rosenn, therefore, would deny enforcement of the
Board's order with prejudice, leaving no opportunity for additional Board
proceedings.'"
Brockway's balancing process is a rather unique approach to the partial
closing problem. As the Brockway court itself notes, prior Board and court
decisions have tended to draw a solid line exclusively on either the "bargaining
required" or "bargaining not required" side of the issue. Thus, the Brockway
decision seems to add some heretofore absent flexibility to consideration of
the question. The soundness of this new, flexible "balancing" approach, how-
ever, is another matter. In many respects, the Brockway aproach may appear
sound since it closely follows the reasoning of Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v.
NLRB, a leading Supreme Court pronouncement. on the employer's duty to
bargain. The Fibreboard Court, in holding that only a particular form of sub-
contracting was a mandatory subject of bargaining, showed a strong disincli-
nation to make sweeping judgments as to the employer's obligation to bargain
in all subcontracting decisions." Rather, the Court geared its discussion—
and its holding—only to the facts of the particular subcontracting decision in
34 Id. at 741, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2028. The court also suggested that the Board order
might he unenforceable in any event, due to evidence that, by the time of oral argu-
ment in Brockway. Brockway had ceased all of its truck-related business Operations. The
bargaining order would then he a "futile - act that the court would not enforce. Id. at
740, 99 L.R.R.M. at '2028. See also NLRB v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.. 361 F.2cl 512,
517, 62 L.R.R.M. 2218, 2222-23 (5th Cir. 1966).
"' 582 F.2d at 741-50, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2028-35.
au 350 F.2d 191, 60 L.R.R.M. 2033 (1965).
37
 582 F.2d at 743, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2030.
3" See text and notes at notes 31-33, supra.
"" 582 F.2d at 748-49, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2033-34.
4" Id. at 750 & n.20, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2035 & n.20.
41 379 U.S. at 209.
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the case before it. 42 In a like manner the Brockway court also avoids sweep-
ing judgments and rigid per se rules in favor of case-by-case balancing. Yet,
there are problems with the Brockway balancing approach. While it is, of
course, true that factual balancing allows for a wider range of relevant factors
which may be considered in a particular case, it also is true that the flexibility
which the balancing approach allows may lead to difficulties in both adminis-
tration and predictability. The approach which the Board has preferred, main-
taining that partial closing decisions are, in almost every instance, mandatory
subjects of bargaining, 43 obviously is easier to administer than is the balancing
approach. Under Brockway's framework, the Board must consider a host of
additional factors, and must be sure to make the correct "balance. - Brockway
thus imposes on the Board additional burdens by increasing the scope of the
relevant inquiry in section 8(a)(5) partial closing cases.
The Brockway balancing approach also tends to make less predictable the
results of proceedings brought by a labor union seeking to enforce an
employer's duty to bargain over a partial closing decision. While the balancing
approach provides flexibility, it does so at the cost of predictability and cer-
tainty of result. It makes planning and reliable legal advice difficult, both for
an employer who wishes to know whether he should confer with the union,
and for a labor union concerned with the probable success of a challenge to a
unilateral partial closing by the employer. The case-by-case, factual balancing
approach almost assures that very few definitive rules can arise to shape the
conduct of the parties. Since the relevant. facts vary with each individual case,
it may be possible to establish whether there is a bargaining obligation only
through case-by-case litigation, before the Board and in the courts.
These difficulties cannot be overlooked. They may, in fact, be of suffi-
cient mangitude to make it unlikely that the National Labor Relations Board,
or other circuit courts of appeal, will choose to follow the Brockway balancing
approach. Yet, it should not be forgotten that the polar per se approaches of
the Board and other courts of appeal have themselves led to much confusion,
conflict and uncertainty in this area. To that. extent, Brockway at least offers a
middle ground that might defuse Board-court conflict. The ultimate impact
and utility of the Brockway framework depends on two key factors: first, will
the Brockway approach be adopted by other circuits and the Board, and sec-
ond, will there be sufficient development of law in this area, within the
framework of case-by-case balancing, to allow counsel, employers and labor
organizations to plan their actions with reasonable certainty.
3. Representation at Investigatory Hearings: Climax IvIolybclenum
In 1975 the United States Supreme Court, in NLRB v. Weingarten Inc.,' held
that section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act 2 guarantees the right of em-
42 Id. at 210-15.
43 See cases cited at note 8, supra.
' 420 U.S. 25! (1975).
2 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976).
November 19791	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 149
ployees to insist on union representation during employer investigatory inter-
views.'' This right may be claimed whenever an employee reasonably believes
that disciplinary measures may result from an interview.' The Court, however,
did not state in Weingarten whether this right to representation included the
right to confer with a union representative on company time prior to the
investigatory interview. During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB' refused to interpret the
Weingarten rule as requiring a conference with union representatives at any
point other than during the investigatory interview, provided that the inter-
view is scheduled to enable the employee to confer with a union representa-
tive on his own time." This refusal to require a pre-interview conference
demonstrates that the Tenth Circuit, and other courts influenced by the
reasoning of the Climax decision, will not expand the right guaranteed by
Weingarten beyond reasonable limits. In interpreting the Weingarten rule, the
interests of the employer demand consideration, and, when these interests
clearly outweigh those of the employees and the union, a proper resolution of
the dispute will lie in the employer's favor.
The facts surrounding the Climax decision are critical in evaluating the
significance of the Tenth Circuit's holding. In 1974 two employees of the
Climax Molybdenum Company (Company) were involved in an altercation
while working in an underground mine.' Upon learning of this incident, the
Company scheduled for the next day an investigatory meeting between its
representatives, the two employees, and representatives of the Oil, Chemical
and Atomic Workers Union (Union)." The Union representatives were in-
formed of this meeting, but were not given the identities of the employees
involved. These employees did not at any time request consultation with their
Union representative." The Union, however, requested an opportunity to
confer with the employees prior to the meeting, but this request was denied." )
During the interview, the Union representative informed the employees
that they need not cooperate with the Company and could remain silent."
Nevertheless, the employees decided to cooperate, and each described the in-
cident. 12
 After the interview, the Climax representatives decided to give the
employees only verbal warnings regarding the incident. Although the em-
ployees were satisfied with the proceedings,' 3 the Union subsequently filed an
unfair labor practices charge under section 8(x)(1) 14 against the employer,
" 420 U.S. at 260.
4 Id. at 257.
584 F.2d 360, 99 L.R.R.M. 2471 (10th Cir. 1978).
" Id. at 365, 99 1...R.R.M. at 2474.
Id. at 361, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2471.
8 Id.
" Id.
'" Id.
" Id. 99 L.R.R.M. at 2472.
12 id.
' 3 Id. at 361-62, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2472. No grievances were filed by the em-
ployees as a result of the interview. Id.
" 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-
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claiming that the Company unlawfully interfered with the employee's section
7 rights by refusing to permit the pre-interview conference.' 5 The Adminis-
trative Law Judge dismissed this complaint, holding that the NLRA does not
require pre-interview conferences,'" but., upon appeal, the Board reversed this
decision and instead found that the Company's refusal constituted an unfair
labor practice.'
Climax then petitioned for review of the Board's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which denied enforcement of
the Board's order.' 8 The court reasoned that neither the rule announced in
Weingarten nor the rationale underlying that decision was applicable tinder the
facts of Climax. As interpreted by the circuit court, the Weingarten rule re-
quires employees to request the presence of their union representative. Since
these employees never made such a request, the court refused to permit the
Union to rely on the Weingarten rule in its section 8(a)(1) claim. 1 °' The court
also noted that the rationale underlying the Weingarten decision—preservation
of parity between employees and employers—did not support expanding the
Weingarten rule to include the instant. situation. 2" The court, therefore, re-
fused to enforce the Board's order. 2 '
The court of appeals in Climax properly interpreted the Weingarten rule.
The Supreme Court. in Weingarten did not state whether section 7 provided a
(1) it interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights
guaranteed in section 157 of the title.
Id.
15 The Union claimed that. the Company had unlawfully threatened the
employees with reprisals because of their connection with the Union. Id. at. 362, 99
L.R.R.M. at 2472.
14;
' 7 The Board, in a 3 to 2 decision, found Climax in violation of 29 U.S.C. §
158(a)(1) (1976). 227 N.I..R.B. 1189, 1190, 94 L.R.R.M. 1177, 1178 (1977).
Climax Molybdenum Co. v. NLRB, 584 F.2d 360, 365, 99 L.R.R.M. 2471,
2474 (101h Cir. 1978).
'" Id. at 363, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2473. The court stated:
To hold that an employer must permit employeeS to consult with union
representatives on company time, when the employees could have, but
elected not to. consult with their union representatives on their own time is
to place a harsh and unfair burden upon the employer .... There is in
fact, no indication in this case that the employees were interested in seek-
ing counsel from their union representative.
Id.
ill Id. at 365, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2474. The court stated:
The employer is under no obligation to accord the employee subject to an
investigatory interview with consultation with his union representatives on
company time if the interview date otherwise provides the employee
adequate opportunity to consult with union representatives on his own
time prior to the interview. Tints we do believe that Weingarten requires
that the employer set investigatory interviews at such a future time and
place that the employee will be provided the opportunity to consult with
his representative in advance thereof on his own time.
Id.
21 Id.
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right to union representation at times other than during investigatory inter-
views. Rather, the Court stated that. the right to union counsel during inves-
tigatory interviews "arises only in situations where the employee requests rep-
resentation." 22
 Since the employees never requested union representation, it
is clear that the Union could not rely on the Weingarten rule to demand par-
ticipation in the interview itself, much less a pre-interview conference.
Similarly, the court's discussion of the rationale underlying
Weingarten—the need to ensure fairness—also reflects a sound interpretation
of the policy underlying that decision. The court, in weighing the comparative
interests of the Company, the Union and the employees, indicated that the
Weingarten right to union presence will not be extended to all aspects of a
disciplinary confrontation. Section 7 of the NLRA should not require an
employer to sacrifice his legitimate business interests by allowing pre-interview
conferences on company time when ample opportunity has been afforded the
Union to meet with the employees involved at sonic other time." In balanc-
ing the interests involved, such a burden should not be imposed without suffi-
cient justification.
The Climax decision, however, should not be interpreted as an absolute
denial of the right of employees to a pre-interview conference with Union
representatives. The denial in this instance involved an employer who held an
interview 171/2 hours after the employees were informed of the investiga-
tion."The Climax court has indicated that should an employer schedule an
interview at a time that would not provide the employee with a sufficient
opportunity to confer with the union on other than company time, and the
employee requests a pre-interview conference, the employer would be re-
quired to provide this opportunity." The Climax decision can be interpreted,
therefore, as expanding the Weingarten right to counsel in certain instances
while also upholding the Weingarten purpose of maintaining a balance be-
tween interests of the company and the employees.
The Climax court, however, did not limit its discussion to those elements
essential to its decision. In dicta the court also discussed the significance of the
Union's policy of discouraging employee cooperation with the Company."
This policy was based on the Union's belief that information given by
employees at investigatory interviews very often results in the employee's dis-
missal. The court determined that while the Union's contention may he valid,
it does not alter the legitimacy of the interview as a fact finding operation,
preliminary to any disciplinary action by the employer." The court noted
22
 420 U.S. at 257.
2 " 584 F.2d at 365, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2474.
24 Id. at 363, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2473.
25 Id. at 365, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2474.
2" Id. at 363-64, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2473-74.
27 Id. at 364, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2473. The court noted that an employer has a
legitimate business interest in resolving disputes between his employees in order to
ensure, as the court states, "a smooth-running business operation." Personal
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that the Union, due to its adversarial stance, may have waived any right to be
present at these interviews. Nevertheless, since the employees had not re-
quested a meeting with the Union representatives, and since the Company
had scheduled the investigatory interview fairly, the court was not required to
decide this issue. 28
The Climax court's discussion of a possible forfeiture of the right to
Union presence, although not the basis of the court's decision, is significant
since it indicates the court's interpretation of the Union's role at investigatory
interviews. As demonstrated by the court's discussion, the Tenth Circuit will
strictly enforce the limits which the Weingarten decision places on the right to
union presence. The Climax court noted that Weingarten prohibits "interfer-
ence with legitimate employer prerogative." Weingarten also provides that
"the employer has no duty to bargain with any union representative who may
be permitted to attend the investigatory interview." 3'1  court of appeals
interpreted these limits as prohibiting the union from taking an active role, by
encouraging the employees to refuse cooperation. 31 The court suggested that
Weingarten may prescribe forfeiture of the right to representation should the
union engage in this practice. 32 Although this reasoning did not underlie the
final decision, it stands as a warning that the Tenth Circuit in future cases will
limit severely union activity in investigatory interviews.
The approach taken by the Tenth Circuit of denying pre-interview con-
ferences, provided employees have ample opportunity to meet with their
union representative on their own time, should be followed by the other cir-
cuits. This rule properly limits the right to request counsel to those instances
when a denial would impose an unfair burden on the employee. Both the
employer's and the employees' interests must be considered in determining
the correct resolution of future disputes. By limiting the employer's obligation
to provide union representation during disciplinary interviews, the Tenth Cir-
cuit in Climax Molybdenum Co. has taken a reasonable approach, calculated to
preserve a proper balance between the interests involved.
4. Discipline for Failure to Cross Picket Lines: William S. Carroll
Employee refusals to cross union-organized picket lines are a fertile
ground for disputes regarding the protection created by the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).' During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the
animosities between employees were not only contrary to the business interest of the
Climax Molybdenum Company, but also presented serious safety hazards considering
the context of an underground mine. The investigatory interview is intended to be a
fact-finding meeting in which problems may be resolved in a spirit of cooperation. Id.
at 363, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2473.
28 Id. at 365, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2474.
29 Id. at 363, 99	 at 2473. See Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 258.
3" 420 U.S. at 259.
31
 584 F.2d at 363, 99 I..R.R.M. at 2473.
32 Id. at 364-65, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2473-74. See id. at 365, 99 L.R.R.M. at 2474
(McKay, J., concurring).
' 29 U.S.C. § 151-169 (1976).
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First Circuit dealt with one such dispute in NLRB v. William S. Carroll, Inc. 2
The court in Carroll considered whether an employer violates section 8(a)(I) of
the NLRA 3 when he discharges an employee who, during the course of his
work, has refused to cross a picket line established by a stranger union at the
premises of a stranger employer." The court determined that a proper re-
solution of the dispute required a balancing of the interests involved in the
dispute, and that, in the present situation, there was insufficient anti-union
animus on the part of the employer to tilt this balance in the employee's
favor.' The Carroll court, therefore, denied enforcement of the National
Labor Relations Board's (NLRB or Board) order to reinstate the discharged
employee."
This chapter, first, will examine the facts of the decision and the test
established by the First Circuit in Carroll. The chapter then will consider the
approach taken by the NLRB and the other circuit courts when faced with
similar issues. It will be submitted that, despite the Carroll court's claim that it
need not decide whether such conduct is protected activity under section 7,
the test established by the First. Circuit, in effect, constitutes a refusal to rec-
ognize the section 7 protection. It will be shown that the Carroll test favors
employers heavily, and, unless altered, will not protect sufficiently employee
rights.
In the instant case, the employer, William S. Carroll, operated a school
bus and charter service in Watertown and Brookline, Massachusetts.' The
employee, Lawrence Rosenberg, was on his first day of work for the company
as a driver, when the dispatcher instructed Rosenberg to pick up passengers
in front of a supermarket and to deliver them to a place where, due to a labor
dispute, a group of employees was picketing. Rosenberg showed reluctance,
but, after the dispatcher offered to drive the charter himself, agreed to take
the assignment. He picked up the passengers and drove them to their destina-
tion point, but refused to enter onto the picketed employer's property. 8 When
Rosenberg continued to refuse to cross the picket line, the police cleared a
way for the passengers to disembark from the bus and to walk through the
picket line onto the grounds and into the building. Rosenberg, thus, was able
to honor the established picket line. When Rosenberg reported for work the
following day, however, he was dismissed on the grounds that he had not
finished his assigned task—to deliver the passengers to their destination." The
union then filed a complaint with the NLRB."'
Upon considering the union complaint, the AdMinistrative Law Judge
(ALJ) determined that the employer had violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA.
578 F.2d 1, 98 L.R.R.M. 2848 (1st Cir. 1978).
" 29	 § 158(a)(1) (1976). Section 8(a)(1) provides in pertinent part:
"It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(I) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of
the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title."
' 578 F.2d at 2, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2848.
Id. at 3-5, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2848-51.
" Id. at 5, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2851.
Id. at 2, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2848.
" Id., 98 L.R.R.M. at 2849.
Id.
" William S. Carroll, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 1131, 97 L.R.R.M. 1037 (1977).
154	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW 11/EV1EW	 [Vol. 21:85
The ALJ stated, "a discharge motivated in part by an employee's exercise of
Section 7 rights is it violation of the Act, even though a valid cause may also be
present." " The ALI, therefore, ordered the employer to reinstate the dis-
charged employee. 12 The Board affirmed the AI.J's decision, stating that the
employer violated Rosenberg's section 7 right to honor a picket line." The
employee's action was protected, the Board determined, even though the
employer lost some business from his customer—the picketed employer—and
even though he believed in good faith that the employee had engaged in
misconduct." The Board, however, emphasizing its firm stand in protecting
the section 7 activity, disagreed with the ALJ dicta that the employer may
have had a valid reason for discharging Rosenberg."
In reviewing the Board's order, the First. Circuit interpreted the standard
established by the Board as "plac[ing] the burden of proof on the employer to
establish that the dominant. motive for the discharge was a valid business rea-
son." tli The court disagreed with this approach, and, instead, placed the
burden of showing discriminatory intent, on the Board. The court. stated in
this regard that:
Once the employer has demonstrated a legitimate business reason
for the dismissal, the burden shifts to the Board to establish that the
primary motivation for the discharge was to penalize the employee
for his conduct sympathetic to picketers."
In summary, once the employer offers a legitimate business justification for
the discharge, the Board must rebut the inference of legitimacy by showing
that the discharge was discriminatorily motivated.
The Carroll court found the employer's assertion that Rosenberg engaged
in misconduct worthy of discharge—his failure to perform his assigned
duty—sufficient to establish a legitimate business reason for the discharge."
The court then made a factual finding that there is not "substantial evidence ,
[to show] that Rosenberg's expressed sympathy for the ... picketers was the
dominant reason for his discharge." 19 Applying its analysis of the burden of
proof, the Carroll court concluded that the Board had failed to meet its bur-
den of demonstrating anti-union animus.'"
In its opinion, the court cites decisions of the Second, Fifth, Seventh,
Eighth and District of Columbia Circuit courts, noting that these courts have
split on the issue whether to recognize section 7 protection for the employee
" Id. at 1134, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1038. See 578 F.2d at 3 n.2.
12
 232 N.L.R.B. at 1135, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1038.
33 Id. at 1131, 97 L.R.R.NI. at 1037.
14 Id. at 1133, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1037.
35 Id. at 1131 ri.1, 97 L.R.R.M. at 1038 11.1.
" 578 F.2d at 3 n.2, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2850 n.2,
17 Id. at 4, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2850 (citations omitted). This standard, the court.
stated, is in accord with the standard employed by the court in Section 8(a)(3) cases,
where the First Circuit also requires a showing of anti-union animus as the employer's
primary motive. Id.
18 Id. at 5, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2851.
° Id., 98 L.R.R.M. at 2850.
20 Id., 98 L.R.R.M. at 2851.
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activity." The Carroll court characterized the Eighth Circuit as one of two
circuit courts that have refused to recognize the honoring of a picket line as a
protected section 7 activity, 22 and cited Montana-Dakota Utilities Co. v. NLRB"
as representative of the Eighth Circuit's position. This decision, however, does
not refuse to recognize the protected section 7 right. Rather, in Montana-
Dakota the Court Of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit specified that "[we] shall
assume for the purposes of this case that the employees have a protected right
under § 7 of the Act." 24
In Montana-Dakota, eight employees had been suspended from work for
refusing to cross a stranger union picket line at a construction site to complete
their job assignment of installing underground pipes. 25 The eight employees
wanted to return to work after the picket line had been withdrawn, but the
employer insisted on a standard thirty-day suspension period, without pay. 2 "
These employees then filed a section 8(a)(1) complaint with the Board. The
Board found for the employees and ordered the employer to pay lost wages
from the date the picket line had been withdrawn to the date of reinstate-
ment. 27
 Although the Eighth Circuit refused to enforce the Board's order, 28
the court's decision resulted from its interpretation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement as waiving the section 7 right to honor stranger union picket
lines. 29 The court expressly assumed the existence of the section 7 right, to
honor stranger union picket lines, but found that the suspension of the
employees was subject to arbitration according to the terms of the agree-
ment. 3" Since the right had been waived in the contract, the union was pre-
vented from going to the Board with a section 8(a)(I) complaint. Thus, the
Eighth Circuit has at least implicitly acknowledged a section 7 right to honor
stranger union picket lines.
The Carroll court identified the Seventh Circuit as the second of two cir-
cuit courts that have refused to recognize the section 7 right,'" and cited the
Seventh Circuit's 1951 decision in NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co." 2 as rep-
resentative of this position. In Illinois Bell, eight workers were threatened with
suspension for refusing to cross a picket line of a union which was picketing
the employees' own work place." When the eight employees returned to
21 Id. at 3, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2849. The court stated that the Seventh and Eighth
Circuits have refused to recognize a refusal to cross a stranger union picket line as
protected activity under section 7 of the NLRA, while the Second, Fifth and District of
Columbia Circuits have recognized honoring a picket line as protected activity. but.
only in the factual context of picketing against the employee's own employer. Id.
22 Id.
23
 455 F.2d 1088, 70 L.R.R.M. 2854 (8th Cir. 1972).
24 Id. at 1091, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2856.
25 Id. at 1090-91, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2856.
2" Id. at 1090, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2856.
27 Montana-Dakota Utils. Co., 189 N.L.R.B. 879, 884, 77 L.R.R.M. 1029, 1033
(1971).
25 455 F.2d at 1094, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2858.
25 Id. at 1093, 79 L.R.R.M. at 2857-58.
'0 Id. at 1091-94, 79 L.R.R.M. at. 2856-58.
3] 578 F.2d at 3, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2849.
32 189 F.2d 124, 28 L.R.R.M. 2079 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 885
(1951).
" Id. at 126, 28 L.R.R.M. 2080.
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work after the picketing ended, the employer demoted them to lower posi-
tions and at lower salaries than they had been receiving previously. 34 The
court. rejected the employees' complaint, reasoning that protected "concerted
activities" under the pre-I947 Act were only those activities agreed upon by
the whole bargaining unit and sanctioned by the union representative. 35 Since
the suspended employees' union had not called for its members to honor the
stranger union's picket line, the court determined that this type of individual
activity was not protected."
In decisions subsequent to the Illinois Bell case, the Second, Fifth and
District. of Columbia Circuits all have recognized the rights of individual
workers to honor stranger union picket lines, though the nature and strength
of the right has been described differently by the various courts and by the
Board. The year after the Illinois Bell decision, the Second Circuit, in NLRB v.
Rockaway News Supply Co. ," 7 considered the issue in light of the new 1947"
Taft-Hartley amendments. In Rockaway, a chauffeur/routeman employee was
discharged for refusing to do his normal daily newspaper pickup at a plant
where a union, other than his own union, was picketing." The Board indi-
cated that it viewed the employee as an individual "sympathy striker" and
implied that he should be treated by his employer as any other economic
striker would be treated."
The Second Circuit did not agree with the Board's analysis in Rockaway,
but the court did make a strong statement in recognition of the right. The
court stated:
Such refusal to cross a picket line is habitual with union workers ... ,
it is frequently of assistance to the labor organization whose picket
line is respected, and it is in a broad but very real sense directed to
mutual aid or protection.'"
The Rockaway court, however, provided that this right is not an unlimited
one;" and drawing from the Supreme Court's language in Republic Aviation
Corp. v. NLRB," the Second Circuit Court of Appeals created a balancing test.
Under this test, the employee's right to respect a stranger union picket line is
recognized, but if the employer's right to manage his business enterprise is
interfered with in the process, the employee's rights will be balanced against
the employer's rights tinder the facts of each case. 43 Applying this balancing
34 Id.
35 Id. at 127, 28 L.R.R.M. 2081.
39 Id. at 128-29, 28 L.R.R.M. 2081-83.
37
 197 F.2d 111, 30 L.R.R.M. 2119 (2d Cir. 1952), off'd on other grounds, 345
U.S. 71 (1953).
39 Id. at 112, 30 L.R.R.M. at 2120.
"3
 Rockaway News Supply Co., 95,N.L.R.R. 336, 337, 28 L.R.R.M. 1314,
1315-16 (1951).
49 Id. at 113, 30 L.R.R.M. at 2121.
41 Id .
42
 324 U.S. 793 (1947). The Court stated, "Mike so many others, these rights
are not unlimited in the sense that they can be exercised without regard to any duty
which the existence of rights in others may place upon employer or employee." Id. at.
798.
43 197 F.2d at 113-14, 30 L.R.R.M. 2121-22.
November 1979]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW 	 157
theory to the facts of Rockaway, the court concluded that the employer's in-
terest outweighed the employee's right, and that given the position of the
employer in this case, he could discharge the employee for not completing his
work, after the employee had been given the choice either to complete his
work or be fired."
The Fifth Circuit decision in NLRB v. Alamo Express, /nc. 45 represents the
second of three circuit court decisions cited by the Carroll court which favors
the employee's right to respect stranger union picket lines. The Alamo Express
case represents the Fifth Circuit's acceptance of the Board's balancing ap-
proach. In Alamo Express, it was the employees' job to pick up merchandise at
a plant where a group of employees were picketing. Two employees refused
to complete their pick-up assignments, due to their recognition of the picket
line, and they were fired." The Board ordered reinstatement of the
employees, 47 and the Fifth Circuit affirmed the Board's decision, first by stat-
ing its position of deferring to the Board's fact-finding process. The court
stated, "[I]t is within the province of the Board to make the initial deter-
mination as to the motivation of the employer's act of discharging its
employees." 48 The court then considered whether, giVen the facts as the
Board found them, the employer was justified in discharging the employee.
As a result of its analysis, the court affirmed the outcome of the Board's
application of the standard to the facts of the case and enforced the Board's
order to reinstate the discharged employees.'"
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has concurred with
the Second and Fifth Circuits' recognition of the section 7 right in several
cases. 5 " Moreover, the District of Columbia court generally adheres to the
Board's application of its balancing test. In each of three decisions reached
between 1964 and 1970—Teamsters Local Union 675, Overnight Transportation
Co., and Redwing Carriers " —the District of Columbia Circuit court looked to
44 Id. at 115, 30 L.R.R.M. at 2122-23. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit
court's decision, NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., Inc., 345 U.S. 71 (1953), but
refused to reach the issue whether the employee's activity was protected under section
7. Id. at 79. Instead, the Supreme Court based its affirmation on the contract between
the two parties, which included a no-strike clause. Id. The majority of the Court
agreed with the court of appeals' criticism of the Board's "economic striker status"
theory. Id. at 75. As the Court noted, the Board's approach, in many situations, could
afford the replaced employee with a theoretical right, but with no job. In response to
this criticism, the Board has since refined its approach, and joined the courts in at-
tempting to find the proper balancing standard to apply to the facts of each case. See,
e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 50 L.R.R.M. 1440 (1962), of 'd sub
nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011, 54 L.R.R.M. 2707 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
45 430 F.2d 1032, 74 L.R.R.M. 2742 (5th Cir. 1970).
" Id. at 1035-36, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2744-45.
47 Id. at 1035, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2744.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1036, 74 L.R.R.M. at 2745.
See, e.g., Teamsters Local 657 v. NLRB, 429 F.2d 204, 75 L.R,R.M. 2480
(D.C. Cir. 1970) (per curiam); Truck Drivers Local 728 v. NLRB, 364 F.2d 682, 62
L.R.R.M. 2503 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (per curiam); Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d
1011, 54 L.R.R.M. 2707 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
Id.
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find whether the Board had reached a reasonable decision on the issue of
whether the employer had discharged the employee to continue business op-
erations, or to punish the employee for asserting his section 7 right to honor a
picket line. In each case, this court, like the Fifth Circuit court, deferred to
the Board's judgment, and enforced the Board's order of reinstatement. of the
employee or dismissal of the complaint. 52 It is apparent, therefore, that
where the Board has reached its conclusion from a careful balancing of the
employee and employer interests, the District of Columbia Court will enforce
the Board's decision.
In summary, all of the circuit courts cited, except the Seventh Circuit,
agree that. honoring a picket line of another union at another employer's
plant is an employee's section 7 right. It is also true, however, that all of the
courts noted agree that the employer has rights, though not absolute rights, to
manage his business, and that within some factual situations, this right might
override the employee's section 7 interests. The major disagreement. arises
over the issue of establishing a proper standard for balancing the interests of
employer and employees. Who should bear the burden of proof? What.
amount and weight of evidence are required to show a violation, or to defend
against a violation?
The Board, following the lead of the Second Circuit, balances the
employee's right to respect a stranger union's picket. line, and the employers'
right to manage his business enterprise. The Board presumes that an
employee is protected by section 7 in honoring a stranger union's picket line.
The employer has the burden of rebutting that presumption by demonstrat-
ing that the discharge or discipline was motivated by a valid business reason.
The First Circuit in Carroll reversed this allocation of the burden of proof.
Once an employer offers a legitimate business reason for the discharge, the
Board has the burden of rebutting the presumption of legitimacy by dem-
onstrating a discriminatory motive or anti-union animus.
Although the First. Circuit stated that "a case-by-case balancing of the
right of the employee to express his union sympathies and the right of the
employer to conduct his business" S 3 is required, the allocation of the burden
of proof created by the First Circuit. clearly loads the balance in the
employer's favor. Despite the court's claim that in deciding the instant, case it
need not determine whether the employee's action was protected under sec-
tion 7, the test used by the court makes it very difficult for the Board to show
an unfair labor practice. Thus, the First Circuit's test is inconsistent with the
policy of the Board, and the Second, Fifth, Eighth and District of Columbia
Circuits.
Unless or until the Supreme Court decides to review the issue," the
Board's decisions on this issue will stand a good chance of survival in the
circuits where the Board's standards and judgment are favored. It is appar-
52 429 F.2d at 205, 75 L.R.R.M. at 2480; 364 F.2d at 684, 62 L.R.R.M. at
2503-04; 325 F.2d at 1012, 54 1.—R.R.M. at 2708.
5" 578 F.2d at 3, 98 L.R.R.M. at 2849.
In its 1953 case on the issue, NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S.
71 (1953), the Supreme Court refused to take a definite stand and fell hack on the
collective bargaining agreement for a resolution of the dispute.
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ent, however, that Board decisions on this issue will face a strong probability
of reversal in the First Circuit. It remains to be seen whether the First Circuit
will apply the same pro-employer standard where an employee honors a
picket line staged against his own employer.
5. Scope qf Bargaining: Bartlett-Collins
Employers and unions are required to bargain collectively regarding
wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment.' Since a re-
fusal to bargain concerning wages, hours and other terms and conditions of
employment. is an unfair labor practice, these topics are classified as manda-
tory bargaining subjects. Bargaining subjects not within wages, hours or other
terms and conditions of employment are either permissive or illegal. 2 Either
party may, without violating its duty to bargain, condition further negotia-
tions, or bargain to impasse over a mandatory bargaining subject. 3 Bargaining
to impasse. or conditioning further negotiations on the resolution of a permis-
sive bargaining subject, on the other hand, is an unfair labor practice; 4 man-
datory subjects cannot. he held hostage by insistence on a permissive subject.'
A national policy of encouraging the resolution of labor disputes through col-
lective bargaining lies behind this interpretation of the duty to bargain collec-
tively.
In applying these rules the NLRB previously had determined that an
employer's insistence on the presence of a court reporter at bargaining ses-
sions was not an unfair labor practice.`' The Board, in effect, treated the
presence of the reporter as a mandatory subject of bargaining.' During the
' 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d) (1976). Section 8(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the representa-
tives of his employees ...." Id. § 158(a)(5). Section 8(d) defines collective bargaining as
conferring "in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment ...." Id. § I58(d).
• 29 U.S.C. § I59(a) (1976).
" In NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958), the
Supreme Court stated, Itihe duty is limited to those [mandatory] subjects, and within
that area neither party is legally obligated to yield. As to other matters, however, each
party is free to bargain or not to bargain, and to agree or not to agree." Id. at. 349
(citation omitted).
• 
Id.
• Id. In Borg-VI/artier the Court noted that "good faith does not license the
employer to refuse to enter into agreements on the ground that they do not include
some proposal which is not a mandatory subject of bargaining." Id. at 349.
" Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 96 N.L.R.B. 850, 29 L.R.R.M. 1608 (1951), mid
on other grounds, 205 F.2d 131, 32 L.R.R.M. 225 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 887
(1953).
Bartlett-Collins Co., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (Aug. 23, 1978), 99 L.R.R.M.
1034, 1035. In St. Louis Typographical Union No. 8, 149 N.L.R.B. 750, 57 L.R.R.M.
1370 (1964), the Board rejected the argument that the presence of a stenographer was
a preliminary issue outside of the duty to bargain. The Board stated: "It is wholly
consistent with the purposes of the Act that the parties be allowed to arrive at a resolu-
tion of their differences on preliminary matters by the same methods of compromise
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Survey year, the Board in Bartlett -Collins Co., 8 re-examined its earlier policy
and determined that the presence of a court reporter is a non-mandatory
subject of bargaining, therefore an employer's insistence to impasse on this
issue is per se an unfair labor practice.' The Board's decision in Bartlett-
Collins Co. is significant. since it eliminates an obstacle to mandatory bargaining
and forecloses an important area for potential abuse of bargaining duty.
The company previously had been found to have failed to bargain in
good faith, violating section 8(a)(5). 10 The company repeatedly had made
proposals which, the administrative law judge determined, could not be ac-
cepted by the Union." In making his decision, that the employer had vio-
lated the obligation to bargain in good faith, the administrative law judge
relied primarily on the testimony of a Union witness.' 2
 After this decision
Union representatives requested that the employer resume bargaining." The
employer proposed that when negotiations resumed a court reporter be pres-
ent at all bargaining sessions."' The Union opposed the presence of the
reporter, but proposed as a compromise that each party be permitted to re-
cord the session, transcribing it at a later time." The employer refused to
accept this compromise, and conditioned any further bargaining on the pres-
ence of a court reporter.'" In response the Union filed another section
8(a)(5) unfair labor practice charge."
In considering the Union's charge, the Board first noted that its prior
decisions had not found unfair labor practices where an employer, in the ab-
sence of had faith, conditioned bargaining on the presence of a court re-
and accommodation as are used in resolving equally difficult differences relating to
substantive terms or conditions of employment. - Id. at 752, 57 L.R.R.M. at 1371.
Bartlett-Collins Co., 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106 (Aug. 23, 1978), 99 L.R.R.M.
1034.
" Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1035-36.
1 " Bartlett-Collins Co., 230 N.L.R.B. 144, 96 L.R.R.M. 1581 (1977).
" 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1034.
12 Id.
1:3 Id.
14 Id. The employer brought a court reporter to a preliminary bargaining
session. The major portion of the session was occupied in arguing over the presence of
the reporter. The meeting ended with both parties in conflict over the issue. The
employer in a subsequent letter to the Union stated. "a record of bargaining under the
circumstances is both desirable and necessary to establish without resort to credibility
determinations what was said or done by the parties in bargaining." Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at
1035.
15
 Id. The Union response to the Company proposal "expressed the hope that
the litigation between the parties had been concluded; that a mutually satisfactory
agreement could now be reached; and that Respondent's concern over potential credi-
bility resolutions and further Board proceedings should not present an issue as far as
future bargaining sessions were concerned." Failing this hope that the employer
should not he concerned with preserving an accurate record of the bargaining, the
Union proposed the compromise of electronic recording. Id.
1 " The employer's counsel responded to the Union proposal by rejecting the
compromise and stating that the employer "remained available for bargaining, pro-
vided that a record of the negotiations would be prepared by a certified court re-
porter." Id.
17 Id.
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porter. In these earlier cases the Board first considered the surrounding cir-
cumstances to determine whether the employer's condition was made in bad
faith, to subvert the bargaining process. If the circumstances did not support
a finding of bad faith, the employer's refusal to bargain was not held to vio-
late the Act."
The Board then reevaluated this prior policy in light of the Supreme
Court's decision in NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg -Warner Corp. 19 The
Board noted that the Supreme Court in Borg - Warner interpreted section
8(a)(5) as prohibiting bargaining to impasse upon any permissive subject of
bargaining. 20 The duty to bargain applied to unions and employers, and was
not mitigated by a good faith belief that the subject was a mandatory bargain-
ing matter. The Board noted the strong stand taken by the Supreme Court
and determined that, upon re-examination, its prior practice of treating the
issue of a court reporter's presence as a mandatory subject of bargaining was
an erroneous interpretation. 2 ' The Board concluded, therefore, that the
employer's insistence to impasse on this non-mandatory subject constituted an
unfair labor practice, violating sections 8(a)(5) and 8(a)(1) of the Act."
This change in policy appears to reflect a proper interpretation by the
Board of the bargaining provisions. It cannot be said that the issue of a court
reporter's presence at a bargaining session is really a matter included in
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 23 This issue
is more appropriately considered a procedural concern, affecting only the
negotiations themselves. The matter is, as the Board characterized it, "a
threshold matter, preliminary and subordinate to substantive negotia-
tions...."24
As well as being conceptually accurate, the decision also reflects the
Board's policy of encouraging bargaining. Neither the employer nor the
union may use the issue of a court reporter's presence to stall negotiations,
regardless of motivation or of good faith intent." Whereas in the past a
union or employer bore the heavy burden of demonstrating bad faith in at-
tempting to compel the opposing party to continue or commence bargaining,
a union or employer can now rely on the Board's per se rule to overcome the
court reporter demands. By establishing this per se rule, the Board has elimi-
nated an obstacle to bargaining, and has closed off an area for potentially
great abuse.
" Id., 99 L.R.R.M. at 1035. See also NLRB v. American Ship Bldg. Co., 26
N.L.R.B. 788, 94 L.R.R.M. 1422 (1976), mid in unpublished order, No. 17-1178 (D.C.
Cir. April 5, 1978).
1" 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
2" 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1036. See Borg-Warner, 356 U.S. at
349. See also note 3 supra.
21 237 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1036.
22
 Id.
22 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). See note I supra.
237 N.L.R.B. No. 106, 99 L.R.R.M. at 1036.
25 The Board stated, "Having found that the subject matter here involved is
not a mandatory subject of bargaining, and that Respondent's insistence on such sub-
ject therefore violated Section 8(a)(5), it is irrelevant whether Respondent's insistence
was in good or had faith." Id.
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The employer in Barden-Collins Co., however, argued that this change in
Board policy will handicap efforts to determine, during subsequent hearings,
the course of negotiation breakdowns. Without the presence of a reporter
during bargaining sessions, the Company argued, no assurances of accurate
reporting would exist. for a court or other body examining the bargaining
process' later. Although this policy may hinder accurate decision making at.
possible future review, the Board's decision places a premium on effective
bargaining conditions.
The Union argued, and the Board noted in its decision, that the pres-
ence of a court reporter at bargaining sessions will often inhibit real prog-
ress. 27
 Negotiators may concentrate on what. they arc saying and on the
recording process, lessening concern with reaching an agreement. By refusing
to permit either party to insist upon the presence of court reporters during
negotiations, the Board foregoes a certain measure of accurate reporting in
order to maintain an atmosphere conducive to effective bargaining.
In addition, it is not yet certain that the difficulties envisioned by the
employer in Barden-Collins will materialize. The parties still may compromise
on this matter and take measures that, to a greater or lesser degree, will en-
sure accuracy in recording the events at. the bargaining sessions. For example,
the parties may agree to permit, as in the instant case, an electronic recording
of the session. This method may he found not to interfere substantially with
open discussion in the sessions since it is a much less blatant form of report-
ing the dialogue. The recording also can provide a fairly accurate report of
what took place.
It remains to be seen what compromises may be worked out to ensure
both effective bargaining and an acceptable measure of accuracy in reporting
the sessions. It is clear, however, that the Board's new policy contained in the
present decision properly characterizes the nature of the issue as a prelimi-
nary, nonmandatory matter, and furthers the Act's policy of encouraging col-
lective bargaining.
IV. MUNICIPAL BOYCOTT OF NON-UNION COMPANY:
J.P. STEVENS V. JACKSON
During the 1978-79 Survey year, the United States District. Court for the
Northern District of Georgia heard an unusual labor-related case involving
J.P. Stevens & Co., the Southern textile manufacturer.' The company, ap-
26 Id.,I 99 L.R.R.M. at 1035.
27
 Id. at 1035-36. The Board referred to a work by Walter Maggiolo in which
he states, "[Oxperience has taught that the presence of a stenographer or tape recorder
does inhibit free collective bargaining. Both sides talk for the record and not fbr the
purpose of advancing negotiations toward eventual settlement. Each becomes overcon-
scions of the recording of his remarks. The ease of expression so necessary to proper
exposition of problems is hampered. The discussion generally becomes stultified." W.
MAGG101.0, TECFIN/QUES OF MEDIATION IN LABOR DISPUTES, Oceana Publications, Dobbs
Ferry, New York, (1971).
_J.P. Stevens & Co. v. Jackson,
	 F Supp. 	
 99 1 R R M 2827 (N.D.
Ga. 1978).
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gearing as plaintiff, alleged violations of its constitutional rights by a union
and by the mayor of Atlanta, Georgia-allegations quite different from those
normally brought by an employer against a union for infringement of
Board-administered statutory laws. 2
 Stevens alleged that an Executive Order
issued by the mayor, forbidding the city of Atlanta from contracting with Ste-
vens until the company ceased discriminatory and illegal practices, violated
the company's clue process 3
 and equal protection' rights. Stevens also alleged
that the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, the union rep-
resenting Stevens' employees, was guilty of conspiracy to deny the company of
its constitutional rights by lobbying with the city to support the union's labor
demands against the company. 5
 The district court rejected each of Stevens'
contentions, finding no violation of the company's constitutional rights and
dismissed the case with award costs to the defendants."
Labor disputes between J.P. Stevens and its employees have a long his-
tory. Since the mid-1960's, the J.P. Stevens Company has been involved in
continual litigation, in which the company's labor practices have been chal-
lenged successfully.' More recently, the company has been found liable for
2
 Of course, in routine labor law cases, only the National Labor Relations
Board, and sometimes the federal appellate courts, have the opportunity to'hear union
versus employer disputes which involve requests for declaratory and injunctive relief.
A district court, less frequently, will hear requests for injunctions against unions under
29 U.S.C. § 107 (1976) (section 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act), and breach of contract.
claims under 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976) (section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act), and claims for compensatory damages under 29 § 187 (1976) (section 303
of the Labor Management Relations Act). Otherwise, it is not the usual course 6'n a
federal district court to become involved with actions arising out of labor disputes.
Thus, this case is unique from the beginning, by virtue of the fact that it is an
employer suit against a union, where the employer is attempting to defeat the union's
boycotting activities, by filing charges in a district court.
3 99 L.R.R.M. 2827, 2829, 2830-33.
4 Id. at 2829, 2833-34.
5 Id. at 2829, 2834-37.
" Id. at 2837.
The J.P. Stevens court summarized the company's history of litigation before
the Board and the courts as follows:
The following provides a summary of plaintiff's adverse history before the
NLRB and appellate courts: J.P. Stevens & Co. (Stevens I), 157 NLRB 869,
61 LRRM 1437, enf'd. with modification, 380 F.2d 292, 65 LRRM 2829
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1005, 66 LRRM 2728 (1967); J.P. Stevens
& Co. (Stevens II), 163 NLRB 217, 64 LRRM 1289, enf'd. with modifica-
dons, 388 F.2d 896, 67 LRRM 2055 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
836, 69 LRRM 2435 (1968); J.P. Stevens & Co. (Stevens III), 167 NLRB
266, 66 LRRM 1024, enf'd. with modifications, 406 F.2d 1017, 70 LRRM
2104 (4th Cir. 1968); J.P. Stevens & Co., (Stevens IV), 167 NLRB 258, 66
LRRM 1030, enf'd. with modifications, 406 F.2d 1017, 70 LRRM 2104 (4th
Cir. 1968); J.P. Stevens & Co. (Dublin-Nathaniel Plants) (Stevens V), 171
NLRB 1202, 69 LRRM 1088, enf'd. 417 F.2d 533, 72 LRRM 2433 (5th
Cir. 1969); J.P. Stevens & Co. (Gulistan Division) (Stevens VII), 179 NLRB
254, 75 LRRM 1375, curd., 441 F.2d 514, 76 LRRM 2817 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 830, 78 LRRM 2464 (1971); J.P. Stevens & Co, (Stevens
IX), 183 NLRB 25, 75 LRRM 1407 (1970), enf'd., 461 F.2d 490, 80 LRRM
2609 (4th Cir. 1972); The Black Hawk Corp. (Stevens X), 183 NLRB 267,
74 LRRM 1277 (1970); J.P. Stevens & Co. (Gulistan Division) (Stevens XI),
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engaging in discriminatory hiring practices, violations under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. 8 Finally, the company has been found in contempt.
of orders to remedy its unfair labor practices."
In the instant case, the mayor of the City of Atlanta, Maynard H.
Jackson, issued an Executive Order which described the J.P. Stevens Company
as "an historic and continuing violator of the federal labor laws"'" and equal
employment. laws. In reaction to the company's practices, the order stated:
[I]t is riot in the best economic business and social interests of the
City of Atlanta and its citizens to support financially organizations
which deny fundamental human and employment rights to
employees and applicants for employment, nor to contract with or-
ganizations which support such illegal, discriminatory activities."
Based on this rationale, the Order provided that the City of Atlanta would
boycott J.P. Stevens by refusing to contract with the company until it dis-
continued its illegal and discriminatory employment. practices. The Order also
called for a boycott of all companies which were "first tier" contractors with
Stevens. 12
 Three days after the Order was issued, the company sought a
186 NLRB 180, 75 LRRM 1393 (1970), enf'd., 455 F.2d 607, 78 1..RRM
3116 (5th Cir. 1971); J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. (Stevens XII), 190 NLRB
751, 77 LRR11 1333 (1971), remanded on other grounds, 475 F.2d 973, 82
1.,RRIM 2471 (D.C. Cir. 1973), on remand, 205 NLRB 1032, 84 LRRM 1092
(1973); NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (Stevens XIII), 464 F.24 1326, 80
LRRM 3126 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 926, 82 LRRM 2597
(1973) (on contempt), remedial order at 81 LRRM 2285; J.P. Stevens & Co.
(Stevens XIV), 217 NLRB 90, 89 LRRNI 1729 (1975), enf'd., 547 F.2d 792,
93 LRRM 2262 (4th Cir. 1976); J.P. Stevens & Co. (Stevens XV), 219
NLRB 850, 89 LRRM 1814, enf'd., 547 F.2d 792, 93 LRRM 2262 (4th Cir.
1976); J.P. Stevens & Co. (Stevens XVI), 220 NLRB 34, 90 LRRN1 1215
(1975); NLRB v. J.P. Stevens Sc Co. (Stevens XVII), 538 F.2d 1152, 93
1.RRM 2265 (5th Cir. 1976) (on contempt); NLRB v. J.P. Stevens & Co.
(Stevens XVIII), 563 F.2d 8, 96 LRRM 2150 (2d Cir. 1977) (on contempt).
Id. at 2828 n.2.
42 U.S.C, § 2000e (1976). The J.P. Stevens court also listed the company's
previous Title VII cases:
Plaintiff's recent history of adverse Title VII, Equal Employment Act,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, el seq., decisions include: Sherrill v. J.P. Stevens & Co.,
410 F. Supp. 770 (W.D.N.C. 1975), aff'd No. 76-1064 (4th Cir. Jan. 24,
1977) (unpublished); Sledge (Harrison) v. J.P. Stevens & Co., It) Empl.
Prac. Dec. $10,585 and 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 111111,248 and 11,047, 16 FEN
Cas. 1652 (E.D.N.C. 1976), stayed pending appeal, 12 Empl. Prac. Dec.
1111,252, 18 FEY Cas. 260 (4th Cir. 1976).
99 L.R.R.M. at 2829 n.2.
See contempt cases cited in n.7 supra (Stevens XII I, Stevens XVII and Stevens
XVIII).
'" 99 L.R.R.M. at 2828.
" Id. at 2829.
' 2 The pertinent part of the order provided that:
effective immediately, the City of Atlanta shall not enter into any contracts
for the purchase of goods or services nor in any other manner contract
with or do business with the J.P. Stevens Company, nor any other company
with whom J.P. Stevens is a first-tier contractor which directly or indirectly
supports the illegal, discriminatory policies and practices of the J.P. Stevens
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temporary restraining order.'" At the hearing on the company's motion, the
Mayor agreed to suspend implementation of the Executive Order until the
plaintiff's request for permanent injunctive relief was heard and decided
upon. Two days later the Mayor publicly withdrew the Executive Order.' 4
Originally, the plaintiff's complaint sought declaratory and injunctive re-
lief under sections 1983' and 1985(3)," of Title 42. After the withdrawal of
the Order by the Mayor, the plaintiff amended its complaint to request de-
claratory relief and nominal and punitive damages under section 1983
alone." First, the plaintiff claimed that under section 1983 of the Civil
Company ... until and unless the J.P. Stevens Company and such of those
companies with whom they do contract cease and desist from such dis-
criminaiwy and illegal practices.
Id. at 2829 (emphasis in original).
mr .
" hi. It was undisputed in the instant case that during the three days the
order was in effect, "neither plaintiff not any of its first-tier contractors tendered any
bid on a city contract, was refused any contract, or suffered any cancellation of an
existing business agreement." Id.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to he sub-
jected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdic-
tion thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in
an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
'" 42 U.S.G. § 1985(3) (1976) provides in pertinent part:
If two or more persons in any State or Territory' conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of
depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of
the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the consti-
tuted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all
persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws ...
in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons
engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the
object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or
property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a
citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an
action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or depriva-
tion, against any one or more of the conspirators.
17
 99 L.R.R.M. at 2829. The fact that a governmental defendant was involved
in the suit limited the company's range of possible approaches. The mayor of Atlanta
is not subject to any N.L.R.A. or L.M.R.A. prohibitions. Otherwise, possible actions
against the union could have included a claim before the Board based on § 8(13)(4) of
the N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1976), or a claim for damages under section 303
of the 29 U.S.C. § 187 (1976). However, the § 303 claim would have served
a limited purpose since punitive &images are not collectible under § 303. See Local 20,
Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252, 260 (1964). On the § 8(b)(4) unfair practices issue,
perhaps the company thought the court would consider its arguments more favorably
than would the Board, which undoubtedly is weary of dealing with repeated offenses
under the Act by J.P. Stevens. Also, by joining the two defendants in the same suit, the
company could better stress to the court the unfair, "conspiring" nature of this
scheme.
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Rights Act, the Mayor's Order could be challenged in federal court as a viola-
tion of the company's due process rights." The company's due process alle-
gations developed along two theories: 1) that the Mayor's allegedly false
statements had damaged the company's business reputation,'`' and 2) that the
Mayor had deprived the company of its right to pursue a lawful business
without prior notice and hearing. 2 "
In considering the first due process allegation—the damage to business
reputation theory—the court considered a 1976 Supreme Court decision,
Paul v. Davis. zi
 In that case, the Supreme Court required the plaintiff to
show that it had suffered both "the stigma associated with false governmental
accusations" and "some significant. resultant alteration of legal status" to estab-
lish a cognizable section 1983 claim based on loss of business reputation. 22
Applying the Paul v. Davis test to the present case, the court found that, al-
though the company showed the Mayor's Order had misstated some details as
to charges against J.P. Stevens under Title VII employment discrimination
laws, and had made the company appear more culpable than had been
proven, it was doubtful that "one imprecise statement, in the long public list.
of labor and employment violations chronicled in the Executive Order, would
lead a jury to find that the level of substantial falsehood demanded in the first
test had been met." 25
 Second, the company did not meet the latter part of
the Paul v. Davis test. It did not allege or substantiate any tangible change in
its legal status caused by the Executive Order : " Thus, due to plaintiff's fail-
ure to meet the Paul v. Davis test., the court dismissed the plaintiff's due
process claim based on damage to business reputation.
The plaintiff's second clue process theory was based on an allegation that.
the Mayor's act had deprived the company of' its right to pursue a lawful
business without prior notice or hearing. 25
 Under this section 1983 allega-
tion, the plaintiff must show 1) an entitlement. to some interest in property or
liberty, and 2) a summary deprivation of that entitlement.. 2" If it is found
that the plaintiff has no "entitlement" to city contracts, the government can
place conditions on receipt of contracts provided, such conditions are
"reasonable."" The plaintiff attempted to base an alleged entitlement to city
18 Id. al 2830-33. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), (quoted at note 15 supra), was the
substantive basis for the company's claim. Under § 1983, the plaintiff is entitled to
bring a suit for damages and equitable relief against a governmental agent who has
allegedly violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.
'" 99 L.R.R.M. at 2830-31.
2"'
	 at 2831-33.
21
 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
22
 99 1..R.R.M. at 2830 (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 708-09 (1976)).
23 Id. at 2831. Thus, plaintiffs burden under a due process claim is greater
than in a common law defamation action. Id. at 2830. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at
701-10.
24 99 L.R.R.N.1. at 2831.
25 id.
2" Id. Compare Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (no entitlement),
with Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (plaintiff deprived of an entitlement
without due process).
27
 99 L.R.R.M. at 2833 fritihg United States ex rel. Laino v. Warden of Walkill
Prison, 246 F. Stipp. 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), gird per curiam, 355 F.2c1 208 (2c1 Cir. 196(3).
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contracts on a Georgia statute, which allowed municipalities to let contracts on
a competitive bid basis," and on an Atlanta ordinance, which required the
city to make purchases on competitive bids." The court, however, rejected
Stevens' argument and concluded that the company here did not establish the
necessary showing of entitlement to potential public contracts. The court
based its rejection of the plaintiff's argument on two grounds. First, the court
stated that neither the statute nor the ordinance created an enforceable right
in the bidder, but rather that they were intended to protect the public at
large. 3 ° Second, the court found that public contracting, unlike public
employment, repeatedly has been held to lie beyond the bounds of due proc-
ess protection._'
Since the court concluded that no civil right to public contracts existed,
therefore the only question remaining with respect to this due process charge
was whether the Mayor's Order included a "reasonable" condition precedent
to the plaintiff's city contracting. 32 The court found that requiring J.P. Ste-
vens to meet the goals of the city and its taxpayers with respect to compliance
with national labor and equal employment laws," 3 as a condition precedent to
receiving city contracts, was as rational as the city's already accepted condition
precedent that contracts go to the "lowest responsible bidder." 34 As a result,
the court dismissed the company's due process claims as "not actionable under
section 1983." 35
The plaintiff's second claim was that Mayor Jackson's Order violated the
company's constitutional right to equal protection. 36 The plaintiff alleged
that similarly situated potential contractors were not treated similarly, and
therefore, that Jackson's Order failed to meet the traditional rational basis
test." In rejecting this argument, the court summarized the elements of the
rational basis standard." The standard, the court stated, "(1) admits that the
government may wield broad discretion in order classifications; (2) presumes
such classifications to be valid; and thereby (3) places the heavy burden of
proving invalidity upon the challenger." 3" The J.P. Stevens court accepted
233 GA. CODE §§ 69-409 (1975).
214 ATLANTA, GA., CODE § 31-41.
3" 99 L.R.R.M. at 2832. The court cited Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S.
113, 126 (1940); M.B. Duran Co. v. City of Akron, 546 F.2d 201 (fith Cir. 1976); and
McQuILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 29.29 (3d ed. 1969) as precedent and author-
ity for its conclusion that no private cause of action was created by the statute or by
the ordinance.
99 L.R.R.M. at 2832. See also Image Carrier Corp. v. l3eame, 567 F.2d 1197,
97 L.R.R.M. 2259 (2c1 Cir. 1977); Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946 (1977); American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719
(M.D. Fla. 1972) (3 judge), aff'd without opinion, 409 U.S. 904 (1972).
32 99 L.R.R.M. at 2833.
3 " See text and notes at notes 10-12 supra.
"4 99 L.R.R.M. at 2833.
"3 Id.
3" Id. at 2833-34.
" Id, at 2833. See City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
99 L.R.R.M. at 2834.
"1" Id. See San Antonio School Dist,. 411 U.S. 1 (1973); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 425-28 (1960).
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the justification for the special classification as stated in the Order that J.P.
Stevens was singled out because of its record of illegal and discriminatory
employment practices and because of the city's interest in discouraging
further use of such undesirable practices.'" Although the plaintiff argued
that Jackson had issued the Order with political motives in mind—to advance
his own popularity with organized laborn—the court followed the rule that
any reasonable justification will be sufficient to substantiate the classification
and found the justification stated in the Order to be substantially "ra-
tional." 42 Thus, Jackson's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's equal
protection claim also was granted. 43
The plaintiff's third allegation brought the Amalgamated Clothing and
Textile Workers Union, the union representing plaintiff's workers, into the
suit as defendants. The company charged the union with engaging in a con-
spiracy to deprive the plaintiff of its constitutional rights."' Since the com-
pany's section 1983 complaint against the Mayor was dismissed on the basis
that no infringement of constitutional rights was suffered by the plaintiff, the
court concluded that the section 1983 complaint against the union as co-
conspirator also must he dismissed. 45 Without a decision against the Mayor,
there could be no constitutional conspiracy claim against the union, the state
action party being a necessary element. 46
The court was not satisfied, however, with dismissing the complaint on
this reasoning alone. As a basis for further discussion of this issue, the court
stated that, in addition to its failure on the basis of an insufficient claim
against the Mayor, "the plaintiff's charge against the union threatens First
Amendment and federal labor law protections which should not go un-
noticed." 47 The allegations behind the company's section 1983 co-conspirator
claims against the union were that the union had offered clerical and adminis-
trative assistance in drafting the Executive Order, and that the union had
given financial support to a non-profit organization, Southerners for
Economic Justice, which participated in promoting an ongoing Stevens con-
sumer boycott and which included Mayor Jackson on its Board of Direc-
tors." The company alleged that the union and the Southerners for
Economic Justice had attempted to persuade Mayor Jackson and other public
officials to support the Stevens consumer boycott and that some of those pub-
lic officials, including Jackson, had publicly voiced their support." Assuming
all of the company's allegations to be true, the court. found that even if the
plaintiff's due process and equal protection claims against the mayor had sur-
vived a summary judgment motion, the union would have been released from
4" See text and notes at notes 10-12 supra.
' I 99 L.R.R.M. at 2834.
42 Id. See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1960).
43 99 L.R.R.M. at 2834.
44 99 L.R.R.M. at 2834-37.
45 Id. at 2835.
4" Id.
47
 Id.
" Id.
4" Id. at 2836.
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the suit because the allegations did not constitute a conspiracy against the
company's constitutional rights on the part of the union."
In rejecting the conspiracy claim on this second level, the court em-
phasized the union's rights in this context and characterized the union's ac-
tivities as falling under the right of petition. The court explained:
[Alll persons, regardless of motive, are guaranteed by the First
Amendment the right to seek to influence the government or its of-
ficials to adopt a new policy, and they cannot be required to com-
pensate another for loss occasioned by a change in policy should
they be successful. 5 !
The court also noted that a broad range of related guarantees—freedom of
speech and association—protected all of the alleged union activities. 52
In addition to the union's constitutional guarantees, the court found pro-
tection for the union's alleged activities in the federal labor laws, citing in
particular section 20 of the Clayton Act," which prohibits courts from issuing
injunctions against peaceful, lawful assembly, boycotting, and other similar ac-
tivities." All of the alleged union activities, the court concluded, related to
advocating and canvassing for a consumer boycott were protected by this sec-
tion of the statute." Finding no unlawful union action, therefore, the court
also granted defendants' third summary judgment request, dismissing the
claim against the union. 5 "
5" Id. at 2837.
51 Id. at 2835-2836 (quoting Sierra Club v. Butz, 349 F. Stipp. 934, 938 (N.D.
Cal. 1972)).
52 99 L.R.R.M. at 2836. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657. 670 (1965); Eastern A.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 138 (1961); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945); U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S.
219 (1941).
53 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
54 99 L.R.R.M. at 2836. Section 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976),
provides in pertinent part:
[No1 restraining order or injunction shall prohibit person or persons,
whether singly or in concert ... from attending at any place where any
such person or persons may lawfully be, for the purpose of peacefully ob-
taining or communicating information ... or from ceasing to patronize ...
any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading
others by peaceful and lawful means so to do; or from paying or giving to,
or withholding from, any person engaged in such dispute ... moneys or
things of value; or from peaceably assembling in a lawful manner, and for
lawful purposes; or from doing any act or thing which might lawfully be
done in the absence of such dispute by any party thereto; nor shall any of
the acts specified in this paragraph be considered or held to be violations
of any law of the United States.
55 99 L.R.R.M. at 2836. The court also cited 29 U.S.C. § 104 (Norris-
LaGuardia Act); 29 U.S.C. § 157 (N.L.R.A.); 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (N.L.R.A. as
amended by the 1959 Landrum-Griffin amendments). Id.
The court noted that the union activities alleged included both a wide range of'
ongoing consumer boycott schemes and specific aid in drafting the Executive Order, to
effect a city-government boycott as well. However, the court did not distinguish the
two types of activities, in the context ui its discussion of constitutional and statutory
protections. The suggestion is that both categories of activity are equally protected.
511 99 L.R.R.M. at 2836.
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The J.P. Stevens decision represents several significant. developments, first,
in determining the acceptable range of action a local government may take in
support of a union-organizecl consumer boycott., and, second, in determining
the wide breadth of union boycott activities which will he protected under
constitutional and statutory provisions. First, with regard to the Mayor's role,
the court's holding allows and, in effect, encourages a city government's vol-
untary use of its economic persuasion on industries, to encourage compliance
with established federal labor laws and with equal employment standards. The
city's use of compliance with Federal labor policies as a precondition to receiv-
ing government contracts, as imposed by the Executive Order, presents a rela-
tively novel issue. One federal case involving a similar issue was Image Carrier
Corp. v. Bearne. 57 In a 2 to I decision in Image Carrier Corp. the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit found that a city policy limiting bid openings
for the city's "flat-form" printing contracts to union printers was "rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective" and therefore constitutionally
allowable. In its opinion, the Second Circuit majority emphasized the local
government's valid role in supporting the policies underlying national labor
policies, specifically, in its attempts to foster collective bargaining.'" The
Image Carrier court also emphasized the basic premise of limiting judicial re-
view in cases where the court is called upon to scrutinize "economic" legisla-
tion."
The J.P. Stevens court followed the Second Circuit's reasoning in Image
Carrier Corp. and extended the Second Circuit's approach in two respects: 1)
by finding that a city mayor's executive order, as well as a city's legislative
resolution, will survive clue process and equal protection scrutiny where the
executive act fosters national labor policy, and 2) by finding that such an ac-
tion by a city may be used to encourage a company's compliance with federal
equal employment policy, as well as to encourage national labor law policies
under the National Labor Relations Act (N.L.R.A.)." Thus, the J.P. Stevens
" 567 F.2d 1197, 97 L.R.R.M. 2259 (2c1 Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1785
(1979). See also Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 946 (1977).
" 567 F.2d at 1203.
" Id. "Illn economic matters
	 (citations omitted) the courts have not, since
the days of the Depression, interfered with legislative judgment rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective." See, e.g., City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303-06 (1976); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970); Williams v.
Lee Optical, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1955).
"" In this second respect, the city's action is comparable on a local level to the
federal policy effected by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d
(1976). Under Title VI, federal agencies are directed to cut off funds to recipients who
discriminate on the basis of race, color, or national origin. In an analogous way, the
court in Stevens v. Jackson approved a similar local government approach to effecting
compliance with equal employment laws. The municipal government in Stevens v.
Jackson had refused to pass taxpayer funds over to a company which had continuously
refused to comply with equal employment policies. The only difference between the
Mayor's approach in Stevens v. Jackson and the congressional approach under Title VI
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decision fosters the approach formulated earlier by the Second Circuit, and,
more generally, approves a city governments voluntary attempts to bring
about compliance with federal labor and equal employment law on a local
level.
It is difficult, however, to determine the future impact of the second sig-
nificant development of the J.P. Stevens decision—the district court's com-
ments regarding the union's protection against a section 1983 claim where the
union has encouraged a government boycott against the employer. The only
issue properly before the district court, relative to the union's activity, was
whether the union was involved with the government in a conspiracy action-
able under section 1983. Once the court found that the company had no
actionable section 1983 claim against the Mayor, the accompanying conspiracy
charge against the union automatically was defeated, the required state action
link having been removed."' Beyond this point, the court's comments are
dicta, unnecessary to the court's decision. The theories advanced by the court
regarding the legal protections of the union, however, provide interesting
starting points from which courts in later cases may draw.
The significant aspect of the court's pronouncements regarding the
constitutional protections applicable to the union activity is that the activities
involved interactions between the union and government officials, rather than
interaction between outside unions or between other private employers. Im-
plicitly, the court draws an absolute distinction between the two situations: 1)
government-union activities, and 2) union-secondary employer activities.
Under the National Labor Relations Act, the extent of allowable activity be-
tween a union and secondary employers is clearly restricted. 62 An extensive
is that in the latter case the funding agencies themselves are givers power to withdraw
or refuse funding after certain inquiries as to the recipient's practices are made accord-
ing 10 specific procedural guidelines. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. However, on the municipal
decision-making level, as in Stevens v. Jackson, presumably the local government may
refuse to provide economic benefits to companies only where there have been previous
judicial determinations of such companies' non-compliance with federal labor or equal
employment laws. Cf. Executive Order No. 11246 (Order issued by President Johnson
in 1965 requiring that all covered governmental contracts contain a non-discrimination
clause, including an agreement to take affirmative action to achieve the equal oppor-
tunity goals of the Order. This Order was found to be valid and enforceable in U.S. v.
New Orleans Public Service, Inc., 553 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1977)).
' 1 99 I...R.R.M. at 2834-35.
"2 See § 8(6)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(h)(4)
(1976), prohibiting certain types of union and joint union-employer activity which con-
stitutes secondary boycotting:
(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents—
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce
to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use,
manufacture, process, transport or otherwise handle or work on any goods,
articles, materials or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to
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body of case law has developed around the issue whether union activity of this
type falls within the permissible bounds of "primary activities," 63 or within the
prohibited category of secondary boycotting." Significantly, under the facts
ofj.P. Stevens, however, the court avoids this difficult primary versus second-
ary boycotting problem. The court does not mention the issue and thus as-
sumes that the distinction is not relevant where a union is lobbying or peti-
tioning for governmental action, as opposed to carrying out the activity on its
own or conspiring with secondary employers.f 5 The difference perceived be-
tween the two types of activity is based on the first amendment theory that
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce, where in either case an object thereof is—
(A) to enter into any agreement which is prohibited by [section
8(e)];
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer,
processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other per-
son	 : Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be con-
strued to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike
or primary picketing;
... Provided further, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, noth-
ing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity,
other than picketing. for the purpose of truthfully advising the public, in-
cluding consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or
products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization
has a primary dispute and arc distributed by another employer, as long as
such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employer
by any person other than the primary employer in the course of his
employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or not to
perform any services, at the establishment. of the employer engaged in such
 . ...distribution;
Section 8(c), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1976), referred to above as a prohibition provi-
sion, states that:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any
employer to enter into any contract or agreement., express or implied,
whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain
from handling, using, selling, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of'
the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any
other person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or
hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such extent un-
enfOrcible and void. 
"" See, e.g., NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760, 377 U.S. 58 (1964);
NLRB v. Carpenters Council, 398 F.2d 11, 68 L.R.R.M. 2840 (8th Cir. 1965).
" 4 See, e.g., Local 140, Furniture Workers v. NLRB, 390 F.2d 495, 67 L.R.R.M.
2392 (2d Cir. 1968); Honolulu Typographical Union No. 37 v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 952
(D.C. Cir. 1968); Retail Clerks (Land Title Ins. Co.) Local 1001, 220 N.L.R.B. No. 106,
93 L.R.R.M. 1338 (1976); Carpenters Local 550 (Diamond Industries), 227 N.L.R.B.
No. 36, 94 L.R.R.N1. 1426 (1976). Cf. cases interpreting § 8(e) ("hot-cargo" agree-
ments), e.g., National Woodwork Mfrs. Ass'n. v. NLRB, 386 U.S. 612, 64 L.R.R.M.
2801 (1967).
" 5
 In the latter case, the union's activity would he prohibited, if the union and
a secondary [private] employer conspired to boycott a "first-tier" contractor of J.P.
Stevens, under § 8(b)(4) and § 8(e) of the N.L.R.A. (quoted at note 62 supra).
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petitioning the government is an absolute right. A union may petition the
government, requesting action that is either consistent with national labor pol-
icy or requesting action that runs against national labor policy. In both cases,
this court implies, the union activity is protected. Presumably, since the
union's "petitioning" activities are absolutely protected, the duty is upon the gov-
ernment to respond to the union in a responsible manner.
In contrast to the court's well-founded comments regarding the constitu-
tional protections available to the union, the court's comments regarding the
statutory protection are less appropriate. Whether the union's activity should
be considered as a protected activity under federal labor law provisions" is a
potentially complex issue, particularly in light of the Mayor's inclusion of an
across-the-board secondary boycott of first tier contractors with Stevens in his
Executive Order."' Moreover, interpretation of what is protected activity
within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act normally is to be
determined by the Board, in the first instance, and to be reviewed not by the
district court, but by a federal circuit court upon appeal. Perhaps for these
reasons, the court dealt with the statutory labor law issue summarily, discuss-
ing in detail only the anti-injunction intent of section 20 of the Clayton Act."
The court correctly stated that under the Clayton Act and section 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act,'" the court lacked jurisdiction to issue an injunction
"" The court stated that, beyond the first amendment protections, the union's
conduct "falls squarely within the protection afforded labor publicity efforts under
federal labor laws." See § 20 of the Clayton Act, 29 U.S.C. § 52 (quoted at note 54
supra); § 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 104; §§ 7 and 8(b)(4) of the
N.L.R.A., 29 U.S.C. § 157 and 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (quoted at note 62 supra).
"7 See text of the Order at note 12 supra.
The N.L.R.A. suggests a policy against secondary boycotts, where non-offending
employers are boycotted even though they have not committed unfair labor practices,
although the Act does not absolutely prohibit such a boycott when imposed by a gov-
ernmental unit, since a government employer is not within the scope of regulation
under the Act. See § 8(h)(4) and § 8(e) of the N.L.R.A. (quoted at note 62 supra).
Whether a union's role in initiating the governmental boycott would be protected
under the Act is not such an easily determined issue as the court apparently assumes
by stating that the union activities here fall "squarely within the protection afforded ...
under federal labor laws." 99 L.R.R.N1. at 2836 (emphasis added).
"8 29 U.S.C. § 52 (1976).
"" 29	 § 104 (1976):
No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to issue any re-
straining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any Case involv-
ing or growing out of any labor dispute to prohibit any person or persons
participating or interested in such dispute (as these terms are herein de-
fined) from doing. whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:
(a) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any rela-
tion of employment;
(b) Becoming or remaining a member of any labor organization or of
any employer organization, regardless of any such undertaking or promise
as is described in section 103 of this title;
(c) Paying or giving to, or withholding from, any person participating
or interested in such labor dispute, any strike or unemployment benefits or
insurance, or other moneys or things of value;
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against the union. If the court had carried through consistently with this ap-
proach, it would not have suggested that the union activities were "squarely
within the protection" of sections 7 and 8(a)(4) of the N.L.R.A. A more accu-
rate approach would treat the union activities here as outside the reach of the
court without further comment. 7 " Aside from this relatively minor difficulty,
however, the court's overall approach brought a correct result—the union's
activities organizing a consumer boycott and seeking the government's sup-
port of that boycott clearly would be protected by the first amendment. and
therefore beyond the reach or a court injunction.
Thus the J.P. Stevens decision suggests continued protection under fed-
eral law of an organized union's right to speak publicly of its dissatisfaction
with an employer who continues to violate federal labor law policies in an
ongoing labor dispute. This guarantee includes the right to persuade third
parties to join a consumer boycott and the right to lobby and petition the
government, in an attempt to persuade public officials to support a union's
interests. Second, the case stands for a newer idea, that city governments—as
well as the state and federal governments—may use their economic power
voluntarily to persuade private companies to operate according to established
federal labor law and equal employment standards. Such a decision seems
appropriate in the instant case, especially in light of the illegal behavior J . P.
Stevens Company has demonstrated after numerous adverse Board and court
decisions. The J.P. Stevens decision, therefore, strengthens the effectiveness of
federal labor law, by permitting a, perhaps, more effective means of inducing
compliance.
(d) By all lawful means aiding any person participating or interested in
any labor dispute who is being proceeded against in, or is prosecuting, any
action or suit in any court of the United States or of any State;
(e) Giving publicity to the existence of, or the facts involved in, any
labor dispute, whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling, or by any other
method not involving fraud or violence;
(I) Assembling peaceably to act or to organize to act in promotion of
their interests in a labor dispute;
(g) Advising or notifying any person of an intention to do any of the
Acts heretofore specified;
(h) Agreeing with other persons to do or not to do any of the acts
heretofore specified; and
(i) Advising, urging, or otherwise causing or inducing without fraud or
violence the acts heretofore specified, regardless of any such undertaking
or promise as is described in section 103 of this title.
7 " Whether all of the union's activities in this case are "protected activities"
under the Act, and therefore to be given protection by the Board in an unfair labor
practice case is a separate question for the Board. Although the union activities, in-
cluding the alleged drafting of the mayor's order, appear to he protected by the Act,
that question is one to be properly decided by the Board in the context of a § 8(b)(4)
complaint, not by a federal district court in a 1983 action.
The purpose of creating the Board in 1947 was to give it general primary juris-
diction in the area of labor relations. Thus, the company should not be allowed to
circumvent the Board, where it is attempting to quash union activity. If requests to
enjoin union activity do riot trigger a district court's jurisdiction under § 7 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, then the court should refuse to consider any equitable action
against the union, leaving the company with its appropriate course—filing a complaint
with the Board, if, in fact, there is a basis for such complaint.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
I. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. Prima Facie Case
1. Disparate Impact and Proof of Prima Facie Case: New York Transit Authority
v. Beazer
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,' the United States Supreme Court de-
termined that victims of employment. discrimination who bring suits under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2
 need not. prove discriminatory in-
tent." Instead, such plaintiffs must demonstrate only that the hiring criteria
in question "select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory pat-
tern."' Once a prima facie case is established, the employer may defend his
practice by showing that it bears "a manifest relation to the employment in
question." 5
 Finally, if an employer has met the burden of showing a "busi-
ness necessity," the plaintiff' may nevertheless demonstrate that the re-
quirement, although facially neutral, is merely a pretext for discrimination."
Although the Griggs Court provided a general outline of the disparate
impact cause of action, it did not specify either the nature or the amount of
statistical evidence necessary to support a prima facie case. In addition, it.
failed to adequately define the burden borne by a defendant in rebutting the
plaintiff's evidence or in demonstrating a business necessity. Several more re-
cent. Supreme Court decisions have further defined the plaintiff's and
defendant's respective burdens to present evidence and to prove their claims.'
However, New York Transit Authority v. Beazer," decided during the Survey year,
introduced new uncertainties into this area.
Beazer was a class action challenging a New York City Transit Authority"
policy which prohibited the employment of any person found to be using
methadone."' The four named plaintiffs challenged this policy on two
' 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
2 42 U.S.C. 2000(e) et seq. (1976).
3
 401 U.S. at 430. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-40 (1976)
(proof of discriminatory intent is required to establish a violation of the equal protec-
tion component of fifth amendment due process).
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). See also Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
• Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 410 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). See also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
425 (1975).
" Dothard v. Rawlinson. 433 U.S. at 329: Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
' See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) (the proper use of statis-
tics in disparate impact cases); Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) (the
proper use of statistics in disparate treatment cases); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody,
422 U.S. 405 (1975) (defendant's burden of proof in disparate impact. cases).
• 440 U.S. 569 (1979).
• Hereinafter referred to as Transit Authority, or TA.
1 " Rule 11(h) of the Transit Authority Rules and Regulations embraces a gen-
eral policy prohibiting the use ()I' narcotic drugs.
Employees must not use, or have in their possession, narcotics, tran-•
quilizers, drugs of the amphetamine group or barbiturate derivatives or
paraphernalia used to administer narcotics or barbiturate derivatives, except
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grounds. First, they argued that a classification based on methadone use vio-
lates the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amend-
ment." Second, claiming that a disproportionate number of methadone
users in New York City are Blacks and Hispanics, plaintiffs argued that the
Transit Authority's exclusionary policy has a disparate impact on Blacks and
Hispanics in violation of Title VII. 12
In its initial opinion, the district court addressed only the constitutional
claim.' 3 After extensive testimony concerning the physical and psychological
effects of methadone use, and the nature of the jobs affected," the court
concluded that the Transit Authority's exclusionary policy violates the equal
protection clause.' The court, however, expressly limited relief to those
members of the class who had been maintained satisfactorily in a methadone
program for at least a year and who were seeking only non-safety-sensitive
jobs." In a supplemental opinion, the district court judge found that the
Transit Authority's exclusionary employment policy also violated Title VII. 17
Since the unconstitutionality of this policy had already been established, the
statutory question was considered merely to establish the availability of attor-
ney's fees." Consequently, the district court gave only superficial considera-
tion to the Title VII issue.
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed that part of the district court's
opinion which related to the class, but reversed the court's denial of individual
relief to three of the four named plaintiffs.'" The circuit court based its
opinion solely on the equal protection claim, 20 but affirmed the award of at-
with the written permission of the medical director-Chief Surgeon of the
system.
440 U.S. at 572. Although this rule does not explicitly cover methadone, and although
it appears to allow the possibility of waiver, the parties in Beazer stipulated that
methadone was considered by the T.A. to be a narcotic drug and that no written
permission was ever given by the chief surgeon for the employment of any person
using methadone. 440 U.S. at 572 n.3.
" Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 399 F. Supp. 1032, 1033
(S.D.N.Y. 1975).
12 Id.
Id. at 1058-59. justice Stevens' majority opinion in the Supreme Court chas-
tised the district court for apparently deviating from the accepted policy of resolving
all statutory issues first in order to avoid constitutional issues. 440 U.S. at 582-83; see,
e.g., Spector Motor Corp. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944).
" 399 F. Stipp. at 1037.
15 Id. at 1058.
'' Id. The Transit Authority employs approximately 47,000 people. Of these,
12,300 are employed in operating positions which have a direct impact on public
safety. These positions include subway operators, conductors, bus drivers and subway
tower men. Id. at 1052-53. In addition, certain other job titles are classified as "critical"
by the N.Y.C. Transit Authority on the basis of the risks which they present to the
public, or to other employees. Id. at 1053-54.
'' Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 414 F. Stipp. 277, 278-79, IS
FEN Cas. 1605, 1606 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
" Id. at 278, 15 FE1' Cas. at 1605.
10 Beazer v. New York City Transit. Authority, 558 F.2d 97, 100-01, 17 FEP
Cas. 226. 229 (2t1 Cir. 1977).
20
 Id., 17 FEP Cas. at 227.
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torney's fees on the basis of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976. 2 ' As a result, the circuit court never considered the Title VII claim. 22
The Supreme Court, in a six to three decision, reversed the judgment of
the Second Circuit and held that all methadone users can be banned from any
employment with the Transit Authority. 23 Although the district court had
given only fleeting consideration to the plaintiff's Title VII challenge and the
Second Circuit had not even considered the question, the Supreme Court de-
cided that it was appropriate nonetheless to resolve the issue. 24 In doing so,
the Court first focused on the strength of the plaintiffs' prima facie case.
Although the majority was unwilling to overturn the district court's conclusion
that a prima facie case of disparate impact had been established, the Court
questioned the strength of the evidence on which this conclusion was based."
The statistical evidence considered by the district court was of two sorts.
The first included a breakdown by race of Transit Authority workers who had
been referred to the medical director for suspected violations of the company
drug policy since July 1972. 2" In its supplemental opinion, the district. court
had noted that 81 percent of suspected violaters were Black or Hispanic."
The Supreme Court, however, questioned the relevance of this statistic. The
Court first noted that the data was deficient because it included all suspected
drug users, not just methadone patients. Second, the statistic was questioned
because it did not reveal the percentage of the protected classes who were
actually fired as a result of illicit methadone use. Finally, the courts surmised
that since the district court had found that few, if any, methadone users
21 Id. at 99-100, 17 HP Gas. at 228. Before the district court order became
final. Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988
(1976), which permitted the recovery of reasonable attorney's fees in actions based on
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). The district court, upon the plaintiff's motion, held this
statute to be an alternative basis for the award of attorney's fees. The circuit court
affirmed the district court's rationale.
22 558 F.2d at 99-100, 17 FEY Cas. at 228.
2" 440 U.S. at 594. Although the Court reversed the judgment of the circuit
court, the Supreme Court did not consider whether the T.A.'s employment policy
would be unlawful if it was also applied to former methadone users. Instead, the
Court merely noted that the district court had expressed some eonfusion as to whether.
the T.A. did in fact extend its exclusionary policy to former methadone users and
moved on to consider the effect of' the policy on only current methadone users. Id. at 572
n.3. justice Powell concurred in the Court's holding with regard to the constitutionality
of the policy as it applies to current methadone users, but he dissented from the
Court's refusal to consider the legality of a policy of excluding former methadone
users. Id. at 596 (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). He believed that both the
district and the circuit courts which had previously heard the case, as well as both
parties to the litigation, had interpreted the T.A. hiring policy to exclude all former
methadone users who had been free of methadone use for less than 5 years. Id. Con-
sequently, he felt that the court should resolve this issue as well. Id.
24 Id. at 583 n.24. The Court concluded that it was appropriate to resolve the
issue at this time because the question was fully aired before the district court, because
settled legal principles were applied to uncontroversial facts, and because the parties
had briefed and argued the issue before the Supreme Court.
22 Id. at 587 n.31.
2" 414 F. Supp. at 278-79, 15 FEP Gas. at 1606.
27 Id.
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would exhibit symptoms of drug use, it was likely that no methadone users
would be among the group of people referred to the medical director for
suspected violations. Because these variables were not specifically accounted
for, the Court determined that the data was not sufficient to support a prima
facie case of disparate impact."
The second class of statistics considered by the district court used non-
applicant. data," comparing the racial composition of city dwellers who would
be excluded from employment with the Transit Authority as a result of the
no methadone policy with the racial composition of New York City as a whole.
On the basis of these statistics, the district court had found that between 62
percent and 65 percent. of the methadone users in New York City were Black
or Hispanic. 3" It concluded, moreover, that this statistic established the plain-
tiff's prima facie case because it demonstrated that the Transit Authority's
exclusionary policy has "a substantially greater impact on minority groups
than on whites. - :"
The Supreme Court, however, was unwilling to attribute the same
amount of significance to the plaintiffs' statistical evidence. Although
acknowledging the possibility that a prima facie case may be established
through the use of non-applicant data," the majority cited Teamsters v. United
States" for the proposition that the utility of non-applicant data may be un-
dermined by evidence that it does not accurately reflect the demographic
characteristics of the pool of actual applicants. 34 The majority then noted
several variables not considered by the plaintiffs, which might undermine the
significance of their data.
One of the concerns that the Beazer Court. had with the plaintiff's use of
non-applicant data was that the data covered all methadone users, not just
those who had been successfully maintained in the program for at least a
year. 35
 The plaintiffs' failure to narrow their data in this manner concerned
the Court because the possibility remained that the data did not reflect the
more narrowly defined pool of methadone users recognized as the class enti-
tled to relief by the district court."" The Court also criticized the data be-
cause it failed to exclude both methadone users who were unemployable be-
" 440 U.S. at 584-85 & 585 n.26.
2" This chapter defines non-applicant dam broadly to mean any statistical evi-
dence based on some source other than information about actual applicants for the
job. The term includes both general population data as well as more specific statistics
concerning the racial makeup of the community labor market.
3" 414 F. Stipp. at 279, 15 FEY Cas. at 1606.
31 Id.
32
 440 U.S. at 586 n.29 citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977).
as 431 U.S. 324, 340 n.20 (1977).
34
 440 U.S. at 586 n.29.
35 Id. at 585-86.
3" Id. The district court concluded that the policy was only unconstitutional as
applied to methadone users who had been in the program for at least a year. 399 F.
Supp. at 1058.
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cause of a non-drug related disability ° and those who were otherwise
employable but who were employed at some other job at the time that the
lawsuit was filed, and hence were unavailable for work with the Transit Au-
thorit.y. 38 Finally, the majority criticized the data because it included only
methadone users who were involved in publicly funded methadone programs
and therefore it provided no information about the nearly 14,000 methadone
users involved in private programs. 3" Because the plaintiffs tailed to dem-
onstrate that these unconsidered variables would not affect the percentages
of Blacks and Hispanics who would be excluded from Transit Authority jobs
because of their methadone use, the Court dismissed the non-applicant data
as "virtually irrelevant." 40
Although the Court was extremely critical of the plaintiff's use of statis-
tics to establish its prima facie case, it did not rest its reversal on this ground.
Instead, the Court noted that even if the plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to
establish a prima facie showing of disparate impact, the prima facie case was
effectively rebutted by the defendant's demonstration of a business neces-
sity,41 Although the Supreme Court expressly reversed the district court's
conclusion on this issue, there was very little discussion in the opinion about
the basis for the reversal. In a footnote,'" the Court simply noted the district
court's finding that the T.A.'s legitimate goals of safety and efficiency were
significantly served by the policy of exclusion even though the total exclusion
of methadone users was not required by these goals. 43 On this basis the
Court concluded that policy "bears a manifest relationship to the employment
in question" 44
 and therefore "whether or not respondents' weak showing was
sufficient to establish a prima facie case, it clearly failed to carry respondents'
ultimate burden of proving a violation of Title VII." 45
Having concluded that the Transit Authority's exclusionary policy did not
violate Title VII, the Court next considered whether the policy could with-
stand the scrutiny required by the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment." The Court noted that only a minimum rational justification
was required since the policy did not mark a class of persons by virtue of
37 440 U.S. at 586 & 586 n.28. The Court was concerned that a substantial
number of methadone users would not be employed anyway because of alcohol abuse
or illicit drug use and that the general data might not accurately reflect the racial
makeup of the class of methadone users who might actually seek jobs with the T.A. Id.
38 Id. at 586. The Court was apparently concerned that the racial makeup of
methadone users who were unemployed and hence available for work with T.A. would
differ from the general citywide statistics.
33 Id. at 586 & 586 n.30. The dissenting opinion disputed this conclusion. Id.
at 601 & 601 n.6 (White, J., dissenting).
40
 Id. at 586.
41
 Id. at 587.
42 Id. at 587 n.31.
43 Id. citing Beazer v. New York City Transit Authority, 399 F.2d 1032, 1049-
50 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
44
 440 U.S. at 587 n.31 quoting Griggs v Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432
(1971).
45 Id.
46 Id. at 587-94.
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"some unpopular trait or affliction.""' Such justification was found in the
articulated rationale of public safety, even though the class of people excluded
under the policy was overinclusive."
The major impact of this decision is on the burden of proof borne by
plaintiffs and defendants respectively in disparate impact employment dis-
crimination cases. The leading case on the proper use of statistical evidence in
a disparate impact claim is Dothard v. Rawlinson. 49 In Dothard, a female
applicant for the position of prison guard in the Alabama prison system chal-
lenged a state statute which established minimum height and weight require-
ments for guards on the ground that the statute excluded a disproportionate
percentage of women." To prove her prima facie case, the plaintiff intro-
" Id. at 592-93. The classification for purposes of the equal protection chal-
lenge was based solely on methadone use,• not on racial background. This was neces-
sary since the fourteenth amendment has been interpreted by the Court to require
proof of intentional discrimination, see cases cited at note 3 supra, and the district
court had found that the policy was not motivated by an intent to discriminate on the
basis of race. 414 F. Stipp. at 279, 15 FEP Gas. at 1606. Considered only from the
perspective that it treats methadone users differently front non-methadone users, the
Court likened its analysis to those cases sustaining state policies which draw classifica-
tions for noninvidious reasons—"where the test of validity requires that the rule he only
rationally related to the purposes for which it was intended. - Barbier v. Connolly, 113
U.S. 27, 31 (1885): see Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307,
312-14 (1976).
4M
 440 U.S. at 589-94.
4" 433 U.S. 321 (1977). There are two other recent Supreme Court cases
which are concerned with the proper use of statistics in proving a Title VII violation;
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) and Hazelwood School Dist. v. United
States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). Although these cases involved claims of disparate treat-
ment as opposed to disparate impact, both decisions provide valuable insights to the
use of general population data in proving a Title VII violation. In Teamsters, the plain-
tiffs relied in part on a comparison of statistics concerning the racial composition of
the communities in which the employer hired, with the racial makeup of the
employer's workforce. In a footnote, the Court endorsed the use of non-applicant data
cautioning only that such statistics are not irrefutable. 431 U.S. at. 339 n.20. Hazelwood
also involved the use of non-applicant data to prove a discriminatory purpose. Here,
however, the Court refined the rules governing the use of non-applicant data by the
development of the labor market concept. This concept required that in instances
where the job in question involves skills not easily acquired, the proper comparison
should be between the workforce and those people in the community who possess the
requisite skills. 433 U.S. at 308 & 308 n.13. Hazelwood is also important for the majori-
ty's suggestion that if applicant data can be obtained, it might be very relevant. Id. at
308 n.13.
These developments do not appear to be relevant in Beazer, however, since there
was no allegation that the jobs available at the T.A. required any type of skilled labor
as was necessary in Hazelwood. The statement concerning the relevance of applicant
data also does not. seem to apply in Beazer because even if such data were available, the
defendants refused the plaintiff's requests to discover such information, 440 U.S. at
599 (White, J., dissenting). For excellent discussions of the effect of Dothard, Hazelwood
and Teamsters on the use of statistics in proving Title VII violations see Shoben, Probing
the Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis
under Title VII, 56 TEx, L. REV. 1 (1977); Note, The Role of Statistical Evidence in Title
VII Cases. 19 B.C.L. Rev. 881 (1978).
51
 433 U.S. at 328-29.
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duced statistics showing both that a substantially smaller percentage of women
were employed as prison guards than were in the total Alabama work force
and that, on the basis of national census statistics, the statute would exclude a
far greater percentage of women than men." The defendants attempted to
attack the latter statistic on the ground that the plaintiff should be required to
produce data regarding the actual applicants for prison guard positions.'
The court rejected this position. Instead, it declared that "[t]here is no re-
quirement ... that a statistical showing of disproportionate impact must al-
ways be, based on analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants."" In
discussing the appropriateness of the general population data relied on by the
plaintiffs, the Court merely noted that reliance on general population data
was permissible so long as there was no reason to believe that the data did not
reflect the characteristics of the relevant labor market. 54
While the Beazer Court acknowledged its earlier conclusion in Dothard that
non-applicant data could be used in proving a disparate impact claim, 55 the
Court applied a much more exacting level of scrutiny to the plaintiff's non-
applicant statistics in Beazer. Specifically, the Beazer Court declared that the
citywide statistics relied on by the plaintiffs were "virtually irrelevant" because
they failed to account for several variables which could skew the conclusions
to be drawn from the data about the racial composition of methadone users
actually available for work with the Transit Authority. 55
 The Court reached
this conclusion even though the defendant offered no evidence suggesting
that the failure to account for these variables would invalidate the conclusions
drawn by the district court. If this approach is adopted as a general rule in
disparate impact cases, a defendant will be able to thwart any prima facie case
based upon non-applicant data by merely mentioning the existence of un-
controlled variables. The adoption of a rule which permits non-applicant data
to be attacked without any evidence that the data is not representative of the pool
of actual applicants would thus he inconsistent with Dothard and earlier deci-
sions establishing the utility of non-applicant data because in practice it would
keep plaintiffs from relying on non-applicant data which was not susceptible
of a minute breakdown into a variety of subgroups,"
51
 Id. at 329-30. Only the second statistic used by the Court in Dothard will he
discussed in this chapter.
52 Id. at 330.
53 Id.
" Id. at 330-31.
55
 440 U.S. at. 586 n.29.
5"
 440 U.S. at 585-86.
57 In Beazer, the Court noted several variables which, because they were un-
accounted for, detracted from the relevance of the plaintiff's statistics. See discussion
in text at notes 46-50 supra. The effect of this criticism would be to require the plain-
tiff to obtain statistics which considered all methadone clinics, both public and private
in New York City; which considered only those methadone users unemployed and
hence available for work; and which distinguished between methadone users who had
successfully been maintained on methadone for at least a year and which were, at the
time the suit was commenced, free from any drug or alcohol use. Most generally avail-
able data does not control for every possible variable which might arise in Title VII
litigation. Thus in many cases a plaintiff who sought to rely on non-applicant data to
prove his prima facie case might he required to expend considerable sums of money in
order to obtain data independently.
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Beazer is also a significant decision because of the majority's use of the
business necessity concept. This term was first employed by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power." There, the Court declared both that "busi-
ness necessity" is the central factor in testing the validity of an employer's
hearing criteria and that the burden of proving business necessity is on the
employer.'" In Albemarle Paper Co. v. 'Woody," the court further defined the
business necessity concept when it is used to evaluate the use of scored tests as
hiring criteria. Albemarle affirmed the requirements that business necessity
must be established wherever a hiring policy has a significant disparate impact
on a group protected by Title VII. The decision went even further, however,
by requiring that a hiring policy involving a scored objective test must be
validated by a professionally conducted study showing a substantial correlation
between test results and important characteristics which are relevant to the job
for which the candidate is being considered."' The court has not yet re-
solved the question of the extent to which the formal validation requirements
of Albemarle will be applied to non-scored objective hiring criteria such as that
involved in Beazer. However, in Dothard the Court refused to approve the use
of hiring criteria shown to cause a disparate impact in the absence of evidence
demonstrating that the criteria was necessary to safe and efficient job
performance. 12
 In addition, those lower federal courts which have con-
sidered the nature of the defendant's burden to prove a business necessity
have considered it to be substantial."
In Beazer, the Court significantly eased the employer's burden in justify-
ing a facially discriminatory hiring policy as a business necessity. In reaching
its decision the Supreme Court emphasized the district court's finding that the
Transit Authority might lawfully exclude all illegal drug users and some
methadone users from certain "safety sensitive" jobs in the interests of safety
and efficiency. The Surpreme Court, however, concluded that this public
safety rationale was sufficient to justify a rule barring all methadone users
from any employment with the Transit Authority, even though such a policy
would exclude certain otherwise qualified members of the class from
employment."' As applied in Beazer, the business necessity test is closer to the
58
 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
'" Id. at 432.
"" 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
" 1 Id. at 431.
" 433 U.S. at 331-32 & 331 n.14.
" 3
 See, e.g., Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1299, 17 FEP
Cas. 712, 718 (8th Cir. 1978) (describing the defendant's burden as a heavy one);
James v. Stockham Valve Co., 559 F.2d 310, 350, 15 FEP Cas. 827, 860 (5th Cir. 1977)
("to be justifiable under the business necessity doctrine a seniority system must be
essential to the goals of safety and efficiency"); Pettaway v. American Cast Iron Pipe
Co., 494 F.2d 211, 245, 7 FEP Cas. 1115, 1142 (5th Cir. 1974) (adopting the Lorillard
test); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798, 3 FEP Cas. 653, 657-58 (4th Cir.
1971) ("the test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose such
that the practice is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business"). But
see McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (letting the mere
articulation of some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason stand as justification in an
individual discrimination case based on an intentional discrimination theory).
" 440 U.S. at 587 n.31.
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standard of scrutiny applied to non-suspect classifications under the equal
protection clause than it is to traditional notions of business necessity. Like the
minimal justification test applied in equal protection cases,65 the test of busi-
ness necessity used in Beazer would permit an employer to justify a facially
discriminatory hiring policy without demonstrating that it is necessary to serve
the legitimate interest. advanced to support the policy. Such a test stands in
sharp contrast to the more rigorous standards required by the Court in Alber-
marle, Dothard and in those federal circuit and district courts which have con-
sidered the concept. Moreover, as was indicated by Justice Marshall in his
dissenting opinion in Beazer, the growing similarity between the Title VII con-
cept of business necessity and the requirements of' the equal protection clause
seems directly contrary to the Court's statement in Washington v. Davis that.
Title VII "involves a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to,
the seemingly reasonable ;Jets of administrators and executives than is ap-
propriate under the Constitution .... ..
2. Rebuttal of a. Prima Facie Case—Age Discrimination.: Marshall v. Westinghouse
Electric; Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear
An unresolved issue under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967' (ADEA) is whether the standard of proof for rebuttal of a prima facie
case should be the same in age discrimination cases as it is in race and sex
discrimination cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 2 (Title
VII). To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a discharged
employee (or the Secretary of Labor suing on his behalf) 3 must. show that he
was within the statutorily protected age group; that he was discharged; that
the employer sought to replace him with a younger person and that he was
replaced with a younger person outside the protected group.' To rebut a
prima facie case of age discrimination, an employer may utilize the defenses
provided in section 623(f) of Title 29." These are: (I) that age is part of a
"5 See, e.g., Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314
(1976); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970); Phillips Chemical Co. v.
Sumas School Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 385 (1960).
"" 426 U.S. 229, 247 (1976) quoted in Beazer, 440 U.S. at 602 (White, J., dissent-
ing).
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (1967)).
42 U.S.C. § 2000c to 2000e-17 (1976).
a 29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976) provides that the Secretary of Labor may sue to
enforce the right of a discharged employee.
I The protected age group includes persons aged at least 40 but less than 70.
29 U.S.C. § 63I(a) (1976), as amended by Age Discrimination in Employment Act
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3(a), 92 Stat. 189.
5 Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 735, 15 FEP Cas.
139, 143 (5th Cir. 1977); Lindsey v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 546 F.2d 1123, 1124-
25, 15 FEP Cas. 138, 139 (5th Cir. 1977); Wilson v. Sealtest Foods Div. of Kraftco
Corp., 501 F.2d 84, 86, 8 FEP Cas. 749, 750 (5th Cir. 1974).
" 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1976). The ADEA is codified in Title 29 of the U.S.
Code. See note I supra.
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bona fide occupational qualification, (2) that the discharge was based on
reasonable factors other than age, or (3) that the discharge was for good
cause.
In comparison, a discharged employee may establish a prima facie case of
racial discrimination in violation of Title VII by showing that he belonged to a
racial minority; that he was qualified for the job he was performing; that he
was satisfying the normal requirements in his work; that he was discharged;
and that after his discharge the employer assigned white employees to per-
form the same work.' Title VII allows the use of the bona fide occupational
qualification defense only when the alleged discrimination is based on reli-
gion, sex or national origin; it is not available in race discrimination cases.'
Title VII case law has developed a "business necessity" defense in race
cases.' The employer defends by proving that business reasons, rather than
impermissible factors such as race, prompted the dismissal or failure to hire.
This is analogous to the statutory "reasonable factors other than age" defense
in ADEA cases. To rebut a prima facie case of race discrimination, an
employer must "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason"" for
dismissing or failing to hire the employee. The employee must be given a
final opportunity to prove that the reasons articulated by the employer are in
fact a mere pretext for discrimination." This approach provides each party
with a fair opportunity to develop its case.
During the Survey year, the District Court for the Eastern District of New
York held in Marshall v. Arlene Knitwear, Inc.' 2
 that the same standard of
proof should be applied in ADEA cases as in Title VII cases. Thus, once the
ADEA plaintiff had established a prima facie case, the defendant could rebut.
by proving the existence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's dis-
missal. The plaintiff must then be given an opportunity to show that the
reason asserted by the defendant was a mere "pretext"; i.e., that the plaintiff's
age, and not the factor asserted by the defendant, was the real reason for the
plaintiff's dismissal. The Arlene Knitwear court stated that the defendant would
prevail only upon proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the plain-
tiff's dismissal was based on a reasonable factor other than age. 12 In contrast,
the Fifth Circuit in Marshall v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." held that a less
stringent standard for rebuttal should be applied in ADEA cases than in Title
VII cases. The court stated that successful rebuttal of a prima fade case re-
quired only that the defendant "go forward" with evidence demonstrating the
existence of a nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's dismissal,''
Flowers v. Crouch-Walker Corp., 552 F.2d 1277, 1282, 14 FEP Cas. 1265,
1268 (7th Cir. 1977).
8
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
" See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
" McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
11
	 at 804.
" 454 F. Stipp. 715, 17 FEP Cas. 1233 (E.D.N.Y.) (1978).
" Id, at 728, 17 FEP Gas. at 1243-44.
14 576 F.2d 588, 17 FEP Cas. 1288, rehearing denied, 582 F.2c1 966, 18 FEP Gas.
501 (5th Cir. 1978),
15 576 F.2d at 592, 17 FEP Cas. at 1291.
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Several courts had considered the issue of the defendant's burden in re-
butting a prima facie case of age discrimination prior to the decisions in Arlene
Knitwear and Westinghouse.' 6 Most of these courts, however, limited their dis-
cussion to whether the burden of persuasion or merely the burden of produc-
tion shifted to the defendant upon the plaintiff's presentation of a prima facie
case. Regardless of how the defendant's burden is characterized, the crucial
question is whether the ADEA plaintiff, like the Title VII plaintiff, is to be
allowed an opportunity to respond to the defendant's evidence by showing
that the defendant's purported nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual." The
purpose of the ADEA would be defeated if a defendant could prevail by pre-
senting evidence, for instance, that the plaintiff's job performance was un-
satisfactory, when in fact the defendant retained or hired younger employees
whose performance was comparable to the plaintiff's. The ADEA is violated
even when age is not the only reason for an employee's dismissal." The
approach of the Arlene Knitwear court appears to be correct because it clearly
provides an ADEA plaintiff with an opportunity to show pretext.
In Arlene Knitwear, an employer dismissed a sixty-two year old clothing de-
signer after telling her that he was liquidating the business and discharging all
the designers. Instead, he retained two younger designers and continued the
business. The Secretary of Labor sued the employer for violation of the
ADEA. The employer defended on the ground that the discharge was "based
on reasonable factors other than age." 19 He claimed that the two younger
employees were more competent and that their designs sold better than those
of the discharged employee.'" The employer was unable, however, to pro-
duce records to support these claims. In the absence of such evidence, the
court was persuaded by oral testimony, and by the fact that the discharged
employee had been paid more than the younger employees, that in-
competence had not been the true reason for her dismissal." The court then
decided that the Title VII standard of proof, which requires the defendant to
prove the existence of a nondiscriminatory reason by a preponderance of the
evidence, should be applied in ADEA cases because "[t]he statutes are reme-
dial in nature, and the ADEA was clearly patterned after Title VII. Age dis-
" Moses v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 550 F.2d 1113, 1114, 14 FEP Cas. 813,
814 (8th Cir. 1977) (defendant hears burden of persuasion); Laugesen v. Anaconda
Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313, 10 FEP Cas. 567, 571 (6th Cir. 1975) (defendant bears burden
of production); Mastic v. Great Lakes Steel Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1299, 1308, 14 FEP
Cas. 952, 959 (ED. Mich. 1976) (defendant bears burden of production).
The Fifth Circuit has consistently held that the defendant hears only the burden
of production. Price v. Maryland Cas. Co., 561 F.2d 609, 612, 16 FEP Cas. 84, 86 (5th
Cir. 1977); Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736, 15 FEN Cas.
139, 144 (5th Cir. 1977); Bittar v. Air Canada, 512 F.2d 582, 582-83, 10 FEP Cas.
1137, 1138 (5th Cir. 1975).
" In O'Connell v. Ford Motor Co., 11 FEN Cas. 1471 (F.D. Mich. 1975), the
court stated that an ADEA plaintiff should be allowed an opportunity to show pretext.
Id. at 1472.
' 8 Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 317, 10 FEN Cas. 567, 574 (6th
Cir. 1975).
19 See 29 U.S.C. § 623(1)(1) (1976).
20 454 F. Supp. at. 729, 17 FEN Cas. at 1244.
21 Id. at 730, 17 FEP Cas.. at 1245.
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crimination, while often more subtle than race or sex discrimination, is equally
pernicious." 22
The court found it unnecessary to provide the plaintiff with a specific
opportunity to prove pretext because it was simply unpersuaded of the verac-
ity of the defendant's assertion that the plaintiff was less competent than the
other designers. Nevertheless, the court noted that if the employer had suc-
cessfully proved the existence of a nondiscriminatory reason, the employee
would still be given an opportunity to show that the purported reason was in
fact a mere pretext." The court emphasized that it was not requiring the
employer to prove the nonexistence of discrimination: "The employer does
not have the burden of proving that it did not discriminate; if it proves any
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, it remains for the plaintiff to prove that
that reason was a pretext for discrimination or was applied in a discriminatory
fashion." 24
In contrast, the Fifth Circuit in Westinghouse held that an employer, when
defending a charge of age discrimination on the ground that the discharge
was "based on reasonable factors other than age,"" is not required to prove
the existence of reasonable factors by a preponderance of the evidence.'" In-
stead, the employer has only to go "forward with the evidence to demonstrate
reasonable factors other than age for the plaintiff's discharge."'" The court
did not state whether the plaintiff would be allowed to show that the asserted
factors were not the true reason for his discharge, but clearly denied any need
to follow Title VII precedent on this issue."
In Westinghouse,  an employee who had worked for Westinghouse from
1948 to 1973 claimed that he had been dismissed because of his age. The
Secretary of Labor sued Westinghouse for violation of the ADEA. Westing-
house defended the action by claiming that the employee's dismissal was
based on incompetence rather than age. Westinghouse admitted that the
employee had been "an excellent field operator,"" but deemed him incompe-
tent as an administrator, claiming that he was unable to keep up with paper-
work and experienced difficulties in handling customer complaints and in
dealing with his supervisor. 30
 The district court decided that age had not
been a factor in the employee's dismissal and ruled for the defendant. 3 '
On appeal to the Fifth Circuit, the Secretary argued that since a prima
facie case of age discrimination had been presented, Westinghouse should be
required to demonstrate that the criteria used to evaluate this employee's per-
formance were also applied to evaluate, all other similarly situated
employees." The court characterized this argument as shifting the burden
22 Id. at 728, 17 FEP Cas. at 1243-44.
23 Id. at 729, 17 FEP Cas. at 1244.
24 Id. at 728-29, 17 FEP Cas. at 1244.
25 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976).
2" 576 F.2d at 591-92, 17 FEP Cas. at 1291.
27 Id. at 592, 17 FEP Cas. at 1291.
28 Id. at 591-92, 17 FEP Cas. at 1291.
28 Id. at 590, 17 FEP Cas. at 1289.
3" Id.
Usery v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 17 FEP Cas. 1287 (S.D. Fla. 1976).
32 576 F.2d at 590, 17 FEP Cas. at 1289.
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of persuasion to the defendant. It refused to require an employer to do more
than demonstrate the existence of reasonable factors other than age." To
support this conclusion, the court of appeals noted distinctions among the
defenses provided by section 623(f) 34 of Title 29: (I) that age is part of a bona
fide occupational qualification, (2) that the discharge was based on reasonable
factors other than age, or (3) that the discharge was for good cause. The
court characterized a claim that age is a bona fide occupational qualification as
an affirmative defense. The use of an affirmative defense, the court reasoned,
shifts the burden of persuasion by choice to the employer who has in effect
admitted the employee's prima facie case. 35 In contrast, the employer who
justifies his action by claiming reasonable factors other than age or good cause
actually denies the employee's prima facie case, and thus, in the court's view,
should not beat - the burden of persuasion.""
In declining to apply the Title VII standard of proof in an ADEA case,
the Fifth Circuit noted its own decision in Turner v. Texas Instruments, Inc." In
Turner the court held that an employer charged with race discrimination in
violation of Title VII must prove the existence of a legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's dismissal by a preponderance of the
evidence in order to rebut a prima facie case."' The court distinguished age
discrimination from race discrimination, and borrowed language from a prior
decision to explain its rationale.
Because the aging process causes employees constantly to exit the
labor market while younger ones enter, simply the replacement of an
older employee by a younger worker does not raise the same infer-
ence of improper motive that attends replacement of a black by a
white person in a Title VII case. 39
The court. concluded that to impose the requirement desired by the
Secretary—that defendants show that the differentiating criteria applied to
the plaintiff were applied equally to all similarly situated employees—would
in effect require defendants to prove that the reasons asserted were "non-
pretextual". Such a requirement, in the court's view, would place a burden on
defendants that would be greater than the burden imposed on Title VII de-
fendants.'" The court thus asserted that Title VII defendants need not show
that they applied the same differentiating criteria to employees of all races.
" Id., 17 FEP Cas. at 1290.
" 4 29 U.S.C. § 623(f) (1976).
35 576 F.2d at 591, 17 FEP Cas. at 1290.
.34;
37 555 F.2d 1251, 15 FEP Cas. 746 (5th Cir. 1977).
"" Id. at 1255, 15 FEP Cas. at 748.
"" Marshall v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 554 F.2d 730, 736, 15 FEP Cas.
139, 144 (5th Cir. 1977), quoted in 576 F.2d at 591-92, 17 FEP Cas. at 1291.
The validity of this distinction between age and race discrimination is challenged
by the author of Note, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 380 (1976), who points out that, "given the percentages of blacks and whites in
the workforce, it is also likely that, absent any discrimination, a black worker who has
been fired or refused a job will be replaced by a white employee ...." Id. at 392.
" 576 F.2d at 592, 17 FEP Cas. at 1291.
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It is not clear that the Fifth Circuit's holding in Westinghouse is a correct
statement of Title VII law. The Supreme Court in Furnco Construction Corp. v.
Waters,'" a race discrimination case, stated that an employer had the burden
"of proving that he based his employment decision on a legitimate con-
sideration, and not on an illegitimate one, such as race." 42 Yet a few months
later, in Board of Trustees v. Sweeney," the Court vacated a First Circuit deci-
sion because it "requir[ed] the defendant to prove absence of discriminatory mo-
tive," 44
 and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Furnco. The
Court stated that the defendant's burden is that of "merely `articulat[ing]
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason' " and not that of " `prov[ing] ab-
sence of discriminatory motive.' " 45 Exactly what the defendant must show in
regard to legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons under Furnco and Board of
Trustees v. Sweeney is thus unclear. These decisions, however, do not change
the requirement. that a Title VII plaintiff be given an opportunity to prove
pretext.
In view of the apparent confusion in Title VII law, it. is difficult to assess
the correctness of the Fifth Circuit's statement in Westinghouse that a Title VII
defendant need not show that he applied the same criteria to all employees.
The Westinghouse decision, however, did not rest on the court's reading of
Title VII law. The court stated further that the Title VII standard (whatever
that standard was) need not be applied in ADEA cases since a prima facie case
of age discrimination did not raise "the same inference of improper motive" 4 "
as a prima facie case of race discrimination. It. is this statement by the Westing-
house court which appears questionable when compared to the reasoning of
the Arlene Knitwear court, which viewed age discrimination and race discrim-
ination as "equally pernicious."'"
The Westinghouse court rejected the Secretary of Labor's argument that
the employer must show that it employed the same criteria to all employees
because it would require the defendant to prove that the asserted nondis-
criminatory reasons were "non-pretextual - . 48 The court, however, did not
elaborate on the meaning of "non-pretextual". Under one possible inter-
pretation, the employer would need to prove that the asserted reason was
true; for example that the employee's incompetence could be objectively
shown. Alternatively, proving non-pretextuality could mean that the employer
must establish first. that the employee was incompetent and second that in-
competence was the sole reason for the employee's dismissal; i.e., that the
employer also would have dismissed a younger employee of the same level of
competence. The Supreme Court's analysis in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green 49
 supports the second interpretation, but suggests that the plaintiff
" 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
' 2 Id. at 577.
" 439 U.S. 24 (1978).
44 Id. at 25.
45 Id.
46
 576 F.2c1 at. 591-92, 17 FEP Cas. at 1291.
97 454 F. Stipp. at 728, 17 FEP Cas. at 1244.
" 576 F.2(1 at 592, 17 FEP Cas. at 1291.
4" 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
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must prove pretextuality rather than non-pretextuality. In McDonnell Douglas,
an employer contended that it had refused to rehire a discharged black
employee because he had engaged in unlawful disruptive acts against the
employer. 50 The Supreme Court stated that the employee must be given an
opportunity to prove that this justification was a pretext for discrimination,s'
and described the type of evidence which would be relevant to such proof.
The Court suggested that if it could be shown that white employees who had
engaged in similar acts were retained or rehired, the asserted reason would be
revealed as a pretext for discrimination.'
Perhaps the Westinghouse court merely meant that while it is reasonable to
allow employees an opportunity to prove that employers' asserted reasons are
pretextual, it is unreasonable to require employers to prove the contrary.
However, the court failed to state whether it would allow employees the op-
portunity to prove that the asserted reasons are a pretext for discrimination.
Since the court clearly denied any need to follow the Title VII decisions on
rebuttal of a prima facie case of discrimination," it appears to have rejected
the ,Title VII requirement that the plaintiff have such an opportunity. Under
Westinghouse, the trial apparently is over after the defendant articulates a
reasonable, nondiscriminatory reason other than age for the employee's dis-
missal. The employee is not allowed to show that the asserted reason for dis-
missal is not the real reason.
The Westinghouse court's distinction between the treatment of Title VII
plaintiffs and ADEA plaintiffs is unwarranted. Congress' failure to include
age discrimination among the activities prohibited by Title VII does not indi-
cate that it intended less favorable treatment for age discrimination plaintiffs
than for those claiming discrimination based on race, sex, or national ori-
gin. Title VII contained a provision directing the Secretary of Labor to study
the problem of age discrimination and to submit a report to Congress." The
Secetary submitted his report in 1965, noting the prevalence of age discrimi-
nation and its deleterious effects, and recommending remedial legislation."
Congress could have simply amended Title VII to include age discrimination.
Instead, it enacted a separate statute. One reason for this decision was the
perception that the EEOC, as of 1967, was "overburdened" with Title VII
complaints "and that age discrimination complaints could be handled more
efficiently by the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor." 5°
This does not indicate that Congress wanted the courts to treat ADEA com-
plaints and Title VII complaints differently with regard to standards of proof.
The Secretary's report suggested that age discrimination, although a seri-
ous problem, is not motivated by "dislike or intolerance for the older
3" Id. at 797.
s' Id. at 804.
52 Id.
53 576 F.2(1 at 591-92, 17 FEP Cas. at 1291.
54 Title Vii, § 715, 78 Stat. 265 (1964) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
14 (1976)).
55 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON AGE DISCRIMINA- ,
TION IN EMPLOYMENT UNDER SECTION 715 OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965).
51 90 NARY. L. REV., supra note 39, at 381.
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worker,"" but by misconceptions about. the abilities of older workers. Thus,
while race discrimination might be based on irrational hostility towards racial
minorities, age discrimination was seen to result. from employers' exaggerated
concerns about the competence of older workers. Congress recognized that
some physically demanding jobs in fact might be unsuitable for older workers.
This recognition is reflected by the insertion in the ADEA of the bona fide
occupational qualification defense which is not available in race discrimination
cases. While an employer may justify an employment decision by asserting
that an older worker would be unable to perform the work, he cannot claim
that a minority worker, by reason of his minority status, was unqualified. The
Westinghouse court offered no indication that. Congress viewed age discrimina-
tion as less invidious than race discrimination, except where age is a hone fide
occupational qualification. The bona fide occupational qualification defense is
available in sex discrimination cases as well." Yet. this has not led courts to
apply more lenient standards of proof in sex cases than in race cases.
Title VII and the ADEA not only have similar aims, the language used in
each to prohibit employment discrimination is identical." In view of the
similarity between the statutes and the absence of' any indication that Congress
intended different treatment for Title VII and ADEA plaintiffs, there is no
foundation for the court's assertion in Westinghouse that a prima facie case of
age discrimination "does not raise the same inference of improper motive' i 0
as a prima facie case of race discrimination. Therefore defense of an ADEA
case should not be made easier than defense of a Title VII case. If the ap-
proach of the Westinghouse court. is followed, ADEA plaintiffs will encounter
extreme difficulty in proving their cases since a successful defense will require
no more than the introduction of some evidence demonstrating reasonable
factors other than age.
B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
. Age Discrimination: Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA) is intended
to protect individuals between 40 and 70 years of age from employment dis-
crimination. Section 623(a) of Tide 29' prohibits an employer from discharg-
ing or refusing to hire an individual in this group because of his or her age.
Persons aggrieved by ADEA violations may sue in federal court to enforce
their rights.' The language of the ADEA, however, does not clearly indicate
57 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR REPORT, supra note 55, at. 6, quoted in 90 1-1Aay.
L. 14.v., supra note 39, at 383.
" 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976).
59 Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623 with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
6" 576 12 .2d at-592, 17 FEY Cas. at 1291.
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976) (originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81
Stat. 602 (1967)).
2 Id. § 623(a). The ADEA is codified in Title 29 of the U.S. Code. See note 1
supra.
3 Id. § 626(c).
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whether an employee must first. seek recourse under state fair employment
provisions.' During the Survey year, the Supreme Court resolved this uncer-
tainty in Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans by holding that section 633(b)" of Title
29 requires resort. to slate agencies prior to the initiation of a federal action.'
Section 626 8
 of Title 29 sets forth the mechanics for the enforcement. of
the act, and section 633" outlines the relationship between federal ADEA en-
forcement and state activity in the age discrimination area. Pursuant to section
626(d), discharged employees seeking to sue their employers under the ADEA
must give sixty clays' notice to the EEOC of their intent to sue.'" The pur-
pose of this requirement is to enable the EEOC to seek informal settlement of
disputes. Failure to give notice results in forfeiture of the employee's right. to
bring a private action under the ADEA." Section 633(b) of Title 29 sets
forth another limitation on the remedy. Section 633(b) provides, in pertinent.
part.:
In the case of an alleged unlawful practice occurring in a State
which has a law prohibiting discrimination in employment because of
age and establishing or authorizing a State authority to grant or seek
rehef from such discriminatory practice, no suit may be brought
under section 626 of this title before the expiration of sixty days
after proceedings have been commenced under the State law, unless
such proceedings have been earlier terminated ... . 12
The Supreme Court in Oscar Mayer rejected the suggestion that section 633(h)
merely required a claimant who resorts to a state agency to give the agency
sixty clays in which to act, and held that resort to a state agency is mandatory
prior to a federal suit, just as prior notice to the EEOC is mandatory under
section 626(d).''
4 Resort to state agencies was held to be mandatory in Reich v. Dow Badische
Co., 575 F.2d 363. 370, 17 FEP Cas. 363, 367 (2d Cir. 1978); Hadfield v. Mitre Corp.,
459 F. Supp. 829, 832, 18 FEP Cas. 742, 744 (D. Mass. 1978); McCracken v.
Shenango, Inc., 440 F. Supp. 1163, 1166, 16 FEP Cas. 114, 116 (W.D. Pa. 1977);
Magalotti v. Ford Motor Co., 418 F. Supp. 430, 433, 15 FEP Cas. 877, 879 (E.D. Mich.
1976); Nickel v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 424 F. Supp. 884, 886, 15 FEP Cas. 1099,
1100 (E.D. Mich. 1976). Resort was held to be optional in: Holliday v. Ketchum, Mac-
Leod and Grove, Inc., 584 F.2d 1221, 1222, 17 FEP Cas. 1175, 1175 (3rd Cir. 1978);
Smith v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 584 F.2d 1231, 1232, 17 FEP Cas. 1188, 1189
(3rd Cir. 1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 2819 (1979); Simpson v. Whirlpool Corp., 573 F.2d
957, 17 FEP Cas. 1089 (6th Cir. 1978), vacated, 99 S. Ct. 2819 (1979).
99 S. Ct. 2066 (1979).
" 29 U.S.C. § 633(h) (1976),
99 S. Ct. at 2071.
8 29 U.S.C. § 626 (1976).
" Id. § 633.
1 " Id. § 626(d). See note 13 infra.
" Reich v. Dow Badische Co., 575 F.2(1 363, 367-68, 17 FEP Cas. 363, 365 (2d
Cir. 1978).
12 29 U.S.C. § 633(h) (1976).
" 99 S. Ct. at 2071. At the time of the complaint in Oscar Mayer, this notice
was to be given to the Secretary of Labor, rather than to the EEOC, but the adminis-
tration of the ADEA was transferred to the EEOC by section 2 of 1978 REORG. PLAN
No. I, 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (May 9, 1978).
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In Oscar Mayer the plaintiff, Joseph Evans, claimed that his employer, in
violation of the ADEA, had forced him to retire because of his age." As
required by section 626(d), Evans notified the Secretary of Labor of his intent
to sue his employer concerning the dismissal." He also asked the Labor De-
partment whether he was required to file a state complaint to preserve his
federal rights under the ADEA." Relying on the Department's advice that
this was unnecessary, Evans sued his employer in federal court without com-
mencing proceedings with the Iowa State Civil Rights Commission which had
jurisdiction over age discrimination complaints.' 7 During the time that Evans'
federal claim was pending, the statute of limitations for his state claim ex-
pired.' 8
The District Court for the Southern District of Iowa rejected the defend-
ant's argument that resort to a state agency was mandatory before the plain-
tiff could sue under the ADEA and held that the plaintiff's federal claim,
therefore, was not barred." The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
affirmed this decision." The Supreme Court, however, granted certiorari
and reversed the lower court decisions. The Court, in an opinion written by
Mr. Justice Brennan, held that section 633(b) of Title 29 does make the
"commencement" of state proceedings mandatory before a federal action can
be brought.' The Court also held, however, that the required "commence-
ment" of state proceedings need not be within the state statute of lim-
itations.' Thus, in the instant case, the plaintiff Evans could preserve his
federal rights simply by filing his time-barred state claim. The Court was
unanimous in its holding that resort to state agencies is mandatory, but Mr.
Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion, in which the Chief Justice and
Justices Powell and Rehnquist joined, taking issue with the Court's holding
that. state statutes of limitation need not he met. Justice Stevens deemed the
Court's holding regarding the statute of limitations an "advisory opinion"
since the plaintiff had not yet filed a claim which the state agency had found
to be time-barred. Thus, Justice Stevens maintained, that issue was not before
the Court. 22
14 99 S. Ct. at 2070.
Id.
1 " Id.
Id.
18 Id. at 2073.
" Evans v. Oscar Mayer & Co., 17 FEP Cas. 218 (S.D. Iowa 1977). The district
court noted that the language of section 633(b) was not mandatory, in contrast to
section 626(d) which says that Ishich notice shall he filed." The court also commented
that, since a federal action automatically supersedes any state action under section
633(a), mandatory filing with the state agency would seem "unnecessary and dilatory."
Id. at 220.
2n The court of appeals had reversed the district. court initially, Evans v. Oscar
Mayer & Co., id. at 221, but on rehearing changed its position, placing substantial
reliance on an amicus brief submitted by the Secretary of Labor. 580 F.2d 298, 17 FEP
Gas. 1119 (8th Cir. 1978).
21 99 S. Ct. at 2073.
22 Id. at 2076.
23 Id. at 2077 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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In holding that section 633(b) of Title 29 requires resort to state agencies,
the Court first noted the similarity between this section and section 706(b) of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 24 Section 706(b) of Title VII has
been interpreted to make resort to state agencies mandatory in those states
which have state discrimination agencies. The Court observed that section
633(b) of the ADEA was patterned after and is virtually in haec verba with
section 706(b) of Title VII.25 The Court then examined the legislative history
of section 706(b) and found that it was intended to keep those controversies
which could be handled effectively by state agencies out of the federal
courts." Since Title VII and the ADEA share a common anti-discrimination
purpose, and since the language of their provisions on resort to state agencies
is almost identical, the Court concluded that Congress must have intended
section 633(b) of Title 29 to be interpreted in accordance with section 706(b).
The Court examined the employee's argument that significant differences
existed between Title VII and the ADEA and that, therefore, resort to state
remedies ought not to be required. Title VII, Evans noted, requires that
claimants file with state agencies before filing with the EEOC, but the ADEA
permits simultaneous filing with the EEOC and state agencies. The Court was
unpersuaded by the employee's argument and observed that the reason for
this distinction was the fear by the drafters of the ADEA that delay would be
"particularly prejudicial to the rights of 'older citizens to whom, by definition,
relatively few productive years are left.' "27
 The Court, therefore, found this
distinction insufficient to justify inconsistent treatment of resort to state rem-
edies under the ADEA and Title VII. The employee also argued that the
filing of state complaints by ADEA claimants would be futile, since section
633(a) of Title 29, a provision for which Title VII has no counterpart, pro-
vides that the commencement of an ADEA action supersedes all state pro-
ceedings. 28
 The Court rejected this contention, reiterating the congressional
intent to provide state agencies sixty days in which to resolve age discrimina-
tion controversies before allowing the disputes into the federal courts." The
Court thus determined that resort to state agencies is mandatory and not op-
tional."
The Court then considered the question whether section 633(b)'s re-
quirement that state proceedings be "commenced" meant that they must be
initiated within the period specified by the state statute of limitations. Section
633(b) contains the following definition of "commencement":
If any requirement for the commencement of such proceedings
is imposed by a State authority other than a requirement of a filing
of a written and signed statement of the facts upon which the pro-
ceeding is based, the proceeding shall be deemed to have been
commenced for the purposes of this subsection at the time such
24
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
25 99 S. Ct. at 2071.
2" Id.
27 Id. at 2072 (quoting 113 CONG. REC. 7076 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Davits)).
2" Id. at 2072.
2" Id.
3" Id. at 2073.
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statement is sent by registered mail to the appropriate State author-4 . 31
Since state statutes of limitation arc requirements "other than a requirement
of a filing of a written and signed statement. of the facts upon which the
proceeding is based," the Court reasoned that the state statutes need not be
complied with in order to have a valid "commencement" under section
633(b)." 2 The identical definition of commencement, the Court noted, is con-
tained in section 706(b) of Title VII and has been interpreted not to require
compliance with state statutes of limitation." Similarly, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure also allow a time-barred action to be "commenced" by the
filing of a complaint.'" The Court thus concluded that state statutes of limi-
tation need not he complied with in order to preserve federal rights under
the ADEA.
Mr. Justice Blackmun wrote a separate opinion, stating that he would
have preferred to have affirmed the court of appeals' holding that resort to
state agencies was not mandatory. Nevertheless he concurred in the Court's
decision because it was important to resolve the prevailing uncertainty as to
procedure under the ADEA." 5 In his opinion justice Blackmun addressed a
problem ignored by the majority—the statement in section 626(b) 3" that
ADEA is to "be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and pro-
cedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act]." This reference noted by justice
Blackmun suggests that the Fair Labor Standards Act (ELSA), and not Title
VII, should be consulted in resolving procedural questions under the
ADEA. 37 The FLSA does not require resort to state agencies as a prerequi-
site to Federal actions. Thus, if' the ELSA pattern were followed, ADEA claim-
ants could forego resort to state agencies.
In 1978 the Supreme Court, in Lorillard v. Pons,"" looked to the FLSA
and not to Title VII to determine whether the ADEA provided a right to a
jury trial in private ADEA actions for lost wages. The Court observed that,
although the ADEA was similar in purpose to Title VII, its remedies and
procedures were derived from the FLSA."" Whether Title VII guaranteed a
jury trial was therefore irrelevant.'" If the analogy followed in Lorillard had
been applied in Oscar Mayer, a different result would have been reached. The
approach taken by the Court in Oscar Mayer seems difficult to reconcile with
that in Lorillard.
While the correctness of the Oscar Mayer decision is questionable in light
of section 62600 reference to ELSA remedies and procedures and the
Court's earlier decision in Lorillard, the decision at least will resolve uncer-
31 29 U.S.C. § 633(b) (1976).
32 99 S. Ct. at 2073.
33 Id. at 2074.
34 Id. at 2073.
33 Id. at. 2077 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
3 ' 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
37 99 S. Ct. at. 2076.
38 434 U.S. 575 (1978).
39 Id. at 584-85.
10 Id. at 585.
November 1979]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 195
minty as to whether ADEA claimants must file with state agencies. Claimants
may preserve their federal rights at any time merely by submitting a state-
ment of facts to the state authorities. Nevertheless the Court's solution is vul-
nerable to the criticism that it. permits evasion of effective state proceedings in
contravention of the congressional desire that these proceedings be utilized to
screen out cases from the federal courts. The state agencies will not have
sufficient time to deal with claims before their proceedings are superseded by
federal actions, pursuant to Title 29, section 633(a). The Court seems to have
dealt adequately with this criticism by noting that after July 1, 1979, pursuant
to section 2 of 1978 Reorganization Plan No. 1, 4 ' the EEOC assumes the ad-
ministration of ADEA claims from the Department of Labor. 42
 Since the
EEOC has a policy of automatically referring claims to appropriate state agen-
cies, the states will have at least. some opportunity to deal with age discrimina-
tion claims prior to the commencement of federal actions. States could amend
their statutes of limitation to conform with the 180 days allowed by section
626(d) of Title 29 and then toll the statutes upon the filing of a timely charge
with the EEOC. 43
 This would provide state agencies an opportunity to deal
with age discrimination complaints without unduly burdening claimants.
Thus, criticism of the decision as undermining the state's role may prove to be
unfounded.
In holding that prior resort to state agencies is required of employees
wishing to sue their employers under the ADEA, the Court apparently ig-
nored section 626(b) of Title 29 as interpreted in the Lorillard case, which
directs reference to the FLSA for procedural and remedial matters. The
Court's decision, however, imposes very little hardship on ADEA plaintiffs,
since it may be complied with merely by filing a statement of facts with the
state agency, regardless of compliance with the state statute of limitations.
Therefore, the decision represents an acceptable compromise between the de-
sire to expedite federal age discrimination actions when disputes cannot be
resolved informally and the desire to give state agencies, as well as the EEOC,
an opportunity to deal with such claims.
2. Title VII: White v. Dallas Independent School District
Under section 706(c) of Title VII,' eligible state or local authorities must be
given 60 days in which to handle a discrimination charge before it is filed with
the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission fEE0C1. 2 Au-
" 43 Fed. Reg. 19,807 (May 9, 1978).
" See note 13 supra.
43
 99 S. Ct. at 2075-76.
' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
Id. The provision states:
In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a
State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law pro-
hibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or au-
thorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such prac-
tice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving
notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (h) of this section
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thorities are eligible under this provision if the practice allegedly violates a
state or local law, and the state or locale has established or authorized an
authority to grant or to seek relief from the practice or to institute criminal
proceedings with respect thereto.' No further requirement for eligibility for
deferral agency status appears on the face of the statute.
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court held that section 706 was satis-
fied if the EEOC orally transmitted a written charge received from a com-
plainant to the appropriate state agency, waited until termination of either the
state proceedings or the sixty days, and then formally filed the complaint on
complainant's behalf without having obtained a second written charge. 4 The
charging party could thus satisfy the pre-suit administrative procedures by
filing a charge only with the EEOC and allowing them to defer to the state
agency. After this decision, and presumably to facilitate the implementation of
this filing practice, the EEOC promulgated a set of regulations requiring all
state or local agencies that considered themselves as authorities to which prior
resort was mandated under section 706, to identify themselves to the Commis-
sion and to request designation as a deferral agency.' Thus the EEOC placed
the burden on the potential deferral agencies to come forward and assert
their entitlement under section 706 to a prior opportunity to resolve discrimi-
nation claims. The regulations state that only those agencies which complied
with the modification requirement would be eligible for designation as "706
agencies," r; and thus entitled to have charges referred to them by the EEOC. 7
During the Survey year, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in
White v. Dallas Independent School District 8 held that the failure of a state agency
to comply with the EEOC regulation requiring it to identify itself to the
Commission as an eligible deferral agency did not prevent it from being con-
sidered a section 706 deferral agency.'' The court held that the Texas district
and county attorneys were in fact deferral agencies because they satisfied the
literal requirements set forth by Congress in section 706(c); i.e., they were
existing authorities authorized to deal with violation of the state fair employ-
by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceed-
ings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such pro-
ceedings have been earlier terminated ....
3 Id .
4 Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
29 C.F.R. §§ 1601.70-1601.74 (1979). 29 C.F.R. § 1601.70(a) (1979) states in
part :
Because of' the large number of State and local fair employment prac-
tice agencies, only those agencies which notify the Commission of their
qualification under section 706(c) of the Title VII and this section and
request designation as '706 Agencies' or 'Notice Agencies' or both will be
eligible for such designation.
The regulations also set up the procedures for submitting notification to the EEOC, 29
G.F.R. § 1601.70 (1979), the mechanisM for Commission determinations on 706
agency applications, 29 C.F.R. § 1601.71 (1979), and a list of presently designated 706
agencies. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74 (1979).
" 29	 § 1601,70 (1979).
29 C.F.R. § 1601.13(c)(2) (1979).
8 581 F.2(1 556, 18 FEP Cas. 204 (5th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 561, 18 FEP Gas. at 207-08.
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ment law." The significance of the case lies in the court's implicit message to
the EEOC that it cannot graft requirements to the existing statutory criteria
set forth by Congress for determining if a state authority constitutes a defer-
ral agency within the meaning of section 706. The EEOC does not have the
discretion to decide that a state authority, which satisfies the literal language
of the statute, is not entitled to deferral because it has not identified itself to
the EEOC.
In August of 1973, Patsy Ruth White [White] filed charges with the
EEOC claiming that the mandatory maternity leave policy of the Dallas Inde-
pendent School District constituted sex discrimination in violation of Title
She did not pursue any remedies under Texas law.' 2 In July of 1974
and January of 1975 she was advised by the EEOC that reasonable cause
existed to believe that Title VII had been violated and that "timeliness and all
other requirements [had] been met." 13 Although the EEOC knew that some
defendants were contending that Texas district and county attorneys were de-
ferral authorities under section 706, the EEOC never advised White of this
nor referred her charge to the Texas authorities.' 4 The Texas authorities
had failed to notify the EEOC of their eligibility as deferral agencies pursuant
to the EEOC regulations requiring such notification." Nevertheless, Texas
did have a statute forbidding employment discrimination in public employ-
ment. such as that claimed by White.'fi The statute provided for civil relief,
including the granting of injunctive relief, and also made knowing violations a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to $1000 or one year in the county
jail." The provision also designated district and county attorneys as the ap-
propriate state or local officials to receive referrals of alleged violations from
the EEOC.'s
In July of 1975, with no referral having been made to the Texas au-
thorities, the EEOC advised White that she was entitled to sue in federal dis-
trict court within 90 days after receipt of the letter.'" White brought suit but
a federal district court dismissed her claim because she had failed to pursue
her Texas state remedies as required by the federal statute. 2* The Fifth Cir-
I" Id., 18 FEP Cas. at 208.
" Id. at 558, 18 FEP Cas. at 205. In August of 1972, White, acting pursuant to
the defendant's then current pregnancy policy, informed the Superintendent of
Schools that she was pregnant. Id. She was, at that time, employed as a permanent.
grade school substitute teacher. Id. Despite a written policy that would not have per-
mitted White to begin employment that fall because her child was due in November.
she was assigned to teach in an elementary school. Id. The assignment was terminated
after one day allegedly because of the school district policy on teacher pregnancy. Id.
Plaintiff, in addition to her Title VII claim, also brought her suit against defendant
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). Id.
2 Id.
13 Id. at 558, 562, 18 FEP Cas. at 205, 208.
14 Id. at 562, 18 FEP Cas. at 208.
1 ' Id. at 561, 18 FEP Cas. at 207.
1" Id. at 559, 18 FEP Gas. at 206.
" Id. at 559 & n.1, 18 FEP Cas. at 206 & n.1.
'" Id.
1 °' Id. at 558, 562, 18 FEP Cas. at 205, 208.
2" Id. at 558, 18 FEP Cas. at 205.
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cult. Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the state statute satisfied
the requirements for deferral contained in Title VI I. 21 On rehearing en
bane, the court of appeals reaffirmed its earlier decision by a 16-0 vote.'
However. it ruled by a 12-4 vote that White could still maintain her Title VII
action despite the fact that the state statute of limitations had run." The
court, in remanding the case to the district court to determine the rights of
the parties under Title VI1, 24 held that the mistakes of the EEOC should not
redound to White's detriment. 25
In finding that the Texas statute created a deferral agency entitled to
section 706 consideration, the court rejected three arguments put forward by
the EEOC and the claimant. They first contended that in order to constitute a
state with a deferral statute, the state must. demonstrate some special concern
in the specific area of fair employment practice beyond a general authoriza-
tion to prosecute under general criminal jurisdiction. 2 " The court answered
the argument. by finding that the Texas district and county attorneys acted in
regard to unfair employment practices under the specific authorization of the
state anti-discrimination statute, and not under their general criminal author-
ity." The court found that the language of section 706, which says that
states may "establish or authorize" agencies, implies that states may utilize
existing structures for the redress of discrimination. 28 Moreover, when the
23 White v. Dallas Independent School District, 566 F.2d 906, 909. 16 FEP
Cas. 739, 741 (5th Cir. 1978).
22
 581 F.2d at 561-63, 18 FEP Cas. at 208-09.
2'S
	 at 562-63, 18 FEP Cas. at 208-09.
" Id. at 563, 18 FEP Cas. at 209.
25 Id. at 562 -63, 18 FEP Cas. at 208-09.
2" Id. at 559-60, 18 FEP Cas. at 206-07, The claimant relied heavily upon Gen-
eral Insurance Company of America v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
491 F.2d 133, 7 FEY Cas. 106 (9th Cir. 1974). In that case, the Ninth Circuit rejected
the argument that a state or county prosecutor could qualify as a deferral agency
through his general authority to institute criminal proceedings. Id. at 135, 7 FEP Cas.
at 107. Thus, the court held that the Washington statute, while prohibiting sex dis-
crimination in wages, had not established or authorized any agency and therefore was
insufficient to require the EEOC to defer to a state authority. Id. The court found that
the deferral provision in section 706 required "a showing of such state concern in the
specific area of unfair employment practices as to result in the establishment or au-
thorizing of an agency to act in this area." Id. See White v. Dallas Independent School
District, 566 F.2d 906, 909-10, 16 FEP Cas. 739, 741-42 (5th Cir. 1978), wherein judge
Tuttle found that the General Insurance decision was on point in this case because the
Texas statute failed to establish or authorize a fair employment agency, since it only
designated the district and county attorneys as the authorities to receive notice of
charges from the EEOC. See text at note 18 supra. Judge Tuttle found:
A state cannot qualify itself for deferral merely by designating an official to
receive notice, for § 706(c) of Title VII sets up the test for determining
when deferral is required. Notice to a representative of the state becomes a
concern only if that test is first satisfied, and that depends upon whether
the state statute meets the dual requirements of prohibiting the alleged acts
and setting up an authority to deal with the problem.
Id. at 910, 16 FEP Cas. at 742. Although Judge Tuttle took part in the rehearing en
bane, 581 F.2d at 558, 18 FEP Cas. at 205, he did not reiterate his finding.
27 Id. tt 560, 18 FEP Cas. at 207.
28
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state chooses, as in the present case, to utilize existing structures to enforce its
discrimination laws, it is sufficient for the state to inform the authority of its
duty, without having to repeat entire sections of the state's code devoted to
the organization and procedural requirements of the offices. 2 " Thus, the
court held that Texas had authorized a NI- employment practices agency
within the meaning of section 706.
The claimant argued next that the district and county attorneys were not
sufficient. deferral agencies because they could not afford her remedies com-
parable to those available under federal law."" The court rejected this argu-
ment also." It reasoned that the heart of the deferral requirement is that a
state must prohibit the alleged act of discrimination and that the agency must
be able to grant or seek relief or institute criminal proceedings." The court
found that a state need not be able to provide the same remedies that are
available under the federal statute." In so holding, the court said: "Section
706(1) requires that the states he given an opportunity to handle the matter; it
does not require a state to 'clone' federal remedies."" Furthermore, the
court pointed out that the availability of relief under state law does not pre-
clude a Title VII litigant from recovering additional relief in federal court
once the deferral period is up." Thus, the court held that the district and
county attorneys constituted deferral agencies despite the fact that they did
not offer the full panoply of relief.
Despite the EEOC's contention to the contrary, the court also held it im-
material that district and county attorneys had not complied with the EEOC
regulation requiring potential deferral agencies to assert their entitlement to
deferral status."' The court found that it was sufficient that the Texas au-
thorities were, in the words of the Act, "State or local authorit[ies] [autho-
rized] to institute criminal proceedings" with respect to the alleged viola-
tion."' Thus, the court found that deferral was mandated by the fact that the
Texas authority satisfied the requirements of section 706."
.Although the court thus established that the Texas district and county
attorneys were entitled to deferral status, the majority held that White was not
2" Id.
"" Id. The Texas statute affords the complainant injunctive relief and au-
thorizes the district or county attorney to institute criminal proceedings. Id. at 559 n.1,
18 FEP Cas. at. 206 n.l. Title VII, on the other hand, affords a successful claimant.
injunctive relief, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976), reinstatement, id., back pay, id., affirm-
ative action, id., attorney's fees, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976), retroactive seniority
rights, Franks v. Bowman Transportation Co., 424 U.S. 747, 762-80 (1976), and any
other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
"I 581 F.2d at 561, 18 FEP Cas. at 207.
32 Id. at 560-61, 18 FEP Cas. at 207.
" Id. at 561, 18 FEP Cas. at 207.
:14 Id.
:0 Id .
"" Id., 18 FEP Cas. at 207-08.
37
 Id., 18 FEP Cas. at 208.
3" Id. The court also noted that the district and county attorneys had received
no notice of the regulation since the EEOC had notified only the Texas governor's
office about its new requirements. Id. at 561 n.6, 18 FEP Cas. at 208 n.6.
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barred from bringing her Title VII action because of the EEOC error." The
defendant school district argued that White had failed to satisfy her statutory
responsibility for proper deferral for exhaustion of state remedies."
Moreover, defendant argued, deferral was not impossible since the two-year
state statute of limitations had run on the filing of that charge with the Texas
district or county attorney, and thus White's Title VII claim was time-barred
as well. 4 ' In rejecting this argument, the court declined to rule on whether
the statutory emphasis on exhaustion of remedies made deferral to an ap-
propriate state agency a jurisdictional requirement. 42 Instead, the court sim-
ply held that, although it could not extend the state agency's authority to act
on White's charge, it was unwilling to bar from federal court a charging party
who had acted in good faith but was misled by the EEOC. 43 The court speci-
fically pointed out that the EEOC had promulgated regulations requiring it to
defer charges and that, at the time White's complaint was filed, the EEOC was
aware of the dispute concerning the deferral status of the Texas county and
district attorneys, but had failed to so notify White. 44 The case was thus
remanded to the district court. 45
The Fifth Circuit. decision in the White case appears correct both on the
issue of the EEOC regulations and on the effect on a claim of an improper
action by the EEOC. There can be no doubt that the dismissal of the Commis-
sion's regulations by the White court, will complicate the EEOC's task of defer-
ring charges to appropriate state and local authorities. It must be noted, how-
ever, that the EEOC voluntarily assumed this role of conduit through its own
regulations, approved by the Supreme Court," requiring it to forward copies
of all charges to appropriate state or local agencies.'" In fulfilling its under-
taking, the EEOC should not be permitted to graft additional requirements
onto the statute. A state agency's right to deferral vests when it satisfies the
requirements of the statute, not when it notifies the EEOC of its eligibility. To
allow the EEOC such broad discretion would circumvent the congressional
purpose of facilitating conciliation or judicial disposition of the discrimination
at the state level. Furthermore, it would be unjust to visit the errors of the
EEOC on the charging party. 48 The EEOC's official status combined with its
common practice of assisting claimants in meeting their Title VII deferral
requirements certainly could have misled White into believing that no further
39 Id. at 561-63, 18 FEP Cas. at 208-09.
4 " Id. at 561, 18 FEP Cas. at 208.
41 Id. at 561-62, 18 FEP Cas. at 208.
42 Id. at 562-63, 18 FEP Cas. at 208-09.
43
 Id.
44 Id. at 562. 18. FEP Cas. at 208. The dissent vigorously argued that the doc-
trine of estoppel should not be invoked against the defendant who was now unable to
assert plaintiff's failure to exhaust state remedies as a defense. Id. at 563-64, 18 FEP
Cas. at 209-10. The dissenting judge remarked that "[t]he twist is that the resort to
estoppel is not necessitated by conduct of the defendant but rather by that of the third
party, the EEOC, who would have the defendant. sued. - Id. at 564. 18 FEP Cas. at 210.
" Id. at 563, 18 FEP Cas. at 209.
" Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522 (1972).
47 See 29 C.F.R.	 1601.13 (1979).
Contra, White. 581 F.2d at 563-64, 18 FEP Cas. at 209-10 (Hill, j.. dissent-
ing). See also note 44 supra.
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action was required. White understandably relied on the EEOC to either
handle her complaint or to defer it to any appropriate state agency, as it was
required to do by its own regulations. The EEOC never notified White that
her claim was insufficient in any way or that it needed to be referred to
another authority.
Although the EEOC has been authorized by the Supreme Court to defer
claims to state and local agencies which are sent directly to the Commission,
the prudent practitioner should file directly with both the appropriate local
agency and the EEOC. The invalidation by the White court of the EEOC regu-
lation requiring registration of deferral agencies will decrease the ability of
the EEOC to recognize all slate and local deferral agencies which satisfy the
requirements of section 706. As a result, the fair employment practitioner will
be in a better position to identify the appropriate local deferral agency. Al-
though the White court did not punish the charging party for her reliance
upon the supposed expertise of the EEOC, not all courts may be as sympa-
thetic to the practitioner who relies on the EEOC to fulfill requirements
which are best fulfilled by her.
C. Employer Retaliation
1. "Opposition Clause": Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, City of Los
Angeles
Employees who exercise their rights under Title VII are protected by that
statute against retaliation by employers.' This ability to oppose illegal em-
ployment practices without fear of retaliation is basic to carrying out the
purpose of Title VII. What has not been clear, however, is the extent to
which the statute protects individuals who, through informal complaints, op-
pose alleged discrimination which later is found not to exist. On its face, Title
VII distinguishes an employee's informal "opposition" to presumed unlawful
practices from an employee's "participation" in an official EEOC investiga-
tion.= One reading of the relevant langauge suggests that, in the absence of a
formal investigation, an employee risks retaliation by opposing an employ-
ment practice which ultimately is found to be legal. 3 During the Survey year
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Sias v. City Dem-
onstration Agency, City of Los Angeles 4 held that the protection against
employer retaliation afforded employees who participate in formal investiga-
tions should cover informal opposition as well, provided that the employee
I See 42 U.S.C.	 2000e-3(a) (1976) which provides in part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrimi-
nate against any of his employees ... because he has opposed any prac-
tice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or [21
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation. proceeding. or hearing under this subchapter.
(emphasis added).
See B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAN.: 416-33
(1976). Sec also note 1, supra.
See, e.g., EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 305-06, 10
FEP Cas. 1131, 1134-35 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
588 F.2cl 692, 18 FEP Cas. 981 (9th Cir. 1978).
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reasonably believes that unlawful discrimination has occurred. 5 In doing so
the Ninth Circuit extended the retaliation protection of' Title VII beyond its
facial limits to include unfounded, albeit "reasonable," informal accusations of
discrimination.
In Sias, an employee was discharged for his repeated informal objection
to alleged racially discriminatory employment practices." The employee
complained that the employer ignored his talents and failed to serve minority
interests in the community. These complaints were made primarily to fellow
workers and supervisors, but twice were taken to local and federal officials in
charge of programs administered by the employer.' Charging unlawful dis-
crimination, the employee eventually sued in federal court seeking back pay
and reinstatement. The district court found the evidence sufficient to support
the employee's claim of retaliatory discharge.' On appeal the employer did
not deny that the employee was discharged for his opposition to certain
employment practices, but instead contended that Title VII affords no protec-
tion from such retaliation unless the practices complained of are found to be
illegal." The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected
this argument" and held that even informal opposition to perceived dis-
crimination must not be chilled by fear of retaliation. A mere reasonable be-
lief that unlawful discrimination exists, the court held, is sufficient to invoke
the statutory protection against retaliation.ht
By its terms the retaliation provision of Title VII protects employees who
either "oppose" unlawful employment practices, or who "participate" in for-
mal investigations of alleged discrimination." The so-called "participation
clause" ' 1
 has been held to protect employees from retaliation regardless of
the ultimate merit of the charge filed with the EEOC." This result is neces-
sary in order to permit adequate investigation of alleged discrimination. 15 The
"opposition clause," 16
 however, applies in the absence of formal charges and
5 Id. at 695-96, 18 FEY Cas. at 982-83.
" Id. at 693-94, 18 FEY Cas. at 981-82.
Sias v. City Demonstration Agency, Nos. 77-2390, 77-2624, 18 FEP Cas. 979
(CD. Cal. 1977).
g Id, at 980. The district court did not consider whether the complaints were
grounded in fact, but found only that Sias' discharge "had definite racial implications."
Id.
" 588 F.2d at 693-94, 18 FEY Cas. at 981.
" Id. at 695-96, 18 FE? Cas. at 982-83.
" Id.
12 See note 1, supra. See also B. Set-tut &- P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DIS-
CRIMINATION LAW 4 16- 18 (1976).
'" This is the clause following the bracketed numeral [21 in the quotation at
note 1, supra.
14 Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 411 F.2d 998, 1007, 1 FEP Cas.
752, 758 (5th Cir. 1969).
15 See id. See also EEOC v. Kallir, Phillips, Ross, Inc., 401 F. Supp. 66, 72, 11
FE? Cas. 241, 244-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). As a matter of common sense, it is easy to see
that employees may hesitate to come forward with complaints and testimony when the
risk of being wrong must be borne entirely by them.
'" This is the clause immediately following the bracketed numeral [1] in the
quotation at note 1, supra.
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is at first glance more narrow in scope. An employee is protected under this
clause when "he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by Title VII." 7 A technical argument can thus be made that "op-
position" protected applies only ,when the opposed practice actually is found
to be unlawful, and that an employee is not entitled to protection in the ab-
sence of such a finding. Nevertheless, this construction of the statute was re-
jected by the court of appeals in Sias." The Sias court first dismissed the
legislative history of the opposition clause as not controlling.'`' With this
freedom the court then held that a liberal construction of the retaliation pro-
vision was proper, and that the purpose of eliminating employment discrimi-
nation is best served by protecting informal opposition to perceived discrimi-
nation so long as the perception of discrimination is reasonable. 2 °
In reaching its result, the Ninth Circuit referred to the recent district
court decision in Hearth v. Metropolitan Transit Commission. 2 ' In Hearth, several
men had opposed informally a hair length regulation which was applied un-
evenly to male and female employees. They contended that their subsequent
suspension occurred in retaliation for their opposition to We hair length regu-
lation. 22
 Although the district court acknowledged that the initial opposition
to the hair length requirement was meridess, 2 " it nevertheless held that the
employees were entitled to prove that their suspension was an unlawful retali-
ation against the exercise of protected rights." The court in Hearth
explained its decision as follows:
This court believes that appropriate informal opposition to perceived
discrimination must not be chilled by the fear of retaliatory action in
the event the alleged wrongdoing does not exist.... When an
employee reasonably believes that discrimination exists, opposition
thereto is opposition to an employment practice made unlawful by
Title VII even if the employee turns out to be mistaken as to the
facts:2 '
This language was adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Sias to explain its expan-
sive interpretation of the opposition clause.'"
As recognized by both the Sias and Hearth courts, strong policy arguments
support a broad interpretation of Title VII's opposition clause. A contrary
result would tend to discourage informal resolution of employees' grievances
and would encourage the filing of formal charges whenever discrimination is
alleged since employees, after registering informal complaints, would be vul-
nerable to retaliation in the event that unlawful discrimination is not
' 7 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976), set out at note I, supra.
Ig 588 F.2d at 695, 18 FEP Cas. at 982.
Id. at 695 n.4, 18 FEP Cas. at 983 n.4.
2" Id. at 695, 18 FEP Cas. at 983.
21 436 F. Stipp. 685, 18 FEP Cas. 329 (D. Minn. 1977).
22 Id. at 686-87, 18 FEP Cas. at 329-30.
23 hi. at 687, 18 FEP Gas. at 330.
24 Id. at 688-89, 18 FEP Cas. at 331-32. The court did so by refusing to grant
summary judgement for the employer on the retaliation issue.
25 Id. at 688-89, 18 FEP Cas. at 331.
'" 588 F.2d at 695, 18 FEP Gas. at 982-83.
204	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW 	 [Vol. 21:85
shown." This increase in formal complaints would burden already crowded
EEOC channels. In addition, certain potential meritorious attempts at infor-
mal resolution might altogether be chilled into non-existence by the threat of
retaliation. Despite the Ninth Circuit's fundamentally sound reasoning, how-
ever, the Sias opinion may be justly criticized for failing to consider the issue
from the employer's perspective as well.
Sias, the employee, ultimately was discharged for writing a letter to fed-
eral authorities who were probably in a position to apply fiscal pressure to the
city agency for which Sias worked." In this letter Sias charged his employer
with racial discrimination. In doing so Sias was apparently attempting to pres-
sure his employer into acting upon his unfounded claim of discrimination. It
is unlikely that such "end run" tactics truly represent the desirable form of
informal dispute resolution intended by Title VII and promoted by the Ninth
Circuit. While it is reasonable to encourage employers and employees to at-
tempt. informally to resolve differences, it is not reasonable to endorse be-
havior which is unlikely to result. in a mutually acceptable solution, but instead
has as its purpose the coercion of employers into premature compromise with
respect to perfectly legal activity." In this regard it should he emphasized
that, by its terms, the opposition clause only protects opposition to "unlawful"
activity,30 and that the judicial broadening of this protection to include oppo-
sition to lawful activity is properly justified only insofar as the purposes of
Title VII are effectuated. Title VII should not be read to immunize
employees who would use the protection from retaliation to harass employers,
certainly not in the absence of any illegality. The formal EEOC mechanism
established by Title VII for resolving questions of discrimination implies that
at some point accusations should not be permitted to proliferate, but instead
should be formally resolved or else discontinued. 3 ' The EEOC offers the
proper forum for such formal resolution, and routine circumvention of its
procedures does not appear proper." Straightforward informal dispute res-
" See id.
28 Id. at 694, 18 FEP Gas. at 982. See also Sias v. City Demonstration Agency,
Nos. 77-2390, 77-2624, 18 FEP Cas. 979, 980 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
29 Cf. EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Stipp. 300, 305, 10 FEP Cas.
1131, 1135 (M.D. Ga. 1975) ("On the other hand, accusations or racism ought not be
made lightly. Unfounded accusations might well incite racism where none had previ-
ously existed.").
3" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976), set out at note 1, supra.
31
 See EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Stipp. 300, 305-06, 10 FEY
Cas. 1131, 1135 (M.D. Ga. 1975).
32 See id. at 306, 10 FEP Cas. at 1135 where the court stated:
[T]he only reasonable interpretation to be placed on Section 704(a) [the
retaliation provision] is that where accusations are made in the context of
charges before thc EEOC, the truth or falsity of that accusation is a matter
to he determined by the EEOC, and thereafter by the courts. However,
where accusations are made outside the procedures set forth by Congress
that accusation is made at the accuser's peril. In order to he protected, it
must be established that the accusation is well-founded. If it is, there is, in
fact, an unlawful employment practice and he has the right, protected by
Section 704(a), to oppose it. However, where there is no underlying unlaw-
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olution is a desirable goal and should be encouraged. Devices with other,
questionable purposes, however, should not receive automatic protection. It
therefore may be argued that if informal resolution is the goal in Sias, the
court's holding in that case should have been better tailored to serve its pur-
pose.
The Ninth Circuit did require that employees maintain a reasonable be-
lief that unlawful employment practices exist in order to be protected from
retaliation," and, furthermore, an employee's actual exercise of the right to
charge discrimination always must be reasonable. 34 These considerations, if
applied equitably as between employers and employees, should provide some
consolation to employers who might fear groundless accusations of discrimina-
tion. What is clear is that these questions of reasonableness are henceforth the
primary source of defense available in the Ninth Circuit for employers
charged under Title VII with retaliation against informal opposition. The
more basic impact of the Sias decision is its effect on the risks which
employees associate with informal opposition to discriminatory employment
practices.. To the extent that these risks are lessened, employees will be more
likely to speak out. The Ninth Circuit in Sias has noticeably reduced this per-
ceived risk and has therefore encouraged informal dispute resolution. Be-
cause satisfactory informal dispute resolution is always preferred over formal
proceedings, this result can be seen as desirable from the viewpoints of both
employee and employer. Nevertheless, in the future more attention should be
given to the employer's side of the question, either through more deliberate
evaluation of how the employee's behavior is justified by the goal of informal
resolution or through development of clear standards of reasonableness
against which such behavior may he judged.
II. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
A. Union Dues
The Supreme Court has interpreted a 1972 amendment to Title VII as
requiring employer accommodation of an employee's religious observances
where such accommodation would not result in an undue hardship to the
employer's business.' The same reasonable accommodation is required of
ful employment practice the employee has no right to make that accusation
in derogation of the procedures provided by the statute.
Id.
588 F.2d at 695-96, 18 FEP Cas. at 983. The Sias court considered a finding
of reasonableness in the employee's behavior to he implicit in the lower court's ruling.
Id.
34 See Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation, 545 F.2d 222, '230-33, 13 FEP Cas.
804, 809-12 (1st Cir. 1976).
See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). The
amendment is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976), and is actually just a redefini-
tion of the term "religion" as used in Title VII. It provides:
The term "religion" includes all aspects of religious observance and prac-
tice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to
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unions. 2 In several cases' decided during the Survey year, among them An-
derson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division,' this amendment was held
to provide relief for employees who were discharged for religion-based refus-
als to pay union dues, alter the employer and union had failed to attempt.
reasonable accommodation of the employee's beliefs.' This result, particu-
larly in Anderson, is significant because it imposes upon Tide VII employers"
the duty to propose accommodation to such employees once a prima facie
case of discrimination is raised, and because it rejects the absolutist view that
union shop agreements inevitably must prevail over personal religious obser-
vances.
In Anderson, a Seventh Day Adventist refused for religious reasons' to
join or contribute to a union. The employer-defendant, General Dynamics,
recently had entered into a new collective bargaining agreement with the co-
defendant local lodge of the International Association of Machinists and
Aerospace Workers. The new contract contained a union shop clause requir-
reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's reli-
gious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer's business.
For the history of this provision, see Cooper v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div.,
533 F.2d 163, 168 n.9, 12 FEP Cas. 1549, 1552 n.9 (5th Cir. 1976),
The basic constraining language of Title VII is found in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (1976).
It provides, in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer (1) ... to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of" such individual's . . . religion „ . .
2 See Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div., 589 F.2d 397,400,
17 FEP Gas. 1644, 1646 (9111 Cir. 1978); McDaniel v. Essex Intl, Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 344, 16
FEP Gas. 904, 907 (611/ Cir. 1978). Title VII expressly addresses union as well as employer
discrimination. 42 U.S.G. 2000e-2(c) (1976). For a view that the accommodation obliga-
tion does not extend to unions„cee Cooper v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Div.,
533 F.2d 163, 170-71, 12 FEP Cas. 1549, 1554-55 (5th Cir. 1976) (opinion of Gee, J.).
3
 Anderson v. General Dynamics Convair Aerospace Division, 589 F.2d 397, 17
FEP Gas. 1644 (9th Cir. 1978); McDaniel v. Essex International, 11/c., 571 F.2cl 338, 16 FEP
Cas. 904 (6th Cir. 1978); Burns v. Southern Pacific Transp. Co., 589 F.2d 403, 17 FEP Cas.
1648 (9th Gk. 1978). See also Maine Human Rights Commission v. Local No. 1361,383 A .2d
369, 17 FEP Cas. 347 (Me. 1978) (involving state law).
4
 589 F.2c1 397, 17 FEP Cas. 1644 (9th Cir. 1978).
5
 See, e.g., id. at 402, 17 FEP Cas. at 1647-48. FEP Cas. 1098, 1099 (6th Cir. 1977)
(without new discussion of the constitutional question); Gavin v. Peoples Natural Gas
Company, 464 F. Supp. 622, 626-33, 18 FEP Cas. 1431, 1434-39 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (finding
hat the court could not constitutionally engage in an evaluation of the employee's asserted
belief's, thus refusing to enforce Title VII for constitutional reasons). fort. v. North
American Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Supp.763, 765-67, 14 FEP Cas. 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1970).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976).
The basic objection held by members of this faith is the belief that man is a
free moral agent who should seek the remedy for social problems not in organized
controversy or argument, but on an individual level. See Gray v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio
R.R. Co., 429 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 n.4, 9 FEP Cas. 256, 258 n.4 (5th Cir. 1970). If
religious beliefs are sincerely held, it is generally beyond the scope of judicial authority
to evaluate their relative merit. See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 184-85
(1965).
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ing union membership of all employees in the collective bargaining unit." Al-
though Anderson was willing to donate to charity in lieu of dues payment to
the union," he refused either to join the union or to pay that amount to the
union for charitable purposes." Upon the union's request, Anderson was
discharged by General Dynamics for this refusal." Neither the union nor
General Dynamics offered Anderson any alternative or accommodation with
respect. to joining the union. 12
Anderson exhausted his administrative remedy" and then brought suit
in federal court. He challenged his discharge on the grounds that failure
reasonably to accommodate his religious beliefs constituted religious discrimi-
nation in violation of Title VII." The union and employer argued that
non-payment of dues by an employee receiving the benefits of bargaining
improperly creates a "free rider," thereby making reasonable accommodation
impossible. After a trial on the merits, the United States District Court en-
tered judgment in favor of the union and employer.'s The district court
held that. Anderson's refusal to support the union did make reasonable ac-
commodation impossible, thus creating an undue hardship as a matter of
law." The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed." The appel-
late court held that the initial burden of proposing accommodation fell on the
union and the employer, and that since no accommodation was attempted
they had failed to prove that accommodation would result in undue hard-
ship. IS
If union security agreements always were to prevail over religious beliefs,
an employee would be placed in the difficult position of choosing between his
beliefs and his employment. On the other hand, if employees could routinely
avoid supporting unions from whose bargaining activities they benefit, the
congressional policy fhvoring viable unions would be undermined." The bal-
ance between these interests appears to have been struck by Title VII.2 "
In Anderson, the union incorrectly assessed its obligation to accommodate
under Title VII. Rather than attempting to accommodate Anderson, the
union asserted that. Anderson himself had failed to propose a satisfactory
589 F.2d at 399, 17 FEP Gas. at 1645. Such clauses are authorized by the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 29 	 § 158(a)(3), (b)(2) (1976).
" See 589 F.2d at 399, 401, 17 FEP Cas. at 1645, 1647. This solution (pay-
ment to charity instead of the union) is expressly adopted in the NLRA in the case of
employees in health care institutions. 29 § 169 (1976).
1 " 589 F.2cl at 399, 401, 17 FEP Cas. at 1645, 1647.
" Id. at 399, 17 FEP Gas. at 1645.
12 Id.
'' Id. This involved receiving a right to sue letter from the local EEOC office
after EEOC attempts at conciliation had failed.
' 4 For the relevant provisions, see note 1 supra.
15 430 F. Supp. 418, 422, 14 FEP Gas. 667, 670 (S.D. Cal. 1977).
16 Id.
589 F.2d at 41)3, 17 FEP Gas. at 1648.
' 8 Id. at 402, 17 FEP Gas. at 1647.
'" This congressional policy is expressed in the union security provisions of
the NLRA which authorize union shop agreements. See note 8 supra. See also McDaniel
v. Essex Ina Inc., 571 F.2d 338, 342-43, 16 FEP Cas. 904, 906-07 (6th Cir. 1978).
2 " See Anderson, 589 F.2d at 400-01, 17 FEP Cas. at 1646.
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accommodation—namely, payment to the union for charitable purposes of a
sum equal to union dues—thereby excusing the union's own obligation to
accommodate."' The court of appeals rejected this attempt to shift the ac-
commodation obligation to the employee, and held that any inadequacies in
the employee's suggested accommodation (payment to a charity of the
employee's choice) would not relieve the employer and union of their obligation
reasonably to accommodate."
The union also argued that the non-payment of union dues creates an
undue hardship as a matter of law, and thus prevents any reasonable accom-
modation from being possible." This argument relies heavily on the policy
behind the union security provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
which authorize mandatory union membe•ship. 24 It is rooted in the notion
that. the creation of "free riders" 25 weakens unions by allowing some
employees to receive the benefits of union membership without paying for
them. The court of appeals rejected this argument on grounds that the
union's reliance on the general sentiment against "free riders," absent more
specific proof of hardship, was insufficient to prove that such hardship would
result.'" The court said that undue hardship cannot be proved by hypotheti-
cal assumptions or opinions, or simply by allegations that dues-paying union
members might protest paying slightly more than their share of union ex-
penses." Since the union and employer had failed to make a more specific
showing, the court held that their burden of' proof had not been met and
therefore reversed the district court's judgment which had reached the oppo-
site conclusion.'"
In reaching its result, the Anderson court referred to the recent Sixth
Circuit decision of McDaniel v. Essex International, Inc., 21 where that court re-
versed a summary judgment for a union and employer under circumstances
almost identical to those in Anderson. McDaniel, the employee, had requested
accommodation from the union and employer, but had received no response.
Like Anderson, she had proposed to pay dues to charity in lieu of the
union." Therefore the issue in McDaniel was essentially the same as that in
2 ' Id. at 401, 17 FEY Cas. at 1647.
22 Id. The court of appeals stated that, "[t]he burden was upon the [company
and union], not Anderson, to undertake initial steps toward accommodation."
23 See id.
24 See note 8 supra. See also S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947)
(hearings on S. 1126).
25 It can be argued that an employee like Anderson who offers to pay clues to
charity instead of the union does not exactly qualify as a free rider because he is still
required to make a financial sacrifice in order to remain employed. See Maine Human
Rights Comm'n v. Local No. 1361, 383 A.2d 369, 379, 17 FEP Cas, 347, 355 (Me.
1978).
" 589 F.2d at 402, 17 FEY Cas. at 1647-48.
27 Id.
" Id. The district court opinion appears at 430 F. Stipp. 418, 14 FEY Cas. 667
(S.D. Cal. 1977).
29 571 F.2d 338, 16 FEP Cas. 904 (6th Cir. 1978).
3° Id. at 340, 16 FEP Cas. at 905.
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Anderson, namely whether non-payment of dues by a religious objector results
in undue hardship as a matter of law to the union.' The McDaniel court
held that undue hardship must appear as a matter of fact in the record, and
that the asserted hardship as a matter of law in that.case was only speculative
and hence was insufficient ,to justify summary judgment."
The outcome of Anderson depends in significant part on the court's allo-
cation of burdens of proof. The plaintiff, in order to establish a prima facie
case of discrimination, is required to prove (1) that he holds a bona fide re-
ligious belief against union support; (2) that he has so informed his employer;
and (3) that he was discharged on the basis of this objection." Once this
proof is provided, the burden shifts to the employer and union to attempt
reasonably to accommodate the employee's beliefs. In Anderson, the employer
and union failed to meet this burden. They failed to take initial steps toward
accommodation, and they relied incorrectly on an asserted but unproved
hardship.
In a companion case, Bunts v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.," the
Anderson court was more specific as to what proof is necessary to excuse an
employer and union when faced with a prima facie case of such religious
discrimination. In Burns, an employee was threatened with discharge under
circumstances very similar to those in Anderson." 5
 And, as in Anderson, the
court of appeals held in favor of the employee. 0
 The court said that Once a
prima facie case of religious discrimination under Title VII has been estab-
lished, the burden falls on the union and employer to prove (1) that they
made good faith efforts to accommodate the employee's beliefs; (2) that the
efforts were unsuccessful; and (3) that they were unable reasonably to ac-
commodate those belief's without undue hardship."'
To determine what constitutes an undue hardship, the Burns court
referred to the recent Supreme Court case of Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Nardi-
son. 38 In Hardison, the Supreme Court held that undue hardship is
demonstrated when the untoward impacts of accommodation on business opera-
tion are greater than de minimis. 39 The proof of hardship provided by the
employer and union in Burns alleged undesirable dissent among employees
resulting from the allowance of "free riders," and financial hardship resulting
not only from nonreceipt of the objecting employee's dues but also from re-
See id. at 341, 16 FEP Cas. at 906.
32
 Id. at 343-44, 16 FEP Cas. at 907-08.
55 589 F.2d at 401, 17 FEP Gas. at 1646.
24 589 F.2d 403, 17 FEP Cas. at 1648 (9th Cir. 1978).
35 Id. at 4{)5, 17 FEP Cas. at 1649-50. The union contract in Burns was gov-
erned by section 2, Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh
(1976), rather than the NLRA, but this has no effect on the outcome or principle of
the case. Id. at 406 n.1, 17 FEY Gas. at 1650 n.l.
38
 Id. at 407-08, 17 FEP Cas. at 1651.
37 Id, at 405, 17 FEP Gas. at 1649-50.
38
 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
34
 Id. at 84.
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cording the employee's alternative payments to charity." The court deemed
both of these alleged hardships de minimis.'
As in Anderson and McDaniel, the court in Burns viewed the asserted dis-
sent among employees as merely speculative, and thus as insufficient to estab-
lish the concrete form of demonstrable hardship required. 42
 This suggests
that. employee unrest must he proved, if at all, by actual experience after
accommodation has been implemented because any forecast of unrest neces-
sarily would be speculative. Such an approach would impose on employers
and unions at least the responsibility to attempt accommodation, with the
availability of a hardship defense to await the experience gained from ac-
commodation. 43
The Burns court viewed the asserted financial hardship arising from the
absence of the employee's dues as merely de minimis, and thus, under Hardi-
son, as insufficient to relieve the union and employer of their obligation to
accommodate." This was so even though other union members would have
to supplant the objecting employee's dues. The court rejected as speculative
the contention that accommodating one employee would excuse non-payment
by many others and would therefore produce a greater than de minimis bur-
den on the union. 45
 The court pointed out that if such advantage were
taken of the union in the future, undue hardship could then be proved. 46 It
is clear, then, that at least in this context the Hardison "de minimis" test should
be taken lightly by employers and unions.
Without the statutory remedy provided by Title VII it seems clear that
the employees in Anderson, McDaniel and Burns would not have been entitled
to relief. The only other available claim would have to be based on an alleged
violation of first, amendment religious freedom, and the balance between
union dues and religious freedom in the constitutional area has been struck in
favor of the union security provisions of the national labor laws. 47
 There
may be future constitutional challenges brought by unions and employers
against the religious accommodation requirements of Title VII. 48 Such
4" 589 F.2d at 406-07, 17 EFT Gas. at 1650-51.
4 ' Id. at 407, 17 FEP Cas. at 1651.
42 Id. at 406-07. 17 FEP Gas. at 1650-51.
4:1 See id.
44 Id. at 407, 17 FEP Cas. at 1651. There was testimony from one union official upon
which the appellate court seemed to rely to the effect that the loss of employee's nineteen
dollars per month would not affect the union "at all.'' Id.
45 Id.
4" Id. at 407 & n.3, 17 FEP Cas. at 1651 & n.3.
47 See You v. North American Rockwell Corp., 501 F.2d 398, 404, 8 FEP Cas. 546,
550-51 (9th Cir. 1974); Linscott v. Millers Falls Co., 440 F.2d 14, 17-18, 9 FEP Gas. 266,
267-69 (1st Cir. 1971). ceri. denied, 404 U.S. 872 (1971); Gray v. Gulf, Mobile, and Ohio
Railroad, 429 F.2/1 1064, 1072, 9 FEY Cas. 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1970).
48
 Such a challenge was raised for the first time on appeal by the union and
employer in Burns, but was not decided due to its improper procedural timing. 589 F.2d at
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claims would assert a violation of the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment under the theory that the government is sanctioning religious obser-
vances by requiring accommodation where there has been no intentional dis-
crimination. Meanwhile, however, it. seems that the obligation of an employer
and union under Title VII to accommodate religious observance is substantial.
Under the holdings in Anderson, McDaniel and Burns, the employer and union
are under an affirmative obligation to reconcile an employee's religious obser-
vances with business necessity, or to carry the formidable burden of proving
that no reasonable reconciliation is possible.
III. REMEDIES
A. Attorney's Fees
1. Definition of "Prevailing Party": Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of
Education
Under American common law a successful litigant cannot recover attorney's
fees as part of an award of damages.' Although exceptions to this rule exist,
as when the losing party acts in had faith, 2 attorney's fees ordinarily are re-
coverable only if authorized by statute. 3
 One such statutory authorization is
section 706(k) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 4 Section 706(k)
407-08, 17 FEP Cas. at 1651. See also Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63,
70 (1977) (finding the question unnecessary to decide); Cummins v. Parker Seal Com-
pany, 516 F.2d 544, 551-54, 10 FEP Cas. 974, 980-83 (6th Cir. 1975) (upholding the
constitutionality of the definition and the accommodation requirement), vacated 433
U.S. 903, 15 FEP Cas. 31 (1977) (apparently on other grounds), aff'd on remand 561
F.2d 658, 659, 15 FEP Cas. 1098, 1099 (6th C:ir. 1977) (without new discussion of the
constitutional issue); Yon v. North American Rockwell Corp., 428 F. Stipp. 763, 765-
67, 14 FEP Cas. 445. 447-49 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (finding the new statutory definition of
religion to he unconstitutional).
' Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc., 421 U.S. 240. 247-61 (1975).
Justice While includes a thorough discussion of the development of the law in this
area. Id. at 247-61.
2 Id. at 258. In some circumstances a contractual provision for attorney's fees
is enforceable. Fleishmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714,117-18
(1967). Two other exceptions recognized in some jurisdictions are the "common fund
doctrine" and the "substantial benefit rule." The first may be invoked when a number
of persons are entitled in common to a specific fund of money and an action brought
by plaintiff results in its recovery or preservation. Trustees of International Improve-
ment Fund v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527, 537 (1881). The substantial benefit rule
applies where a shareholder's derivative action or where a class action results in the
conferral of a substantial benefit, monetary or otherwise, to defendant. In these cir-
cumstances the defendant may be required to yield some of these benefits in the form
of an award of attorney's fees to the successful plaintiff. See Sprague v. Ticonic Na-
tional Bank, 307 U.S. 161 (1939).
3
 421 U.S. at 260.
Section 706(k), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(k) (1976) provides:
In any action or proceeding under this sub-chapter the court, in its discre-
tion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the Commissioner or the
United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the
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allows a court, in its discretion, to award reasonable attorney's fees to a pre-
vailing party in employment discrimination suits. 5
While section 706(k) of Title VII permits a federal district court to exer-
cise such discretion, the statute does not contain criteria for deciding 1) the
standard to be utilized by courts in exercising their discretion to award attor-
ney's fees to defendants; 2) the standard to be utilized in awarding attorney's
fees to plaintiffs; and 3) what a litigant must show to be a "prevailing party."
The Supreme Court addressed the first issue during the previous Survey
year in Christianburg Garment Co. v. EEOC." There the Court held that a pre-
vailing defendant should be awarded attorney's fees only when the district
court finds that the plaintiff's claim was frivolous, unreasonable, groundless,
or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after the claim became so. 7 In so
holding, the Supreme Court pointed out that. this was a much stricter stan-
dard than the criteria it had articulated in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 8 for
awarding attorney's fees to prevailing plaintiffs. In Albemarle Paper the Su-
preme Court transported the standard under Title II of the Civil Rights Act
that it had enunciated in Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc." to the Title
VII field.'" The appropriate standard for prevailing plaintiffs, the Albemarle
Court held, was that attorney's fees should be awarded "unless special cir-
cumstances would make the award unjust." "
These differing standards reflect one of the underlying purposes of the
statute: to encourage private enforcement. of the federal policy to eliminate
employment discrimination." In these decisions the Supreme Court has im-
plicitly revealed certain elements regarding what one must show to be a pre-
vailing party. While ordinarily every lawsuit contains a prevailing party, it
would be inconsistent with federal policy to permit every prevailing defendant
to recover his attorney's fees. The standards of discretion established by the
Supreme Court do not address the issue of what a plaintiff must show to be a
"prevailing party." During the Survey year the Sixth Circuit considered this
issue in Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education."
The plaintiff in Harrington was a woman who had formerly taught physi-
cal education in the Vandalia-Butler School District." Prior to the suit, she
Commissioner and the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a
private person.
Id.
434 U.S. 412 (1978).
Id. at 422. For a full discussion of Christianburg see 1977-1978 Annual Survey
of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, V. Remedies—Attorney's Fees, 20 B.C.
L. Ri:v. 216 (1978).
8 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
9 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
1 " 422 U.S. at 415.
" Id.
12 Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968); Carrion
v. Yeshiva Univ., 563 F.2d 722, 727, 13 FEP Cas. 1521, 1525 (2d Cir. 1976).
13 585 F.2d 192, 197, 18 FEP Cas. 348, 352 (6th Cir. 1978).
t4 Id. at 194, 18 FEP Cas. at 349.
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had elected to accept a voluntary disability retirement instead of a transfer to
teach a different subject in another junior high school.'" Mrs. Harrington
alleged that the defendant Vandalia-Butler Board of Education (Board) had
intentionally discriminated against her by providing working conditions in-
ferior to those provided male physical education instructors."' The evidence
of disparity in working conditions ranged from substantial inferiority in the
facilities for instruction of girls' physical education,'' to inferiority in the qual-
ity of the offices provided for her as opposed to her male counterparts." To
show the Board's intent to discriminate, the plaintiff presented, in addition to
the differences just noted, evidence that when a male teacher taught a girls'
gym class, the class would be assigned to the modern field house where the boys'
classes were normally taught and not to the girls' gym."
The district court held that Mrs. Harrington had established intentional
discrimination by the Board,'" that such discrimination violated Title V11, 2 '
and that as a result she was entitled to compensatory damages of $6,000. 22
Moreover, the court. concluded that, as the prevailing party, plaintiff was enti-
tled to an award of attorney's fees of $2,000—the reasonable cost of bringing
her suit. 23
 In reaching the decision to award compensatory damages, Judge
Rubin relied upon general notions of jurisprudence regarding the duty of
federal courts to fashion remedies to protect federally created rights."
On appeal the Sixth Circuit reversed the awards of compensatory dam-
ages and attorney's fees. 25
 The appellate court noted the trial court's finding
that the Board had discriminated against Mrs. Harrington.'" Nevertheless,
after carefully construing section 706(g) of Title VII 27
 which provides explicit
15 Id., 18 FEN Cas. at 349-50,
'" Id., 18 FEN Cas. at 350.
17 Id. See also Harrington v. Vandalia-Butler Board of Education, 418 F. Supp.
603, 605-07, 13 FEN Cas. 702, 703-04 (S.D. Ohio 1976),
111
 585 F.2d at 193-94, 18 FEN Cas. at 349.
I" Id. The girls' gym was poorly lit, and was on two levels making it difficult to
supervise a class. 418 F. Supp. at 605, 13 FEN Cas. at 703.
2"
 418 F. Supp. at 606, 13 FEN Cas. at 704.
21
 Id.
22 Id. at 607, 13 FEN Cas. at 705:
2 " Id.
21
 Id. judge Rubin relied on Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
(1975). The Albemarle Court, citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946) with ap-
proval, stated "[W]here federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the
rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant
the necessary relief." 422 U.S. at 418.
25 585 F.2(1 at 197, 18 FEN Cas. at 352.
2" Id. at 193, 18 FEN Cas. at 352.
27 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976). Section 706(g) provides in relevant extract:
(g) Injunctions; appropriate affirmative action;-equitable relief; accrual of
back pay; reduction of back pay; limitations on judicial orders
If the court finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in or
is intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged in
the complaint, the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in such
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remedies, the court held that Congress did not intend to authorize the recov-
ery of compensatory damages in employment discrimination cases." The
court then concluded that, since Mrs. Harrington had not been entitled to any
remedy permitted by the statute, she was not a prevailing party and so could
not be awarded attorney's fees."
The court began by noting that section 706(g), by its terms, allows such
remedies as reinstatement, injunction of the particular unlawful practice in-
volved, awards for back wages, and "any other equitable relief as the court
deems appropriate."" The appeals court went on to analyze compensatory
damages 31
 and cited extensively the reasoning of a previous Sixth Circuit de-
cision, EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co." In Detroit Edison the Sixth Circuit had
ruled that, under the doctrine of ejusdem generic, the catch-all phrase "any
other equitable relief" was limited to the same kinds of relief otherwise estab-
lished by section 706(g) and, therefore, remedies at law such as punitive dam-
ages cannot be granted."" The Harlington court then examined the legislative
history of section 706(g) to determine if compensatory damages were within
the scope of Congress' intent in enacting Title VII."
The telling point for the Harrington 34
 court. was the similarity of § 706(g) to
the relief provisions of the NLRA." Not only was section 706(g) modeled on
the relief provisions of the NLRA, but the sponsoring Senators, in introduc-
ing and explaining the Civil Rights Bill, asserted that. relief under Title VII
was similar to that available under the NLRA." 7
 The court concluded that
since neither punitive damages nor compensatory damages are allowed under
the NLRA," these remedies are not available under Title VII either."" Hav-
ing ruled that Mrs. Harrington was not entitled to compensatory damages,"
the court then held that she could not be a prevailing party and so could not
receive attorney's fees.'" The court reasoned that to be a "prevailing party" a
plaintiff must have been entitled to some form of relief at the time suit was
filed. 42
 Thus, despite receiving a judicial determination that the defendant
unlawful employment practice. and order such affirmative action as may be
appropriate, which may include, but is not limited to, reinstatement or hir-
ing of employees, with or without back pay ... or any other equitable relief
as the court deems appropriate.
" 585 F.2d at 194, 18 FEP Cas. at 350.
2"
 Id. at 198, 18 FEP Cas. at 352.
3" Id. at 194, 18 FEP Cas. at 350.
31 Id.
32 515 F.2d 301, 10 FEP Cas. 239, untended in part, 10 FEP Gas. 1063 (6th Cir.
1975), vacated on other grounds, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
515 F.2d at 308-09, 10 FEP Cas, at 243-44.
34 585 F.2d at 194-95, 18 FEP Cas. at 350-51.
" 585 F.2d 192, 18 FEP Cas. at 348.
3" Id. at 197, 18 FEP Cas. at 351.
7214 (remarks of Senator Clark).
" See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 235-36 (1938).
39 585 F.2d at 197. 18 FEP Cas. at 351.
4" Id. at 197, 18 FEP Cas. at 352.
41 Id,
42 Id.
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had discriminated against her," Mrs. Harrington was not a prevailing party
because she was not entitled to any of the statutory remedies nor to an award
of damages."
The Sixth Circuit addressed two issues of law in Harrington: whether it is
appropriate to award compensatory damages in Title VII cases, and what a
plaintiff must establish to be a prevailing party for purposes of awarding at-
torney's fees. Both issues required the court to divine congressional purpose
in enacting various provisions of Title VII, and both required the court to
tread a fine line between encouraging meritorious suits and discouraging
meritricious suits in keeping with federal policy. The issue of awarding com-
pensatory damages is essentially a question relating to the judicial inference of
remedies from a federal statute—the "implication doctrine."45 While it is
unnecessary here to examine all of the niceties of this doctrine, the impact of
recent Supreme Court decisions on the implication of remedies in the
employment discrimination area is worth noting.
For purposes of implying private remedies, the Supreme Court distin-
guishes cases affecting civil rights" from cases concerning only economic
rights.47
 It is clear that this distinction does not form a perfect dichotomy
and that employment discrimination cases may often be in both categories.
While employment rights are certainly related to the economic area, the
stronger analogy is to the civil rights area since employment discrimination is
one of the most pernicious forms of impermissible discrimination under the
Civil Rights Act. 48
 Indeed, Congress was so concerned with this type of dis-
crimination that it included a separate title in the Act dealing explicitly with
such abuses. Thus, federal courts should be more willing to imply remedies
under Title VII than in cases concerned with purely economic matters.
Nevertheless, in defining a prevailing plaintiff in terms of available relief,
the Harrington court appears to have made a sound decision. The right to
some form of relief required by the Harrington court must be not only au-
thorized, but also must have existed at the time suit was brought. Both ele-
ments of this definition support the congressional policies behind Title VII of
encouraging plaintiffs of limited means to bring meritorious suits," deterring
parties from bringing suits without foundation, 58 and carrying out the correc-
tive aspects of the Act." If a suit is brought which proves discrimination but
for which no remedy can be fashioned under the statute, no corrective aspect
is served. Similarly, if a defendant has already ceased the discriminatory
practice and back wages are not sought, no corrective aspect is served by
43 Id .
44 Id.
45 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) for a discussion of this doctrine.
46 Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 99 S. Ct. 1946 (1979).
' Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 99 S. Ct. 2479 (1979). See also Trans-
america Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 100 S. Ct. 242 (1979).
48 See the remarks of Senator Humphrey cited in note 37 supra.
48 Christianburg, 434 U.S. at 418-19. See authorities cited at note 12 supra.
5 " 535 F.2d at 727, 13 FEP Cas. at 1525.
51
 See [1964] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 2401, 2516.
216	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 1 Vol. 21:85
bringing the suit. But if, as in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.," the defen-
dant alters its employment practices after suit is filed, and the suit had some
causal connection to the alteration, a plaintiff should be awarded attorney's
fees. A plaintiff in this situation would have a right to relief at the time suit
was brought and the corrective policy is fulfilled. Again, if the suit is settled
after filing, as in Parker v. Califano," not only is the definition of prevailing
plaintiff satisfied, but the congressional policies are fulfilled as well. Thus, the
Harrington court's definition of prevailing party synthesizes the earlier deci-
sions and, as a technical matter, seems to reach the right result. Those per-
sons being discriminated against and who have a right to relief at the time suit
is filed will receive the benefit of the statute, but those whose rights are no
longer being invaded at the time of filing will not receive the statutory ben-
efit.
While the technical merit of the Harrington decision is unassailable, a
question still exists regarding the denial of attorney's fees to persons who
prove discrimination yet. are not deemed to have been entitled to a remedy at
the time suit was brought. The Harrington court's definition focuses upon par-
ticular cases and does not consider the wider effect which denying attorney's
fees to those who merely prove discrimination may have upon persons decid-
ing to bring suits. The decision could well have a chilling effect on the interest
that potential plaintiffs seeking the more far-sighted remedies such as 'arious
forms of affirmative action will have in bringing suits. In short, the Harrington
decision adds a new uncertainty to the calculus of determining when and
which suits to bring. In addition to uncertainty over the likelihood of proving
discrimination, there is now uncertainty in determining the likelihood of at-
taining relief. The increased uncertainty surrounding an award of attorney's
fees could make plaintiffs less likely to bring these suits and attorneys less
likely to accept them from clients who cannot guarantee payment of fees.
These persons are precisely the persons the attorney's fee statute is designed
to benefit.
B. Damages
I. Punitive Damages and Damages for Pain and Suffering: Age Discrimination
Although the Age Discrimination in Employment. Act' (ADEA) clearly
provides relief for victims of age discrimination, 2
 federal courts have differed
22
 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). In Parham plaintiff was awarded attorney's
fees when the court held that his suit had been the catalyst in changing defendant's
employment policies. Id. at 429-30.
33
 561 F.2d 320, 333, 18 FEP Cas. 391, 401 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
' 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) and (c) (1976).
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over the availability under the Act of compensation for pain and suffering or
punitive damages." At the heart of this judicial controversy lies the proper
interpretation of the relief provisions contained in section 7(b) of the
ADEA. 4
 This section states that enforcement of the ADEA is to he sought in
accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures found in sections
211(b), 216, and 217 of the Fair Labor Standards Act' (FLSA), and that
amounts owing to victims of age discrimination shall be unpaid wages and
overtime, and, in cases of willful violations, liquidated damages." The section
also provides courts with jurisdiction to grant "such legal or equitable relief as
may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes of' this [Act], including without
limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or promotion
...." 7 Of' the three FLSA provisions incorporated into the ADEA, only sec-
See text and notes at 13-18 infra. The two cases discussed in this article
involved only the recovery of damages for pain and suffering. See text at notes 20-26
infra. However, although pain and suffering and punitive damages are, of course, dif-
ferent remedies, for the purposes of this analysis they shall be treated jointly. The
cases dealing with either both of the remedies or just one employ the sante type of
analysis for determining the availability of each under section 626 of the ADEA. See,
e.g., Riddle v. Getty Refining & Marketing Co., 460 F. Stipp. 678, 18 FEP Cas. 1072
(N D. Okla. 1978); Dean v. American Security Insurance Co., 559 F.2(1 1036, 15 FEP
Cas. 889 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). Presumably, a court's out-
come on one of the issues will be determinative of its outcome on the other.
4 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
5 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976). Congress did not graft. the entire FLSA en-
forcement scheme on to the A DEA, but rather, selectively incorporated some of the
provisions and adopted others with modification. For example, Congress expressly
provided fi - injunctive relief in suits by private litigants, although such relief had been
judicially denied under the FLSA. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 626(h) (1976) with Powell v.
Washington Post. Co., 267 F.2d 651 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Furthermore, although liquidated
damages are available under both schemes, under the ADEA, unlike the FLSA, they
are only awarded when the violation is willful. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976) with
29 U.S.C. §§ 216(b), 260 (1976), Finally, the ADEA expressly omitted the FLSA
penalty scheme in 29 U.S.C, § 216(a) (1976) in favor of its own separate one in 29
U.S.C. § 629 (1976).
" 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). That subsection specifically provides:
(b) The provisions of this chapter shall be enforced in accordance with the
powers, remedies, and procedures provided in sections 211(b), 216 (except
for subsection (a) thereof), and 217 of this title, and subsection (c) of this
section. Any act prohibited under section 623 of this title shall be deemed
to be a prohibited act under section 215 of this title. Amounts owing to a
person as a result of a violation of this chapter shall be deemed to be
unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation for purposes of
sections 216 and 217 of this title; Provided, that liquidated damages shall be
payable only in cases of willful violations of this chapter. In any action
brought to enforce this chapter the court shall have jurisdiction to grant
such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the pur-
poses of this chapter, including without limitation judgments compelling
employment, reinstatement or promotion, or enforcing the liability for
amounts deemed to he unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime com-
pensation under this section.
29 U.S.C. § 626(c) (1976) similarly provides in relevant part that: "Any person ag-
grieved may bring a civil action ... for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate
the purposes of this chapter ...."
7 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
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tion 216 is relevant to the issue of available remedies." Similar to section 7(b)
of the ADEA, section 216(b) of the FLSA provides that violators will be liable
to victims in the amount of unpaid compensation and liquidated damages.'
It. is unclear whether the broad statutory allowance of "legal" relief found
in subsection 7(b) includes the traditional legal remedies of punitive damages
and compensation for pain and suffering,'" or whether legal relief is limited
to the remedies specifically enumerated in section 7(b) of the ADEA and sec-
tion 216(b) of the FLSA." Thus, courts must decide whether to allow com-
pensatory damages beyond unpaid wages and overtime, or punitive damages
beyond the set amount of liquidated damages.'
During the Survey year, the First Circuit in Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines,
Inc." and the Fourth Circuit in Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute 14 considered
this question and decided that AREA claimants can recover only lost wages
and liquidated damages." In so doing, these circuit courts reached the same
29 U.S.C. § 216 (1976), Section 211 deals with the administrative aspects of
enforcement, and section 217 discusses injunctive proceedings by the administrative
agency. 29 U.S.C. §§ 211, 217 (1976),
29 U.S.C. § 216(h) (1976) provides in relevant part:
(h) Any employer who violates Ihe provision of section 206 or section 207
of this title shall be liable to the employee or employees affected in the
amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime com-
pensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liqui-
dated damages.
'" See generally D. Dosss, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES (1973).
" See notes 6 and 9 supra for full text of' the subsections.
12
 Liquidated damages are available to the ADEA claimant but only in cases of
willful violations of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976). The amount of liquidated dam-
ages available is limited to the amount of unpaid minimum wages or overtime com-
pensation due the age discrimination victim. Id.
13
 579 F.2d 107, 17 FEP Cas. 1116 (1st Cir. 1978).
14
 590 F.2d 1292, 18 FEP Cas. 1475 (4th Cir. 1979).
15 Vazquez, 579 F.2d at 111-12, 17 FEP Cas. at 1119; Stalin, 590 F.2d at 1296,
18 FEP Cas. at 1478. Also during the Survey year, the District. Court for the Northern
District of Oklahoma, in Riddle v. Getty Refining & Marketing Company, 460 F. Supp.
678, 18 FEP Cas. 1072 (N.D. Okla. 1978). faced with a complaint alleging wrongful
termination of employment in violation, inter alia, of the ADEA, concluded t.hat puni-
tive damages and damages for pain and suffering arc not available under the Act. Id.
at 680, 18 FEP Cas. at I 073. The Riddle court thereby endorsed the approach taken by
the majority of district courts. See, e.g. , Douglas v. American Cyanamid Co„ 472 F.
Supp. 298, 19 FEP Cas. 1671 (D.Conn. 1979); Quinn v. llowmar Publishing Co., 445
F. Supp. 780, 18 FEP Cas. 1468 (D. McI. 1978); Jaeger v. American Cyanamid Co., 442
F. Supp. 1270, 16 FEP Cas. 568 (FA). Wis. 1978); Catlett v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 454
F. Stipp. 358, 19 FEP Cas. 1664 (W.D. Mo. 1978); Ellis v. Philippine Airlines, 443 F.
Supp. 251, 17 FEP Cas. 67 (N.D. Cal. 1977); Travers v. Corning Glass Works, 76
F.R.D. 431, 15 FEP Cas. 584 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Rechsteiner v. Madison Fund, Inc., 75
F.R,D. 499, 15 FEP Cas. 216 (D. Del. 1977); Looney v. Commercial Union Assurance
Companies, 428 F. Supp. 533, 14 FEP Cas. 843 (E .D. Mich. 1977); Hannon v. Conti-
nental National Bank, 427 F. Supp. 215, 14 FEP Cas. 1364 (D. Colo. 1977); Postemski
v. Pratt Whitney Div., United Technologies Corp., 443 F. Supp. 101, 16 FEP Cas.
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practical result as did the Third 16 and Fifth Circuits," the only other circuit
courts previously to have considered this question. Nevertheless, the First Cir-
cuit in Vazquez, in holding that damages for pain and suffering may be found
appropriate in the future," took a narrower and more prudent stance than
the other three circuits.
This growing judicial trend to deny punitive or pain and suffering dam-
ages to victims of age discrimination greatly reduces the amount of relief
available under the ADEA. A close examination of the reasoning relied upon
in these decisions, however, reveals little support for the complete denial of
these forms of relief. As the Vazquez court found, the decision to disallow
these damages should rest ultimately upon the ability of federal courts to ef-
fectuate the underlying objectives of the ADEA without them.'" Federal
courts should not completely abandon any means for enforcing the ADEA
without a clear indication of congressional intent.
In Slatin v. Stanford Research Institute, 29 Harry Slatin alleged age discrimi-
nation in violation of the ADEA. 21 In his prayer for relief, Slatin requested
damages for "mental and physical pain and suffering." 22 The district court
denied a motion by the defendant to strike Slatin's request for pain and suf-
565 (D. Conn. 1977); Cobb v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 15 FEP Gas. 408 (N.D. Ga. 1977);
Fellows v. Medford Corp., 431 F. Supp. 199, 14 FEP Cas. 11513 (D. Or, 1977); Platt v.
Burroughs Corp., 424 F. Supp. 1329, 14 FEP Gas. 1057 (E.D. Pa. 197(3); Sant v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 621, 13 FEP Gas. 854 (N.D. Cal. 1976). Cf. Schlicke v.
Allen-Bradley Co., 448 F. Supp. 252, 17 FEP Cas. 394 (E.D. Wis. 1978) and Dorsey v.
Consolidated Broadcasting Corp., 432 F. Supp. 542. 16 FEP Cas. 231 (E.D. Wis. 1977)
(ADEA plaintiffs not entitled to damages for harm to reputation).
But see Morton v. Sheboygan Memorial Hospital, 458 F. Supp. 804, 18 FEP Cas.
525 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Kennedy v. Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 449
F. Supp. 1008, 17 FEP Cas. 616 (D. Colo. 1978); Buchholz v. Symons Mfg. Co., 445 F.
Supp. 706, 16 FEP Cas. 1084 (E.D. Wis. 1978); Coates v. National Cash Register Co.,
433 F. Supp. 655, 15 FEP Cas. 222 (W.D. Va. 1977) (now overruled by Stalin, 590 F.2d
1292, 18 FEP Cas. 1475 (4th Cir. 1979)); Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 419 F.
Supp. 1123, 13 FEP Gas. 1447 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd on rehearing, 432 F. Supp. 952, 15
FEI' Cas. 21 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Walker 1.. Pettit Consi•uction Co. Inc., 437 F. Supp. 730,
16 FEP Cas. 118 (D.S.C. 1977) (now overruled by Stalin); Combes v. Griffin Television,
Inc., 421 F. Supp. 841. 13 FEP Gas. 1455 (W.D. Okla. 1976); Murphy v. American
Motors Sales Corp., 410 F. Supp. 1403, 12 FEP Cas. 1090 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 570
F.2c1 1226, 17 FEP Cas. 180 (5th Cir. 1978); Dean v. American Security Ins. Co., 429
F. Supp. 3, 15 FEP Cas. 403 (N.D. Ga. 1976), rev'd, 559 F.2d 1036, 15 FEP Cas. 889
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & En-
gineering Co.,404 F. Supp. 324, 11 FEP Gas. 776 (D.N.J. 1975), rev'd, 550 F.2d 834, 14
FEP Cas. 518 (3rd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
"' Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834, 14 FEP Cas.
518 (3rd Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
17 Dean v. American Security Insurance Co„ 559 F.2d 1036, 15 FEP Cas. 889
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). See also Murphy v. American Motors
Sales Corp., 570 1.7 .2d 1226, 17 FEP Cas. 180 (5th Cir. 1978).
' 8 579 F.2d at 112, 17 FEP Cas. at 1119.
1" Id.
2" 590 F.2d 1292, 18 FEP Cas. 1475 (4th Cir. 1979).
21 Id. at 1293, 18 FEP Cas. at 1475.
22 Id.
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tering damages for being beyond the scope of the ADEA. 23 On interlocutory
appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's ruling and held that
pain and suffering damages are not recoverable against an employer under
the ADEA. 24
Similarly, the First Circuit in Vazquez v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., considered
whether damages for physical and mental suffering resulting from an
employer's age discrimination were available to an ADEA claimant. 25 On
interlocutory appeal, the First Circuit reversed the district court's order dis-
missing defendant's motion to strike the demand for physical and mental suf-
fering darnages. 26
 While disallowing the damages, the Vazquez court
nevertheless took a unique approach and did not permanently preclude the
recovery of damages for pain and suffering under the ADEA." Rather,
given the statutory emphasis on the FLSA enforcement scheme and concilia-
tion, and the fact that age discrimination is generally a product of mis-
conceptions rather than of invidious hostility, the court concluded that such
damages are not appropriate at this time. 28 The court, however, expressly
reserved the remedy in its judicial arsenal for the possibility that, at some
future date, such damages would become necessary to effectuate the goals of
the ADEA. 29
The Slatin and the Vazquez courts relied upon similar rationales, but ar-
rived at different conclusions as to their effect on the damages issue. Both
courts cited the 1978 Supreme Court decision of Lorillard v. Pons."" In Loril-
lard the Supreme Court considered whether ADEA litigants have a right. to a
jury trial in the absence of express statutory authorization:" In upholding
the plaintiff's right to a jury trial, the Lorillard Court repeatedly emphasized
the ADEA's partial adoption of the FLSA enforcement scheme." 2 The Court
found that Congress had deliberately incorporated select provisions of the
FLSA into the ADEA. 33 From this the Court presumed that Congress must
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1296, 18 FEP Cas. at 1478. Slatin's complaint also contained a demand
for a jury trial which defendant moved to strike. Id. at 1293, 18 FEP Cas. at 1475. The
Fourth Circuit denied this motion to strike, holding that the ADEA plaintiff's right to
a jury trial had been conclusively established by the Supreme Court in Lorillard v.
Pons, 434 U.S. 575 (1978), and by Congress' 1978 amendments to the ADEA, Age
Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 4(a),
92 Stat. 190, 191 (codified as 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2)). 590 F.2d at 1293, 1296, 18 FEP
Cas. at 1475-76, 1478.
25 579 F.2d 107, 108, 17 FEP Cas. 1116, 1116 (1st Cir. 1978).
2" Id. at 108, 17 FEP Cas. at 1116.
27 hi. at 112, 17 FEP Cas. at 1119.
28 Id. at 111-12, 17 FEP Cas. at 1119.
2" Id. at 112, 17 FEP Cas. at 1119.
M11 434 U.S. 573 (1978).
3 ' Id. at 575-76.
32 See, e.g., id. at 582.
33 Id. at 581-82.
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have been aware of previous judicial interpretations of these FLSA provisions
establishing the FLSA litigant's right to a jury trial, and concluded that Con-
gress must have intended to provide similar rights to ADEA litigants. 34
The Vazquez and Slatin courts both relied on the Lorillard reasoning in
presuming that Congress was also cognizant of the judicial interpretations
under the FLSA holding that only amounts owed by the employer and liqui-
dated damages—those forms of relief listed in the statute—were permitted
under the ELSA. 35
 The Stalin court, concluding that Congress must have
intended the same result under the ADEA, held that since pain and suffering
damages are not allowable under the FLSA, ADEA litigants similarly are
barred from requesting such relief. 36 Under this interpretation, the broad
statutory language of section 7(b) is in fact limited by the statutory inclusion
of the FLSA provisions. 37
In contrast, however, the Vazquez court, mindful of the statutory invita-
tion to courts to grant any necessary legal or equitable relief, pointed out that
while Congress knowingly adopted the enforcement scheme of the FLSA, the
ADEA also contains language which goes beyond the scope of the FLSA."
Reconciling this seeming contradiction, the Vazquez court held that the statute
dictates that ADEA remedies are to be fashioned with reference only to the
FLSA procedures unless those remedies fail to guarantee the effectuation of
the Act's broad purposes." The court concluded, therefore, that ADEA
courts should defer to, but not be forever limited by, the FLSA remedies."
34 Id. at 580-81.
35 Vazquez, 579 F.2d at 110, 17 FEP Cas. at 1117-18; Slatin, 590 F.2d at 1296,
18 FEP Cas. at 1478.
3" 590 F.2d at 1296, 18 FEP Cas. at 1478.
The district court in Riddle v. Getty Refining & Marketing Company, 460 F.
Stipp. 678. 680, 18 FEP Cas. 1072, 1073 (N.D. Okla. 1978) similarly relied upon the
reasoning in Lorillard (o deny pain and suffering and punitive damages to an ADEA
claimaint. See note 15 supra. The Riddle court found additional evidence of congres-
sional intent to deny punitive and compensatory damages to ADEA plaintiffs. In 1978,
Congress amended the ADEA to grant an AREA litigant the right to a jury trial. 460
F. Stipp. at 680, 18 FEP Cas. at 1073. The congressional conference report stated, inter
alia, that:
The ADEA as amended by this act does not provide remedies of a punitive
nature. The conferees therefore agree to permit a jury trial on the factual
issues underlying a claim for liquidated damages because the Supreme
Court has made clear that an award of liquidated damages under the
FLSA is not a penalty but rather is available in order to provide full com-
pensatory relief for losses that are 'too obscure and difficult of proof or
estimate other than by liquidated damages.'
Id. at 680, 18 FEP Cas. at 1073 citing H.R. REP. No. 950, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. Cone CONG. & An. NEws 528, 535. In the Riddle court's view,
this comment provided strong evidence of Congress' original intent in passing the
ADEA to disallow punitive damages. Id. at 680, 18 FEP Gas. at 1073. If the congres-
sional report was as dispositive as the Riddle court claimed it to be, however, the
Fourth Circuit certainly would have mentioned it in the Slatin decision which was de-
cided two months after Riddle.
3" 579 F.2d at 110-11, 17 FEP Cas. at 1118.
39 Id. at 112, 17 FEP Gas. at 1119.
4" Id.
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Following their respective discussions of the Lorillard case, the First and
Fourth Circuits went on to evaluate the utility of pain and suffering damages
in effectuating the purposes of the ADEA. In Vazquez, the First Circuit noted
that the discrimination against workers between the ages of fUrty and sixty-
five, which the ADEA was designed to correct, is the product of miscon-
ceptions about. the productivity of older employees and, therefore, can be dis-
tinguished from the invidious prejudices which are common in other forms of
discrimination.'" Both the Slatin and Vazquez courts noted that Congress, in
order to remedy these incorrect assumptions, had placed the statutory em-
phasis on educational efforts and voluntary compliance by the employers
rather than on "hard-fought lawsuits, with substantial compensatory damages
hanging in the balance." 42 Mindful of their responsibility to fashion rem-
edies which effectuate the legislative purpose, the Vazquez and Slatin courts
held that the statutory deference to conciliatory and educational efforts by the
Department of Labor, coupled with the limited FLSA enforcement scheme for
private litigants if administrative efforts fail, are, by themselves, adequate to
accomplish the statutory purpose of eradicating age-based prejudices and mis-
conceptions.a' Moreover, the Sty/in court found that this limited enforcement
and remedial scheme alone is sufficient to relieve any mental suffering of
victims of age discrimination.'"
It should be noted, however, that while the Stalin court relied on this
justification to permanently foreclose pain and suffering damages under the
ADEA, the Vazquez court narrowly held that the efforts of the Department of
Labor combined with the FLSA enforcement scheme are sufficient at this
time . 45 The Vazquez court left. open the possibility that at. some future date,
additional remedies would be necessary to guarantee the integrity of the
ADEA. 4 "
In addition to denying the need of pain and suffering damages, the
Fourth Circuit in Slatin endorsed the prior Finding of the Third and Fifth
Circuits that allowance of these damages would "frustrate rather than ... 'el-
4 ' Id. at 111-12, 17 FEP Cas. at 1110.
42 Id.; Stalin, 590 F.2d at 1295-06, 18 FEY Gas. at 1477. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b)
(1976) which provides, inter alia, that:
Before instituting any action under this section, the Secretary shall attempt
to eliminate the discriminatory practice or practices alleged, and to effect
voluntary compliance with the requirements of this chapter through in-
frmal methods of conciliation, conference and persuasion.
43
 Vazquez, 579 F.2d at 112, 17 FEI) Gas. at 1119, Slatin, 590 F.2d at 1296, 18
FEU' Gas. at 1477. See also Dean v. American Security insurance Co., 559 F.2d 1036,
1038-39, 15 FEP Gas. 889, 890-91 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978);
Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834, 841, 14 FEP Cas. 518,
523-24 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978).
44 Slatin, 590 F.2d at 1295-96, 18 FEP Cas. at 1477. Accord, Rogers v. Exxon
Research & Engineering Co., 550 F.2d 834, 840, 14 FEP Cas. 518, 522-23 (3d Gin
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022 (1978). Contra, Bertrand v. Orkin Exterminating Co.,
432 F. Stipp. 952, 954, 15 FEP Gas. 21, 22-23 (N.D. III. 1977).
45
 Vazquez, 579 F.2d at 112, 17 FE!' Cas, at 1119.
4" Id.
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fectuate the purposes' of the Act." 47
 In support of this contention, the Slatin
court found that the provisions of such relief, in the absence of specific
statutory guidelines, would inject an element of uncertainty into the con-
ciliation process." In addition, the availability of pain and suffering damages
would simulataneously jeopardize the efficacy of the administrative proceed-
ings and increase the likelihood of litigation by discouraging claimants from
accepting conciliation agreements which only compensate victims for out-of-
pocket losses. 4 " Thus, the Slatin court concluded that pain and suffering
damages are inconsistent with and would actually undermine the ADEA en-
forcement scheme.
The Vazquez court, although agreeing that these damages are unnecessary
to effectuate the purposes of the ADEA, specifically challenged this notion
that to allow them would undermine the conciliation process. 5 " The court
claimed that, in fad, they might strengthen the administrative process since
currently an employer, aware that the most he stands to lose in private litiga-
tion was out-of-pocket losses, might he less inclined to compromise at the con-
ciliation stage. 5 ' Moreover, in questioning this rationale of limiting remedies
in order to encourage conciliation, the court pointed to the current 32% suc-
cess rate of the conciliation process, and to the very limited compliance effort
by the Department of Labor due to its limited resources." Despite its doubts
about the efficacy of the conciliation process, however, the Vazquez court con-
cluded that, at least for the present, deference should he paid to the con-
gressional emphasis on pursuing voluntary compliance.'
It is submitted that the statutory language and the legislative history are
ambiguous with respect to the availability of these damages under the ADEA.
The language of the ADEA relief provision in section 7(b) simultaneously
provides for enforcement in accordance with the FLSA and for the granting
of any appropriate legal and equitable relief. 54 These seemingly contradic-
tory provisions create a statute which is unclear on its face.
" Slatin, 590 F.2d at 1296, 18 FEP Cas. at. 1477-78. See Dean v. American
Security Insurance Co., 559 F.2(1 1036, 1039, 15 FEP Cas. 889, 890-91 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978); Rogers v. Exxon Research & Engineering Co., 550
F.2d 834, 840, 14 FEP Cas. 518, 522-23 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1022
(1978).
411
 Slatin, 590 F.2d at 1296, 18 FEP Cas. at 1477-78.
49 Id., 18 FEP Cas. at 1478.
'" Vazquez, 579 F.2d at lit, 17 FEP Cas. at 1118. The District Court for
Northern Illinois, allowing these damages, also directly attacked the Slatin court's con-
tention that such an award would undercut the conciliation process. Bertrand v. Orkin
Exterminating Co., 432 F. Supp. 952, 954-55, 15 FEP Cas. 21, 23 (N.D. 111. 1977). The
Bertrand court noted that this contention was predicated upon a judicial fear of abuse
by emotional juries or by greedy plaintiffs who have unrealistic expectations or plan to
use the threat of excessive verdicts for bargaining leverage. Id. The court reasoned,
however, that these fears were unfounded because of such existing safeguards as jury
instructions and a court's power to reject excessive awards, and that, in any event,
these fears did not outweigh the injustice of leaving the injury without an adequate
remedy. Id.
51
 579 F.2d at 111, 17 FEP Cas. at 1118.
52
 Id. at 111 & n.4, 17 FEP Cas. at 1118 & n.4.
5" Id. at 111-12, 17 FEP Cas. at 1118-19.
54 See note 6 supra for full text of 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (1976).
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The legislative history, like the statutory language, falls short of establish-
ing clear evidence of Congress' intent. The inferences drawn by the Lorillard
Court concerning legislative intent do not present a definitive basis for deny-
ing these damages. It is tenuous to assume that the Supreme Court intended
to resolve the important issue of the measure of a plaintiff's damages in mere
dicta. Moreover, the Lorillard rationale of imputing to Congress knowledge of
previous judicial interpretations of FLSA fails to address the statutory lan-
guage empowering courts to fashion any appropriate legal or equitable rem-
edy.
The proper significance of Lorillard, moreover, is in dispute. Because of
its ambiguity, the case has been used by courts to strengthen the arguments
on both sides of the damages issue. A district court in Colorado, for example,
pointed out that the Supreme Court in Lorillard emphasized that the term
"legal relief" as used in the ADEA was intended to have its well-known com-
mon law meaning. 55
 Applying this reasoning, the district court found that
this meaning includes not only the right to a jury trial, as was determined by
the Lorillard Court, but also the right to punitive and pain and suffering dam-
ages which have been established as legal remedies.'" This use of the Loril-
lard decision is certainly as convincing as that espoused by the Stalin and Vaz-
quez courts."
Given this ambiguity within legislative history and statutory language, the
most sensible approach toward resolving the dilemma was adopted by the
First Circuit in Vazquez. The First Circuit recognized in the statute congres-
sional intent that courts defer to the compliance and educational efforts of the
Department of Labor and the FLSA enforcement scheme.'" Yet, the court
also read the broad statutory language as directing courts to ensure that these
procedures are sufficient to guarantee the integrity of the ADEA.'`' If they
are found to be inadequate, the procedures should be supplemented with
further legal and equitable relief, such as punitive or psychological dam-
ages."0
 The court held:
While we find that the statutory language, coupled with congres-
sional purpose, indicates the correctness of limiting damages to those
provided by the FLSA, we do not suggest permanently foreclosing
remedies which might prove essential to guarantee the integrity of
the statute. It may be at some future date it will be shown that with-
out a damage remedy the purposes of the Act cannot be realized.
We are not, however, faced with that situation today. [footnote omit-
ted]."
55
 Kennedy v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co., 449 F. Stipp.
1008, 1010-11, 17 FEP Cas. 616, 617-18 (D. Colo. 1978).
5" Id.
57
 See text and notes at 36-41 supra.
5"
 579 F.2c1 at 112, 17 FEP Cas. at 1119.
5" Id.
fia
"' Id. With respect to its holding, the Vazquez court made an interesting and
apt analogy to the fact that a private remedy under section 27 of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa, was first inferred thirty years after the Act's
passage in the case of Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). 579 F.2d at 112 ri.6,
17 FEP Cas. at 1119 n.6.
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This reasoning reflects an admirable degree of judicial resraint and wis-
dom. The court exercised prudence in not rushing to provide these remedies
at this time. After an examination of the efficacy of the conciliatory activities
and FLSA remedies, it decided that the congressional purpose of educating
rather than punishing violators was best served by disallowing additional re-
lief. Furthermore, a decision to grant such damages cannot be reversed easily.
If, however, the emphasis is placed on conciliation and out-of-pocket losses
and, at a later date, greater damages prove to be necessary to effectuate the
goals of the ADEA, they can be granted at that time.
The Vazquez court also exercised forethought in retaining its option to
provide additional remedies at a later date. It is conceivable that punitive or
pain and suffering damages will become necessary to effectuate the purposes
of the ADEA. Such action might be required if long-term statistics reveal that
conciliation efforts are mostly unsuccessful and tend to discourage would be
claimaints, or if an employer has a history of invidious hostility towards older
employees. At that point, effectuating the purposes of the ADEA would re-
quire a rethinking of Congress' underlying assumptions about mere ignorance
being the source of age discrimination, and additional damages would become
appropriate.
From the foregoing discussion, the wisdom and prudence displayed by
the First Circuit in Vazquez becomes apparent. The court was most alert to its
duty to construe the ADEA so as to make effective the congressional purpose.
Accordingly, a similarly tempered approach is suggested for the remaining
circuits which have not yet had the opportunity to rule on this issue.
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Weekly review and analysis of current
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REPORT
Supplies you with weekly coverage of U.S.
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troller General, Renegotiation Board,
Courts of Claims, Tax Court, and other
courts and agencies; plus federal legisla-
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TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT
JOURNAL
Gives you weekly notification, analysis,
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right Office opinions, statements, and
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